Network Working Group R. Housley Internet Draft Vigil Security expires in six months September 2003 Using CMS to Protect Firmware Packages Status of this Memo This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." To view the entire list of current Internet-Drafts, please check the "1id-abstracts.txt" listing contained in the Internet-Drafts Shadow Directories on ftp.is.co.za (Africa), ftp.nordu.net (Northern Europe), ftp.nis.garr.it (Southern Europe), munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim), ftp.ietf.org (US East Coast), or ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast). Abstract This document describes the use of the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) to protect firmware packages. A digital signature is used to protect the firmware package from undetected modification and provide data origin authentication. Encryption is optionally used to protect the firmware from disclosure, and compression is optionally used to reduce the size of the protected firmware package. A firmware package loading signed receipt can optionally be generated to acknowledge the successful loading of a firmware package. Housley [Page 1] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 Table of Contents Status of this Memo ................................................