XMPP M. Miller
Internet-Draft Cisco Systems, Inc.
Intended status: Standards Track C. Wallace
Expires: January 5, 2015 Red Hound Software, Inc.
July 4, 2014
End-to-End Object Encryption and Signatures for the Extensible Messaging
and Presence Protocol (XMPP)
draft-miller-xmpp-e2e-07
Abstract
This document defines two methods for securing objects (often
referred to as stanzas) for the Extensible Messaging and Presence
Protocol (XMPP), which allows for efficient asynchronous
communication between two entities, each with might have multiple
devices operating simultaneously. One is a method to encrypt stanzas
to provide confidentiality protection; another is a method to sign
stanzas to provide authentication and integrity protection. This
document also defines a related protocol for entities to request the
ephemeral session keys in use.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 5, 2015.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
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described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Changes to existing clients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. End-point procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. End-point state . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Key distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Key table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.1. Determining Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.2. Encrypting XMPP Stanzas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.2.1. Prerequisites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.2.2. Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.3. Decrypting XMPP Stanzas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.3.1. Protocol Not Understood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.3.2. Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.3.3. Insufficient Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.3.4. Failed Decryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.3.5. Timestamp Not Acceptable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.3.6. Successful Decryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.4. Example - Securing a Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7. Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
7.1. Determining Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
7.2. Signing XMPP Stanzas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7.2.1. Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7.3. Verifying Signed XMPP Stanzas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
7.3.1. Protocol Not Understood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
7.3.2. Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
7.3.3. Insufficient Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
7.3.4. Failed Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
7.3.5. Timestamp Not Acceptable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
7.3.6. Successful Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
7.4. Example - Signing a Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
8. Requesting Session Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
8.1. Request Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
8.2. Accept Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
8.3. Error Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
8.4. Example of Successful Key Request . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
9. Mulitple Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
10. Inclusion and Checking of Timestamps . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
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11. Interaction with Stanza Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
12. Interaction with Offline Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
13. Mandatory-to-Implement Cryptographic Algorithms . . . . . . . 40
14. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
14.1. Storage of Encrypted Stanzas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
14.2. Re-use of Session Master Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
15. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
15.1. XML Namespaces Name for e2e Data in XMPP . . . . . . . . 41
16. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
16.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
16.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Appendix A. Schema for urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6 . . . . 43
Appendix B. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
1. Introduction
End-to-end protection and authentication of traffic sent over the
Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol [RFC6120] is a desirable
goal. Requirements and a threat analysis for XMPP encryption are
provided in [E2E-REQ]. Many possible approaches to meet those (or
similar) requirements have been proposed over the years, including
methods based on PGP, S/MIME, SIGMA, and TLS.
Most proposals have not been able to support multiple end-points for
a given recipient. As more devices support XMPP, it becomes more
desirable to allow an entity to communicate with another in a more
secure manner, regardless of the number of agents the entity is
employing. This document specifies an approach for encrypting and
signing communications between two entities which each might have
multiple end-points.
A primary challenge with supporting multiple end-points is key
distribution. This is complicated by the fact that some end points
for a given recipient may share keys, some may use different keys,
some may have no keys and some may not support encryption or
signature verification at all. To address these differences, this
specification defines a symmetric key table that is managed via three
mechanisms that enable a key to be pushed to an end point, to be
pulled from an originator or negotiated. The key table contains
named master keys along with meta data describing usage of the key.
Encrypted XMPP messages use a named master key to encrypt a content
encryption key. Prior to decrypting a message, recipients of an
encrypted message will either find the named key present in their key
table (as the result of an earlier operation) or obtain the key from
the sender.
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Comments are solicited and should be addressed to XMPP mailing list.
Information about the XMPP mailing list can be found here:
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/xmpp.
2. Terminology
This document inherits XMPP-related terminology from [RFC6120], JSON
Web Algorithms (JWA)-related terminology from [JOSE-JWA], JSON Web
Encryption (JWE)-related terminology from [JOSE-JWE], and JSON Web
Key (JWK)-related terminology from [JOSE-JWK]. Security-related
terms are to be understood in the sense defined in [RFC4949].
The capitalized key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL",
"SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC2119].
3. Changes to existing clients
3.1. End-point procedures
Existing XMPP clients will need to implement some new procedures in
order to support end-to-end encryption and authentication. Changes
for sending clients include:
o Generating session master keys (SMKs)
o Storing SMKs for use during active sessions
o Storing SMKs to provide to peers and to support reading of saved
messages (may require use of storage key)
o Accepting requests for SMKs
o Releasing SMKs to authorized requestors (where requests may be
received from multiple different resources associated with a
single peer with each resource using a different means to
authenticate)
o Generating content encryption keys (CEK)
o Using SMK and CEK values to encrypt XMPP stanzas
o Generating a signing key (optional)
o Using a signing key to sign XMPP stanzas
o Generating and using a long term storage key (optional)
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Changes for receiving clients include:
o Sending requests for SMKs to peers
o Accepting public key to use when encrypting an SMK from peers
o Storing SMKs for use when decrypting XMPP stanzas during active
session
o Using an SMK to decrypt a CEK used to decrypt XMPP stanzas
o Storing SMKs retrieved from peers to support reading of saved
messages (may require use of storage key)
o Providing indication to users when encryption is in use
o Retrieving keys required to verify signatures on signed XMPP
stanzas
o Verifying signatures and displaying indication of success/failure
to user
o Storing keys required to verify signature to support reading of
saved messages (may require use of storage key)
o Generating and using a long term storage key (optional)
3.2. End-point state
End points utilizing end-to-end encryption and signatures are
required to maintain some new state information, and may find some
additional information helpful to maintain. New state information
includes:
o Session master key table (required)
o Public/private key store (required)
o Trust anchor store (optional)
o Intermediate certification authority (CA) store (optional)
o Long-term storage key (optional)
Session master keys (SMKs) are used to encrypt XMPP stanzas. An end-
point may have many active SMKs at any given point in time, but only
one SMK active per bare JID (TODO: or should this be per full JID?).
Each SMK has a name generated by the entity who generated the key.
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The name MUST be unique from the generator's perspective (i.e., full
JID + SMK name MUST uniquely identify a specific SMK). When a new
SMK is received, any previous SMK stored for the full JID of the
entity providing the SMK may be destroyed. Alternatively, previous
SMKs may be preserved to support future decryption of stored
messages. This specification places no requirements on handling of
stored messages. Clients may re-encrypt messages under a long-term
storage key, store messages as-is encrypted using an SMK or store
plaintext messages.
Each end-point must have at least one public/private key pair used
for SMK distribution.
A trust anchor store or intermediate CA store may be useful to
support automated release of encrypted SMKs or to verify signed XMPP
stanzas.
A long-term storage key may be used to either encrypt data stored in
the key table or to re-encrypt encrypted messages prior to storing
the message for future review.
4. Key distribution
Several different types of keys are used to support end-to-end
encryption and signatures. These keys may be distinct from any keys
used to authenticate to XMPP servers and include the following:
o Session master key (SMK)
o Content encryption keys (CEKs) for XMPP stanzas
o Public/private key pair for SMK distribution
o Content encryption keys for SMK distribution
o Public/private key pair for signature generation
o Trust anchor and intermediate certification authority (CA) public
keys
o Long-term storage key
SMKs are symmetric keys generated by an end-point prior to utilizing
end-to-end encryption (see Section 6.2.1). SMKs are used to encrypt
the CEK used to encrypt an XMPP stanza. SMKs are stored in the SMK
table and may be distributed using one of the following mechanisms:
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o Manually pre-placed at some point prior to using end-to-end
encryption
o Released to an end-point upon request after receiving an encrypted
XMPP stanza
o Provided to an end-point using an IQ stanza sent prior to sending
encrypted XMPP stanzas
CEKs for XMPP stanzas are symmetric keys generated by an end-point to
encrypt an XMPP stanza (see item 5 in Section 6.2.2). CEKs are
encrypted using the SMK and included with encrypted XMPP data.
Public/private key pairs for SMK distribution are asymmetric keys
that may be generated by an end point, imported into an end point or
used via a hardware cryptographic module. The public key is
distributed to XMPP peers for use when distributing SMKs (see step 1
in Section 8.1). The public key is formatted as a JWK, which may
include an X.509 certificate. An end-point MUST establish trust in a
public key prior to releasing an SMK value. Trust establishment
mechanisms include checking a key thumbprint provided via a trusted
channel or by validating an X.509 certificate to a trust anchor. The
public keys may be distributed using one of the following mechanisms:
o Manually pre-placed prior to using for SMK release (details for
manual pre-placement are not defined by this specification)
o Presented when requesting an SMK from a peer after receiving an
encrypted XMPP stanza from the peer (the peer may store the public
key for use in providing future encrypted SMK values prior to
using the SMK to encrypt XMPP stanzas see Section 8.1)
o Provided upon request in response to an IQ get request in
preparation for receiving encrypted XMPP stanzas (TODO: define IQ
for pushing SMK)
CEKs for SMK distribution are symmetric keys generated by an end-
point to encrypt an SMK (see item 3 in Section 8.2). CEKs are
encrypted using the public key used for SMK distribution and included
with encrypted SMK data.
Public/private key pairs for SMK distribution are asymmetric keys
that may be generated by an end point, imported into an end point or
used via a hardware cryptographic module (see bullet 4 of section 5.1
in [JOSE-JWE]). The public key is distributed to XMPP peers for use
when verifying signatures. Trust establishment may be performed by
checking a key thumbprint provided via a trusted channel or by
validating an X.509 certificate to a trust anchor.
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Trust anchor and intermediate CA public keys may be used to validate
X.509 certificates in support of SMK release or verification of
signatures on signed XMPP stanzas.
A long-term storage key may be used to encrypt information stored in
the key table or to re-encrypt encrypted messages prior to storing
the message for future review. The long-term storage key may be a
public/private key pair or a symmetric key.
5. Key table
The conceptual database for long-lived cryptographic keys described
in [Key-Table] may be suitable for use in storing the SMKs described
above for use in supporting end-to-end XMPP encryption. The columns
that the table consists of are listed as follows:
TODO: figure out whether to read time values from JWKs. If so,
augment section 8.2.
AdminKeyName: The AdminKeyName field contains a human-readable
string meant to identify the key for the user. Implementations
can use this field to uniquely identify rows in the key table.
The same string can be used on the local system and peer
systems, but this is not required.
LocalKeyName: The LocalKeyName field contains a string identifying
the key. It can be used to retrieve the key in the local
database when received in a message. For SMKs, this is the
value of the 'id' attribute value of the element (see
Section 6.3).
PeerKeyName: PeerKeyName is not used as the name is the same at each
end point.
Peers: This field lists the full JID of each peer systems that has
this key in their database. The peer name is read from the
'from' attribute of the wrapping stanza (see Section 6.3).
Interfaces: This field is not used and must be set to "all".
Protocol: The Protocol field identifies XMPP the protocol where this
key may be used to provide cryptographic protection. (TODO:
registry entry for the protocol?)
ProtocolSpecificInfo: This field is not used and must be be empty.
KDF: The KDF field is not used and must be set to "none". (TODO:
define a use for this field?)
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AlgID: The AlgID field indicates which cryptographic algorithm to be
used with the security protocol for the specified peer or
peers. Such an algorithm can be an encryption algorithm and
mode (e.g., AES-128-CBC), an authentication algorithm (e.g.,
HMAC-SHA1-96 or AES-128-CMAC), or any other symmetric
cryptographic algorithm needed by a security protocol. (TODO:
identify source for algorithm strings)
Key: The Key field contains a long-lived symmetric cryptographic key
in the format of a lower-case hexadecimal string. The size of
the Key depends on the KDF and the AlgID. For instance, a
KDF=none and AlgID=AES128 requires a 128-bit key, which is
represented by 32 hexadecimal digits.
Direction: The Direction field indicates whether this key may be
used for inbound traffic, outbound traffic, both, or whether
the key has been disabled and may not currently be used at all.
The supported values are "in", "out", "both", and "disabled",
respectively.
SendLifetimeStart: The SendLifetimeStart field specifies the
earliest date and time in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) at
which this key should be considered for use when sending
traffic. The format is YYYYMMDDHHSSZ, where four digits
specify the year, two digits specify the month, two digits
specify the day, two digits specify the hour, two digits
specify the minute, and two digits specify the second. The "Z"
is included as a clear indication that the time is in UTC.
SendLifeTimeEnd: The SendLifeTimeEnd field specifies the latest date
and time at which this key should be considered for use when
sending traffic. The format is the same as the
SendLifetimeStart field.
AcceptLifeTimeStart: The AcceptLifeTimeStart field specifies the
earliest date and time in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) at
which this key should be considered for use when processing
received traffic. The format is YYYYMMDDHHSSZ, where four
digits specify the year, two digits specify the month, two
digits specify the day, two digits specify the hour, two digits
specify the minute, and two digits specify the second. The "Z"
is included as a clear indication that the time is in UTC.
AcceptLifeTimeEnd: The AcceptLifeTimeEnd field specifies the latest
date and time at which this key should be considered for use
when processing the received traffic. The format of this field
is identical to the format of AcceptLifeTimeStart.
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6. Encryption
6.1. Determining Support
If an agent supports receiving end-to-end object encryption, it MUST
advertise that fact in its responses to [XEP-0030] information
("disco#info") requests by returning a feature of
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6:encryption".
...
...
To facilitate discovery, an agent SHOULD also include [XEP-0115]
information in any directed or broadcast presence updates.
6.2. Encrypting XMPP Stanzas
The process that a sending agent follows for securing stanzas is the
same regardless of the form of stanza (i.e., , , or
).
6.2.1. Prerequisites
First, the sending agent prepares and retains the following:
o The JID of the sender (i.e. its own JID). This SHOULD be the bare
JID (localpart@domainpart).
o The JID of the recipient. This SHOULD be the bare JID
(localpart@domainpart).
o A Session Master Key (SMK). The SMK MUST have a length at least
equal to that required by the key wrapping algorithm in use and
MUST be generated randomly. See [RFC4086] for considerations on
generating random values.
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o A SMK identifier (SID). The SID MUST be unique for a given
(sender, recipient, SMK) tuple, and MUST NOT be derived from SMK
itself.
6.2.2. Process
For a given plaintext stanza (S), the sending agent performs the
following:
1. Ensures the plaintext stanza is fully qualified, including the
proper namespace declarations (e.g., contains the attribute
'xmlns' set to the value "jabber:client" for 'jabber:client'
stanzas defined in [RFC6120]).
2. Notes the current UTC date and time (N) when this stanza is
constructed, formatted as described under Section 10.
3. Constructs a forwarding envelope (M) using a element
qualified by the "urn:xmpp:forward:0" namespace (as defined in
[XEP-0297]) as follows:
* The child element qualified by the "urn:xmpp:delay"
namespace (as defined in [XEP-0203]) with the attribute
'stamp' set to the UTC date and time value N
* The plaintext stanza S
4. Converts the forwarding envelope (M) to a UTF-8 encoded string
(M'), optionally removing line breaks and other insignificant
whitespace between elements and attributes, i.e. M' =
UTF8-encode(M). We call M' a "stanza-string" because for
purposes of encryption and decryption it is treated not as XML
but as an opaque string (this avoids the need for complex
canonicalization of the XML input).
5. Generates a Content Master Key (CMK). The CMK MUST have a length
at least equal to that required by the content encryption
algorithm in use and MUST be generated randomly. See [RFC4086]
for considerations on generating random values.
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6. Generates any additional unprotected block cipher factors (IV);
e.g., initialization vector/nonce. A sending agent MUST ensure
that no two sets of factors are used with the same CMK, and
SHOULD NOT reuse such factors for other stanzas.
7. Performs the message encryption steps from [JOSE-JWE] to generate
the JWE Header (H), JWE Encrypted Key (E), JWE Ciphertext (C),
and JWE Integrity Value (I); using the following inputs:
* The 'alg' property is set to an appropriate key wrapping
algorithm (e.g., "A256KW" or "A128KW"); recipients use the key
request process in Section 8 to obtain the SMK.
* The 'enc' property is set to the intended content encryption
algorithm.
* SMK as the key for CMK Encryption.
* CMK as the JWE Content Master Key.
* IV as the JWE Initialization Vector.
* M' as the plaintext content to encrypt.
8. Constructs an element qualified by the
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6" namespace as follows:
* The attribute 'type' set to the value "enc".
* The attribute 'id' set to the identifier value SID.
* The child element qualified by the
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6" namespace and with XML
character data as H, encoded base64url as per [RFC4648].
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* The child element qualified by the
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6" namespace and with XML
character as E, encoded base64url as per [RFC4648].
* The child element qualified by the
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6" namespace and with XML
character as IV, encoded base64url as per [RFC4648].
* The child element qualified by the
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6" namespace and with XML
character data as C, encoded base64url as per [RFC4648].
* The child element qualified by the
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6" namespace and with XML
character data as I, encoded base64url as per [RFC4648].
9. Sends the element as the payload of a stanza that SHOULD
match the stanza from step 1 in kind (e.g., ), type
(e.g., "chat"), and addressing (e.g., to="romeo@montague.net"
from="juliet@capulet.net/balcony"). If the original stanza (S)
has a value for the 'id' attribute, this stanza MUST NOT use the
same value for its 'id' attribute.
6.3. Decrypting XMPP Stanzas
6.3.1. Protocol Not Understood
If the receiving agent does not understand the protocol, it MUST do
one and only one of the following: (1) ignore the extension,
(2) ignore the entire stanza, or (3) return a
error to the sender, as described in [RFC6120].
NOTE: If the inbound stanza is an , the receiving agent MUST
return an error to the sending agent, to comply with the exchanging
of IQ stanzas in [RFC6121].
6.3.2. Process
Upon receipt of an encrypted stanza, the receiving agent performs the
following:
1. Determines if a valid SMK is available, associated with the SID
specified by the 'id' attribute value of the element and
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the sending agent JID specified by the 'from' attribute of the
wrapping stanza. If the receiving agent does not already have
the SMK, it requests it according to Section 8.
2. Performs the message decryption steps from [JOSE-JWE] to generate
the plaintext forwarding envelope string M', using the following
inputs:
* The JWE Header (H) from the element's character
data content.
* The JWE Encrypted Key (E) from the element's character
data content.
* The JWE Initialization Vector/Nonce (I) from the
element's character data content.
* The JWE Ciphertext (C) from the element's character
data content.
* The JWE Integrity Value (I) from the element's
character data content.
3. Converts the forwarding envelope UTF-8 encoded string M' into XML
element (M).
4. Obtains the UTC date and time (N) from the child
element, and verifies it is within the accepted range, as
specified in Section 10.
5. Obtains the plaintext stanza (S), which is a child element node
of M; the stanza MUST be fully qualified with proper namespace
declarations for XMPP stanzas, to help distinguish it from other
content within M.
.
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6.3.3. Insufficient Information
At step 1, if the receiving agent is unable to obtain the CMK, or the
receiving agent could not otherwise determine the additional
information, it MAY return a error to the sending
agent (as described in [RFC6120]), optionally supplemented by an
application-specific error condition element of :
[XML character data]
[XML character data]
[XML character data]
[XML character data]
[XML character data]
In addition to returning an error, the receiving agent SHOULD NOT
present the stanza to the intended recipient (human or application)
and SHOULD provide some explicit alternate processing of the stanza
(which MAY be to display a message informing the recipient that it
has received a stanza that cannot be decrypted).
6.3.4. Failed Decryption
At step 2, if the receiving agent is unable to successfully decrypt
the stanza, the receiving agent SHOULD return a error
to the sending agent (as described in [RFC6120]), optionally
supplemented by an application-specific error condition element of
(previously defined in [RFC3923]):
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[XML character data]
[XML character data]
[XML character data]
[XML character data]
[XML character data]
In addition to returning an error, the receiving agent SHOULD NOT
present the stanza to the intended recipient (human or application)
and SHOULD provide some explicit alternate processing of the stanza
(which MAY be to display a message informing the recipient that it
has received a stanza that cannot be decrypted).
6.3.5. Timestamp Not Acceptable
At step 4, if the stanza is successfully decrypted but the timestamp
fails the checks outlined in Section 10, the receiving agent MAY
return a error to the sender (as described in
[RFC6120]), optionally supplemented by an application-specific error
condition element of (previously defined in
[RFC3923]):
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[XML character data]
[XML character data]
[XML character data]
[XML character data]
[XML character data]
6.3.6. Successful Decryption
If the receiving agent successfully decrypted the payload, it MUST
NOT return a stanza error.
If the payload is an of type "get" or "set", and the response
to this is of type "error", the receiving agent MUST send the
encrypted response wrapped in an of type "result", to prevent
exposing information about the payload.
6.4. Example - Securing a Message
NOTE: unless otherwise indicated, all line breaks are included for
readability.
The sending agent begins with the plaintext version of the
stanza 'S':
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35740be5-b5a4-4c4e-962a-a03b14ed92f4
But to be frank, and give it thee again.
And yet I wish but for the thing I have.
My bounty is as boundless as the sea,
My love as deep; the more I give to thee,
The more I have, for both are infinite.
and the following prerequisites:
o Sender JID as "juliet@capulet.lit/balcony"
o Recipient JID as "romeo@montegue.lit"
o Session Master Key (SMK) as (base64 encoded)
"xWtdjhYsH4Va_9SfYSefsJfZu03m5RrbXo_UavxxeU8"
o SMK identifier (SID) as "835c92a8-94cd-4e96-b3f3-b2e75a438f92"
The sending agent performs steps 1, 2, and 3 from Section 6.2.2 to
generate the envelope:
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35740be5-b5a4-4c4e-962a-a03b14ed92f4
But to be frank, and give it thee again.
And yet I wish but for the thing I have.
My bounty is as boundless as the sea,
My love as deep; the more I give to thee,
The more I have, for both are infinite.
Then the sending agent performs steps 4 through 7 (with Content
Master Key as "LViSXX0Jx-I3v1zY1-KcGeivmWKuq0QE_71ywQGU6OhlM2NoQo1zHi
77zI3ieIUh7Wb1S3kXmNily0_FZoIG7A", base64url encoded) to generate the
[JOSE-JWE] outputs:
JWE Header
{
"alg":"A256KW",
"enc":"A256CBC+HS512",
"kid":"835c92a8-94cd-4e96-b3f3-b2e75a438f92"
}
JWE Encrypted Key
2tsmGH-WQdBxxJEs3d6LB2ovK6e1_9C1ogizJ9c6OvLmC6IeilHZ2Mimq2AElgI
ploz0VQv5LOH9ST93WvvhVzMHSfx0Cwl0
JWE Initialization Vector
ncOH4MsHT9HlJxnirx4qwg
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JWE Ciphertext
FkFc4xGTVkjn7ojtS0SUY8IWfqsQKEIAlvLaBKieqVX1PAlq1ZjPp4TZC2I2eh7
01Lef3iRuNZd1nlgP2aREyHYCpE3FAelUoVG90B1FrJMnDUKAka7eb6GImamWPf
9onV-m5-GcUpejO9f1oPi-rwHzp475UPdAeKq5Z4zds8yXhQP-XyJbCPTtM-UQC
2-_q-3EKBHC4jM3qWDxVJ0JbIif3fCVRowzJh4AOB84YrfvkgUjMItqQPg2H6QB
NqGUspLI634lM8R-mhGciDZX2Jh_nKoXLAf5GCnvL9PlI7OdFqocPBIIPpjNrgX
_Z4PFjeq7ILx98GhVkryLYU9HVOFPCYci-lF9nfw1geliLfkoj5QZyi4J2SOtYa
O_zPmQvCXaUREqPf5UDAlgvc50a4ByYnNbkWSbhZ5Z388s8ELzPSE9XypdgP-1c
SyRke7V8iGe4eHNsm01TgWILYOFK4mYAM52OTitJxmQtmRp6izY5ZFdH9f_WdoB
1RXmGEZydvL-estcjx5ghsV3gktedIl0HA4R_M_N5TFIwv7hiisyRLi2aQtyFbE
7pZ6Oz-cYsLc4qFfXbb13U9a2-Byul8hm_E2b3m4GMhmsCiROm-uht9Ek4h9BIx
FhDKPr-htOXc93-uQNZlAQfkITAKlJfQ
JWE Integrity Value
Aj8lKdPMDE4U82UAhDJBaRrl3USmuzS2hfFOe_OBEv8
Then the sending agent performs steps 8 and 9, and sends the
following:
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eyJhbGciOiJBMjU2S1ciLCJlbmMiOiJBMjU2Q0JDK0hTNTEyIiwia2lkI
joiODM1YzkyYTgtOTRjZC00ZTk2LWIzZjMtYjJlNzVhNDM4ZjkyIn0
2tsmGH-WQdBxxJEs3d6LB2ovK6e1_9C1ogizJ9c6OvLmC6IeilHZ2Mimq
2AElgIploz0VQv5LOH9ST93WvvhVzMHSfx0Cwl0
ncOH4MsHT9HlJxnirx4qwg
FkFc4xGTVkjn7ojtS0SUY8IWfqsQKEIAlvLaBKieqVX1PAlq1ZjPp4TZC
2I2eh701Lef3iRuNZd1nlgP2aREyHYCpE3FAelUoVG90B1FrJMnDUKAka
7eb6GImamWPf9onV-m5-GcUpejO9f1oPi-rwHzp475UPdAeKq5Z4zds8y
XhQP-XyJbCPTtM-UQC2-_q-3EKBHC4jM3qWDxVJ0JbIif3fCVRowzJh4A
OB84YrfvkgUjMItqQPg2H6QBNqGUspLI634lM8R-mhGciDZX2Jh_nKoXL
Af5GCnvL9PlI7OdFqocPBIIPpjNrgX_Z4PFjeq7ILx98GhVkryLYU9HVO
FPCYci-lF9nfw1geliLfkoj5QZyi4J2SOtYaO_zPmQvCXaUREqPf5UDAl
gvc50a4ByYnNbkWSbhZ5Z388s8ELzPSE9XypdgP-1cSyRke7V8iGe4eHN
sm01TgWILYOFK4mYAM52OTitJxmQtmRp6izY5ZFdH9f_WdoB1RXmGEZyd
vL-estcjx5ghsV3gktedIl0HA4R_M_N5TFIwv7hiisyRLi2aQtyFbE7pZ
6Oz-cYsLc4qFfXbb13U9a2-Byul8hm_E2b3m4GMhmsCiROm-uht9Ek4h9
BIxFhDKPr-htOXc93-uQNZlAQfkITAKlJfQ
Aj8lKdPMDE4U82UAhDJBaRrl3USmuzS2hfFOe_OBEv8
7. Signatures
7.1. Determining Support
If an agent supports receiving end-to-end object signatures, it MUST
advertise that fact in its responses to [XEP-0030] information
("disco#info") requests by returning a feature of
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6:signatures".
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...
...
To facilitate discovery, an agent SHOULD also include [XEP-0115]
information in any directed or broadcast presence updates.
7.2. Signing XMPP Stanzas
The basic process that a sending agent follows for authenticating
stanzas is the same regardless of the kind of stanza (i.e., ,
, or ).
7.2.1. Process
For a given plaintext stanza (S), the sending agent performs the
following:
1. Ensures the plaintext stanza is fully qualified, including the
proper namespace declarations (e.g., contains the attribute
'xmlns' set to the value "jabber:client" for 'jabber:client'
stanzas defined in [RFC6120]).
2. Notes the current UTC date and time (N) when this stanza is
constructed, formatted as described under Section 10.
3. Constructs a forwarding envelope (M) using a element
qualified by the "urn:xmpp:forward:0" namespace (as defined in
[XEP-0297]) as follows:
* The child element qualified by the "urn:xmpp:delay"
namespace (as defined in [XEP-0203]) with the attribute
'stamp' set to the UTC date and time value N
* The plaintext stanza S
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4. Converts the forwarding envelope (M) to a UTF-8 encoded string
(M'), optionallly removing line breaks and other insignificant
whitespace between elements and attributes, i.e. M' =
UTF8-encode(M). We call M' a "stanza-string" because for
purposes of encryption and decryption it is treated not as XML
but as an opaque string (this avoids the need for complex
canonicalization of the XML input).
5. Chooses a private asymmetric key (PK) for which the sending agent
has published the corresponding public key to the intended
recipients.
6. Performs the message signatures steps from [JOSE-JWS] to generate
the JWS Header (H) and JWS Signature (I); using the following
inputs:
* The 'alg' property is set to an appropriate signature
algorithm for PK (e.g., "R256").
* M' as the JWS Payload.
7. Constructs an element qualified by the
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6" namespace as follows:
* The attribute 'type' set to the value "sig"
* The child element qualified by the
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6" namespace and with XML
character data as H, encoded base64url as per [RFC4648].
* The child element qualified by the
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6" namespace and with XML
character data as M', encoded base64url as per [RFC4648].
* The child element qualified by the
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6" namespace and with XML
character data as I, encoded base64url as per [RFC4648].
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8. Sends the element as the payload of a stanza that SHOULD
match the stanza from step 1 in kind (e.g., ), type
(e.g., "chat"), and addressing (e.g., to="romeo@montegue.lit"
from="juliet@capulet.lit/balcony"). If the original stanza (S)
has a value for the 'id' attribute, this stanza SHOULD NOT use
the same value for its "id" attribute.
7.3. Verifying Signed XMPP Stanzas
7.3.1. Protocol Not Understood
If the receiving agent does not understand the protocol, it MUST do
one and only one of the following: (1) ignore the extension,
(2) ignore the entire stanza, or (3) return a
error to the sender, as described in [RFC6120].
NOTE: If the inbound stanza is an , the receiving agent MUST
return an error to the sending agent, to comply with the exchanging
of IQ stanzas in [RFC6121].
7.3.2. Process
Upon receipt of a signed stanza, the receiving agent performs the
following:
1. Ensures it has appropriate materials to verify the signature,
which generally means ensuring that it possesses one or more
public keys for the sending agent (if one is not provided as part
of the JWS Header).
2. Performs the message validation steps from [JOSE-JWS], with the
following inputs:
* The JWS Header H from the element's character
data content.
* The JWS payload M' from the element's character data
content.
* The JWS Signature from the element's character data
content.
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3. Converts the forwarding envelope UTF-encoded string M' into XML
element M.
4. Obtains the UTC date and time N from the child element,
and verifies it is within the accepted range, as specified in
Section 10.
5. Obtains the plaintext stanza S, which is a child element node of
M; the stanza MUST be fully qualified with the proper namespace
declrations from XMPP stanzas, to help distinguish it from other
content within M.
7.3.3. Insufficient Information
At step 1, if the receiving agent does not have the key used to sign
the stanza, or the receiving agent could not otherwise determine it,
it MAY return a error to the sending agent (as
described in [RFC6120]), optionally supplemented by an application-
specific error condition element of :
[XML character data]
[XML character data]
[XML character data]
In addition to returning an error, the receiving agent SHOULD NOT
present the stanza to the intended recipient (human or application)
and SHOULD provide some explicit alternate processing of the stanza
(which MAY be to display a message informing the recipient that it
has received a stanza that cannot be verified).
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7.3.4. Failed Verification
At step 2, if the receiving agent is unable to successfully verify
the stanza, the receiving agent SHOULD return a error
to the sending agent (as described in [RFC6120]), optionally
supplemented by an application-specific error condition element of
:
[XML character data]
[XML character data]
[XML character data]
In addition to returning an error, the receiving agent SHOULD NOT
present the stanza to the intended recipient (human or application)
and SHOULD provide some explicit alternate processing of the stanza
(which MAY be to display a message informing the recipient that it
has received a stanza that cannot be verified).
7.3.5. Timestamp Not Acceptable
At step 4, if the stanza is successfully verified but the timestamp
fails the checks outlined in Section 10, the receiving agent MAY
return a error to the sender (as described in
[RFC6120]), optionally supplemented by an application-specific error
condition element of (previously defined in
[RFC3923]):
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[XML character data]
[XML character data]
[XML character data]
7.3.6. Successful Verification
If the receiving agent successfully verified the payload, it SHOULD
NOT return a stanza error. However, if the signed stanza is an
of type "get" or "set", the response MAY be sent unsigned if the
receiving agent does not have an appropriate public-private key-pair.
Otherwise, the receiving agent SHOULD send the response signed
as per Section 7.2.1, with the 'type' attribute set to the value
"result", even if the response to the signed stanza is of type
"error". The error applies to the signed stanza, not the wrapping
stanza.
7.4. Example - Signing a Message
NOTE: unless otherwise indicated, all line breaks are included for
readability.
The sending agent beings with the plaintext version of
stanza 'S':
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35740be5-b5a4-4c4e-962a-a03b14ed92f4
But to be frank, and give it thee again.
And yet I wish but for the thing I have.
My bounty is as boundless as the sea,
My love as deep; the more I give to thee,
The more I have, for both are infinite.
Then the sending agent performs steps 1, 2, and 3 from Section 7.2.1
generate the envelope M:
35740be5-b5a4-4c4e-962a-a03b14ed92f4
But to be frank, and give it thee again.
And yet I wish but for the thing I have.
My bounty is as boundless as the sea,
My love as deep; the more I give to thee,
The more I have, for both are infinite.
Then the sending agent performs steps 4, 5, and 6 to generate the
[JOSE-JWS] outputs:
JWS Header (before base64url encoding)
{
"alg":"RS512",
"kid":"juliet@capulet.lit"
}
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JWS Payload
PGZvcndhcmRlZCB4bWxucz0idXJuOnhtcHA6Zm9yd2FyZDowIj48ZGVsYXkgeG1
sbnM9InVybjp4bXBwOmRlbGF5IiBzdGFtcD0iMTQ5Mi0wNS0xMlQyMDowNzozNy
4wMTJaIi8-PG1lc3NhZ2UgeG1sbnM9ImphYmJlcjpjbGllbnQiIGZyb209Imp1b
GlldEBjYXB1bGV0LmxpdC9iYWxjb255IiB0bz0icm9tZW9AbW9udGVndWUubGl0
IiB0eXBlPSJjaGF0Ij48dGhyZWFkPjM1NzQwYmU1LWI1YTQtNGM0ZS05NjJhLWE
wM2IxNGVkOTJmNDwvdGhyZWFkPjxib2R5PkJ1dCB0byBiZSBmcmFuaywgYW5kIG
dpdmUgaXQgdGhlZSBhZ2Fpbi4gQW5kIHlldCBJIHdpc2ggYnV0IGZvciB0aGUgd
GhpbmcgSSBoYXZlLiBNeSBib3VudHkgaXMgYXMgYm91bmRsZXNzIGFzIHRoZSBz
ZWEsIE15IGxvdmUgYXMgZGVlcDsgdGhlIG1vcmUgSSBnaXZlIHRvIHRoZWUsIFR
oZSBtb3JlIEkgaGF2ZSwgZm9yIGJvdGggYXJlIGluZmluaXRlLjwvYm9keT48L2
1lc3NhZ2U-PC9mb3J3YXJkZWQ-
JWS Signature
YPfGouD50j0C_C-RneawG0jxXWDXgBkN3FJz6eaBFIPCh3hopiwtwKir7Yamvgt
OrqhXx2pcu-70caGi6mKKLWvpdwdJ3nEnhdjPOd3CmLdaK_PBAMtIt8d3155hdl
qNxSMsJN7PxmNLNwJhbksAsI-2TcCQsuxdIPXh6hcqBm44BpVio6AoRPqwF06XZ
MMBMOMnEFcV6Ht20wCK1BEGgOmN3KYPbwKeTctG8HKPAh25_K66aEXT66lI19uW
j1fGFJ79QQHUhc5y9pSKmpK7HKruPMRyrvpzBSfUhcb62nLXhM-LzY5taaDECzi
fCi-IxySBtJJtPCqYAYW_IbrRFg
Then the sending agent performs steps 7 and 8 and sends the
following:
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eyJhbGciOiJSUzUxMiIsImtpZCI6Imp1bGlldEBjYXB1bGV0LmxpdCJ9
PGZvcndhcmRlZCB4bWxucz0idXJuOnhtcHA6Zm9yd2FyZDowIj48ZGVsY
XkgeG1sbnM9InVybjp4bXBwOmRlbGF5IiBzdGFtcD0iMTQ5Mi0wNS0xMl
QyMDowNzozNy4wMTJaIi8-PG1lc3NhZ2UgeG1sbnM9ImphYmJlcjpjbGl
lbnQiIGZyb209Imp1bGlldEBjYXB1bGV0LmxpdC9iYWxjb255IiB0bz0i
cm9tZW9AbW9udGVndWUubGl0IiB0eXBlPSJjaGF0Ij48dGhyZWFkPjM1N
zQwYmU1LWI1YTQtNGM0ZS05NjJhLWEwM2IxNGVkOTJmNDwvdGhyZWFkPj
xib2R5PkJ1dCB0byBiZSBmcmFuaywgYW5kIGdpdmUgaXQgdGhlZSBhZ2F
pbi4gQW5kIHlldCBJIHdpc2ggYnV0IGZvciB0aGUgdGhpbmcgSSBoYXZl
LiBNeSBib3VudHkgaXMgYXMgYm91bmRsZXNzIGFzIHRoZSBzZWEsIE15I
GxvdmUgYXMgZGVlcDsgdGhlIG1vcmUgSSBnaXZlIHRvIHRoZWUsIFRoZS
Btb3JlIEkgaGF2ZSwgZm9yIGJvdGggYXJlIGluZmluaXRlLjwvYm9keT4
8L21lc3NhZ2U-PC9mb3J3YXJkZWQ-
YPfGouD50j0C_C-RneawG0jxXWDXgBkN3FJz6eaBFIPCh3hopiwtwKir7
YamvgtOrqhXx2pcu-70caGi6mKKLWvpdwdJ3nEnhdjPOd3CmLdaK_PBAM
tIt8d3155hdlqNxSMsJN7PxmNLNwJhbksAsI-2TcCQsuxdIPXh6hcqBm4
4BpVio6AoRPqwF06XZMMBMOMnEFcV6Ht20wCK1BEGgOmN3KYPbwKeTctG
8HKPAh25_K66aEXT66lI19uWj1fGFJ79QQHUhc5y9pSKmpK7HKruPMRyr
vpzBSfUhcb62nLXhM-LzY5taaDECzifCi-IxySBtJJtPCqYAYW_IbrRFg
8. Requesting Session Keys
Because of the dynamic nature of XMPP stanza routing, the protocol
does not exchange session keys as part of the encrypted stanza.
Instead, a separate protocol is used by receiving agents to request a
particular session key from the sending agent.
8.1. Request Process
Before a SMK can be requested, the receiving agent MUST have at least
one public key for which it also has the private key. The public
key(s) are provided to the sending agent as part of this process.
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To request a SMK, the receiving agent performs the following:
1. Constructs a [JOSE-JWK] JWK Set (KS), containing information
about each public key the requesting agent wishes to use. Each
key SHOULD include a value for the property 'kid' which uniquely
identifies it within the context of all provided keys. Each key
MUST include a value for the property 'kid' if any two keys use
the same algorithm.
2. Constructs a element qualified by the
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6" namespace as follows:
* The attribute 'id' set to the SMK identifier value SID.
* The child element qualified by the
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6" namespace and with XML
character data as KS, encoded base64url as per [RFC4648].
3. Sends the element as the payload of an stanza
with the attribute 'type' set to "get", the attribute 'to' set to
the full JID of the original encrypted stanza's sender, and the
attribute 'id' set to an opaque string value the receiving agent
uses to track the response.
8.2. Accept Process
If the sending agent approves the request, it performs the following
steps:
1. Generate a JSON Web Key (JWK) representing the symmetric SMK
(according to [JOSE-JWK]):
* The "kty" parameter MUST be "oct".
* The "kid" parameter MUST be the SID.
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* The "k" parameter MUST be the SMK, encoded as base64url.
* The "alg" parameter, if present, MUST be set to the algorithm
in use for encrypting messages from Section 6.2.
* The "use" parameter, if present, MUST be set to "enc".
2. Chooses a key (PK) from the keys provided via KS, and notes its
identifier value 'kid'.
3. Protects the SMK using the process outlined in [JOSE-KEYPROTECT]
to generate the JWE Header (H), JWE Encrypted Key (E), JWE
Initialization Vector (IV), JWE Ciphertext (C), and JWE Integrity
Value (I); using the following inputs:
* The 'alg' property is set to an algorithm appropriate for the
chosen PK (e.g., "RSA-OAEP" for a "RSA" key).
* The 'enc' property is set to the intended content encryption
algorithm.
* A randomly generated CMK. See [RFC4086] for considerations on
generating random values.
* A randomly generated initialization vector. See [RFC4086] for
considerations on generating random values.
* SMK, formatted as a JWK as above.
4. Constructs a element qualified by the
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6" namespace as follows:
* The attribute 'id' set to the SMK Identifier (SID).
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* The child element qualified by the
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6" namespace and with XML
character data as H, encoded base64url as per [RFC4648].
* The child element qualified by the
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6" namespace and with XML
character data as E, encoded base64url as per [RFC4648].
* The child element qualified by the
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6" namespace and with XML
character data as IV, encoded base64url as per [RFC4648].
* The child element qualified by the
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6" namespace and with XML
character data as C, encoded base64url as per [RFC4648].
* The child element qualified by the
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6" namespace and with XML
character data as I, encoded base64url as per [RFC4648].
5. Sends the element as the payload of an stanza
with the attribute 'type' set to "result", the attribute 'to' set
to the full JID from the request 's 'from' attribute, and
the attribute 'id' set to the value of the request 's 'id'
attribute.
8.3. Error Conditions
If the sending agent does not approve the request, it sends an
stanza of type "error" and containing the reason for denying the
request:
o : the key request is made by an entity that is not
authorized to decrypt stanzas from the sending agent and/or for
the indicated SID.
o : the requested SID is no longer valid.
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o : the key request did not contain any keys the
sending agent understands.
8.4. Example of Successful Key Request
NOTE: unless otherwise indicated, all line breaks are included for
readability.
To begin a key request, the receiving agent performs step 1 from
Section 8.1 to generate the [JOSE-JWK]:
{
"keys": [{
"kty":"RSA",
"kid":"romeo@montegue.lit/garden",
"n":"vtqejkMF01h8oKEaHfHEYO0C2jM7eISbbSvNs0SNItYWO6GbjpJf
N4ldXw2vpVRdysnwU3zk6o2_SD0YCH1WgeuI0QK1knMTDdNSXx52e1c4BTw
hlA8iHuutTWmpBqesn1GNZmqB3jYsJOkVBYwCJtkB9APaBvk0itlRtizjCf
1HHnau7nGStyshgu8-srxi_d8rC5TTLSB_zT1i6fP8fwDloemXOtC0U65by
5P-1ZHxaf_bD8fpjps6gwSgdkZKMJAI0bOWZWuMpp2ntqa0wLB7Ndxb2Ijr
eog_s5ssAoSiXDVdoswSbp36ZP-1lnCk2j-vZ4qbhaFg5bZtgt-gwQ",
"e":"AQAB"
}]
}
Then the receiving agent performs step 2 to generate the :
eyJrZXlzIjpbeyJrdHkiOiJSU0EiLCJraWQiOiJyb21lb0Btb250ZWd1ZS5
saXQvZ2FyZGVuIiwibiI6InZ0cWVqa01GMDFoOG9LRWFIZkhFWU8wQzJqTT
dlSVNiYlN2TnMwU05JdFlXTzZHYmpwSmZONGxkWHcydnBWUmR5c253VTN6a
zZvMl9TRDBZQ0gxV2dldUkwUUsxa25NVERkTlNYeDUyZTFjNEJUd2hsQThp
SHV1dFRXbXBCcWVzbjFHTlptcUIzallzSk9rVkJZd0NKdGtCOUFQYUJ2azB
pdGxSdGl6akNmMUhIbmF1N25HU3R5c2hndTgtc3J4aV9kOHJDNVRUTFNCX3
pUMWk2ZlA4ZndEbG9lbVhPdEMwVTY1Ynk1UC0xWkh4YWZfYkQ4ZnBqcHM2Z
3dTZ2RrWktNSkFJMGJPV1pXdU1wcDJudHFhMHdMQjdOZHhiMklqcmVvZ19z
NXNzQW9TaVhEVmRvc3dTYnAzNlpQLTFsbkNrMmotdlo0cWJoYUZnNWJadGd
0LWd3USIsImUiOiJBUUFCIn1dfQ
Then the receiving agent performs step 3 and sends the following:
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eyJrZXlzIjpbeyJrdHkiOiJSU0EiLCJraWQiOiJyb21lb0Btb250ZWd1Z
S5saXQvZ2FyZGVuIiwibiI6InZ0cWVqa01GMDFoOG9LRWFIZkhFWU8wQz
JqTTdlSVNiYlN2TnMwU05JdFlXTzZHYmpwSmZONGxkWHcydnBWUmR5c25
3VTN6azZvMl9TRDBZQ0gxV2dldUkwUUsxa25NVERkTlNYeDUyZTFjNEJU
d2hsQThpSHV1dFRXbXBCcWVzbjFHTlptcUIzallzSk9rVkJZd0NKdGtCO
UFQYUJ2azBpdGxSdGl6akNmMUhIbmF1N25HU3R5c2hndTgtc3J4aV9kOH
JDNVRUTFNCX3pUMWk2ZlA4ZndEbG9lbVhPdEMwVTY1Ynk1UC0xWkh4YWZ
fYkQ4ZnBqcHM2Z3dTZ2RrWktNSkFJMGJPV1pXdU1wcDJudHFhMHdMQjdO
ZHhiMklqcmVvZ19zNXNzQW9TaVhEVmRvc3dTYnAzNlpQLTFsbkNrMmotd
lo0cWJoYUZnNWJadGd0LWd3USIsImUiOiJBUUFCIn1dfQ
If the sending agent accepts this key request, it performs step 1
from Section 8.2 to generate JWK representation of the SMK:
{
"kty":"oct",
"kid":"835c92a8-94cd-4e96-b3f3-b2e75a438f92",
"k":"xWtdjhYsH4Va_9SfYSefsJfZu03m5RrbXo_UavxxeU8"
}
Then the sending agent performs steps 2 and 3 to generate the
protected SMK:
JWE Header (before base64url encoding)
{
"alg":"RSA-OAEP",
"kid":"romeo@montegue.lit/garden",
"enc":"A256CBC+HS512",
"cty":"application/jwk+json"
}
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JWE Encrypted Key
hKUOpAif76c-hmRwEphVB9wXjloLpwu75x98MSWyCBtfUgmopk93ttUXoZ4AAIk
rZJOtrPUqPZwYHjay3ggfgjVljJ_KGhgqI5cScIzaAQs0Pxep6FnrsnUrw09Sjv
2VRXOay4guMQnbQo0ibpifBxeuL9MJ_vdeb_BdSE8YZ4iTfMb7GT35gZC9NgweX
3fiTEo2LjY8hEV3DHud5LlNZzYp9kLmAUZNIwGu7LtYyI4F7NnOv9oLx1HtmfE3
_skkYtQoKMvMewLkIO88h325qCpWFdrLwPp63betCmewDJPaBdrp91rLchkXVo-
d2ueKkb59TxWjMx7esBdaxCAcDQ
JWE Initialization Vector
Ggiego8UiSsj7GgY94qOng
JWE Ciphertext
4vIGDz9Hm6X4lSo9JoA6ZzS0KitztLGAiMUs3RTviFO09choPhxJNlOj8KX8QIL
u4zZ-ytCnG-yzNx5SsT8KEQJhIf6_9yWplxpX173k6ZJV-sXGd4Mj9u7N0IqWQL
K5DMytv7XopsZsR9QFCDNGew
JWE Integrity Value
3GuaasWV0XGTBbRtNP6OQ14_cHL-ZJC1naDtU6EIecw
Then the sending agent performs step 4 to generate the
response:
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eyJhbGciOiJSU0EtT0FFUCIsImtpZCI6InJvbWVvQG1vbnRlZ3VlLmxpdC9
nYXJkZW4iLCJlbmMiOiJBMjU2Q0JDK0hTNTEyIiwiY3R5IjoiYXBwbGljYX
Rpb24vandrK2pzb24ifQ
hKUOpAif76c-hmRwEphVB9wXjloLpwu75x98MSWyCBtfUgmopk93ttUXoZ4
AAIkrZJOtrPUqPZwYHjay3ggfgjVljJ_KGhgqI5cScIzaAQs0Pxep6Fnrsn
Urw09Sjv2VRXOay4guMQnbQo0ibpifBxeuL9MJ_vdeb_BdSE8YZ4iTfMb7G
T35gZC9NgweX3fiTEo2LjY8hEV3DHud5LlNZzYp9kLmAUZNIwGu7LtYyI4F
7NnOv9oLx1HtmfE3_skkYtQoKMvMewLkIO88h325qCpWFdrLwPp63betCme
wDJPaBdrp91rLchkXVo-d2ueKkb59TxWjMx7esBdaxCAcDQ
Ggiego8UiSsj7GgY94qOng
4vIGDz9Hm6X4lSo9JoA6ZzS0KitztLGAiMUs3RTviFO09choPhxJNlOj8KX
8QILu4zZ-ytCnG-yzNx5SsT8KEQJhIf6_9yWplxpX173k6ZJV-sXGd4Mj9u
7N0IqWQLK5DMytv7XopsZsR9QFCDNGew
3GuaasWV0XGTBbRtNP6OQ14_cHL-ZJC1naDtU6EIecw
Then the sending agent performs step 5 and sends the following:
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eyJhbGciOiJSU0EtT0FFUCIsImtpZCI6InJvbWVvQG1vbnRlZ3VlLmxpdC9
nYXJkZW4iLCJlbmMiOiJBMjU2Q0JDK0hTNTEyIiwiY3R5IjoiYXBwbGljYX
Rpb24vandrK2pzb24ifQ
hKUOpAif76c-hmRwEphVB9wXjloLpwu75x98MSWyCBtfUgmopk93ttUXoZ4
AAIkrZJOtrPUqPZwYHjay3ggfgjVljJ_KGhgqI5cScIzaAQs0Pxep6Fnrsn
Urw09Sjv2VRXOay4guMQnbQo0ibpifBxeuL9MJ_vdeb_BdSE8YZ4iTfMb7G
T35gZC9NgweX3fiTEo2LjY8hEV3DHud5LlNZzYp9kLmAUZNIwGu7LtYyI4F
7NnOv9oLx1HtmfE3_skkYtQoKMvMewLkIO88h325qCpWFdrLwPp63betCme
wDJPaBdrp91rLchkXVo-d2ueKkb59TxWjMx7esBdaxCAcDQ
Ggiego8UiSsj7GgY94qOng
4vIGDz9Hm6X4lSo9JoA6ZzS0KitztLGAiMUs3RTviFO09choPhxJNlOj8KX
8QILu4zZ-ytCnG-yzNx5SsT8KEQJhIf6_9yWplxpX173k6ZJV-sXGd4Mj9u
7N0IqWQLK5DMytv7XopsZsR9QFCDNGew
3GuaasWV0XGTBbRtNP6OQ14_cHL-ZJC1naDtU6EIecw
9. Mulitple Operations
The individual processes for encrypting and signing can be nested;
the output of each process a complete stanza that could then be
performed with the other. An implementation MUST be able to process
one level of nesting (e.g., an encrypted stanza nested within a
signed stanza), and SHOULD handle multiple levels within reasonable
limits for the receiving agent.
10. Inclusion and Checking of Timestamps
Timestamps are included to help prevent replay attacks. All
timestamps MUST conform to [XEP-0082] and be presented as UTC with no
offset, and SHOULD include the seconds and fractions of a second to
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three digits. Absent a local adjustment to the sending agent's
perceived time or the underlying clock time, the sending agent MUST
ensure that the timestamps it sends to the receiver increase
monotonically (if necessary by incrementing the seconds fraction in
the timestamp if the clock returns the same time for multiple
requests). The following rules apply to the receiving agent:
o It MUST verify that the timestamp received is within an acceptable
range of the current time. It is RECOMMENDED that implementations
use an acceptable range of five minutes, although implementations
MAY use a smaller acceptable range.
o It SHOULD verify that the timestamp received is greater than any
timestamp received in the last 10 minutes which passed the
previous check.
o If any of the foregoing checks fails, the timestamp SHOULD be
presented to the receiving entity (human or application) marked as
"old timestamp", "future timestamp", or "decreasing timestamp",
and the receiving entity MAY return a stanza error to the sender.
Note the foregoing assumes the stanza is received while the receiving
agent is online; see Section 12 for offline storage considerations.
11. Interaction with Stanza Semantics
The following limitations and caveats apply:
o Undirected stanzas SHOULD NOT be encrypted. Such
stanzas are delivered to anyone the sender has authorized, and can
generate a large volume of key requests.
o Undirected stanzas MAY be signed. However, note that
signatures significantly increase the size of a stanza kind that
is often multiplexed across to many XMPP entities; this could have
large impacts on bandwidth and latency.
o Stanzas directed to multiplexing services (e.g., multi-user chat)
SHOULD NOT be encrypted, unless the sender has established an
acceptable trust relationship with the multiplexing service.
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12. Interaction with Offline Storage
The server makes its best effort to deliver stanzas. When the
receiving agent is offline at the time of delivery, the server might
store the message until the recipient is next online (offline storage
does not apply to or stanzas, only
stanzas). The following need to be considered:
o If the sending agent is not also online when the message is
delivered to the receiving agent from offline storage, then the
decryption process fails for insufficient information as described
in Section 6.3.3.
o When performing the timestamp checks in Section 10, if the server
includes delayed delivery data as specified in [XEP-0203] for when
the server received the message, then the receiving agent SHOULD
use the delayed delivery timestmap rather than the current time.
13. Mandatory-to-Implement Cryptographic Algorithms
All algorithms that MUST be implemented for [JOSE-JWE] and [JOSE-JWS]
also MUST be implemented for this specification. However, this
specification further mandates the use of the following:
o MUST implement the "RSA1_5" JWE algorithm.
o MUST implement the "RS256" JWS algorithm.
14. Security Considerations
14.1. Storage of Encrypted Stanzas
The recipient's server might store any stanzas received
until the recipient is next available; this duration could be
anywhere from a few minutes to several months.
14.2. Re-use of Session Master Keys
A sender SHOULD NOT use the same SMK for stanzas intended for
different recipients, as determined by the localpart and domainpart
of the recipient's JID.
A sender MAY re-use a SMK for several stanzas to the same recipient.
In this case, the SID remains the same, but the sending agent MUST
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generate a new CMK and IV for each encrypted stanza. The sender
SHOULD periodically generate a new SMK (and its associated SID);
however, this specification does not mandate any specific algorithms
or processes.
In the case of stanzas, a sending agent might generate a
new SMK each time it generates a new ThreadID, as outlined in
[XEP-0201].
15. IANA Considerations
15.1. XML Namespaces Name for e2e Data in XMPP
A number of URN sub-namespaces of encrypted and/or signed content for
the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) is defined as
follows.
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6
Specification: RFC XXXX
Description: This is an XML namespace name of encrypted and/or
signed content for the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol
as defined [[ this document ]].
Registrant Contact: IESG,
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6:encryption
Specification: RFC XXXX
Description: This is an XML namespace name signalling support for
encrypted content for the Extensible Messaging and Presence
Protocol as defined [[ this document ]].
Registrant Contact: IESG,
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6:signatures
Specification: RFC XXXX
Description: This is an XML namespace name signalling support for
signed content for the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol
as defined [[ this document ]].
Registrant Contact: IESG,
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16. References
16.1. Normative References
[E2E-REQ] Saint-Andre, P., "Requirements for End-to-End Encryption
in the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP)",
draft-saintandre-xmpp-e2e-requirements-01 (work in
progress), March 2010.
[JOSE-JWA]
Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", draft-ietf-jose-
json-web-algorithms-11 (work in progress), May 2013.
[JOSE-JWE]
Jones, M., Rescola, E., and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web
Encryption (JWE)", draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-11
(work in progress), May 2013.
[JOSE-JWK]
Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", draft-ietf-jose-json-web-
key-11 (work in progress), December 2012.
[JOSE-JWS]
Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature-11
(work in progress), May 2013.
[JOSE-KEYPROTECT]
Miller, M., "Using JSON Web Encryption (JWE) for
Protecting JSON Web Key (JWK) Objects", draft-miller-jose-
jwe-protected-jwk-00 (work in progress), February 2013.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, October 2006.
[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", RFC
4949, August 2007.
[RFC6120] Saint-Andre, P., "Extensible Messaging and Presence
Protocol (XMPP): Core", RFC 6120, March 2011.
[RFC6121] Saint-Andre, P., "Extensible Messaging and Presence
Protocol (XMPP): Instant Messaging and Presence", RFC
6121, March 2011.
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[XEP-0030]
Eatmon, R., Hildebrand, J., Millard, P., and P. Saint-
Andre, "Service Discovery", XSF XEP 0030, June 2006.
[XEP-0082]
Saint-Andre, P., "XMPP Date and Time Profiles", XSF XEP
0082, May 2003.
[XEP-0115]
Hildebrand, J., Troncon, R., and P. Saint-Andre, "Entity
Capabilities", XSF XEP 0115, February 2008.
[XEP-0203]
Saint-Andre, P., "Delayed Delivery", XSF XEP 0203,
September 2009.
[XEP-0297]
Wild, M. and K. Smith, "Stanza Forwarding", XSF XEP 0297,
July 2012.
16.2. Informative References
[RFC3923] Saint-Andre, P., "End-to-End Signing and Object Encryption
for the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol
(XMPP)", RFC 3923, October 2004.
[RFC4086] Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness
Requirements for Security", RFC 4086, June 2005.
[XEP-0201]
Saint-Andre, P., Paterson, I., and K. Smith, "Best
Practices for Message Threads", XSF XEP 0203, November
2010.
[Key-Table]
Housley, R., Polk, T., Hartman, S., and D. Zhang,
"Database of Long-Lived Symmetric Cryptographic Keys",
December 2013.
Appendix A. Schema for urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-e2e:6
The following XML schema is descriptive, not normative.
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Appendix B. Acknowledgements
Thanks to Richard Barnes, Andrew Biggs, and Ben Schumacher for their
feedback.
Authors' Addresses
Matthew Miller
Cisco Systems, Inc.
1899 Wynkoop Street, Suite 600
Denver, CO 80202
USA
Phone: +1-303-308-3204
Email: mamille2@cisco.com
Carl Wallace
Red Hound Software, Inc.
Email: carl@redhoundsoftware.com
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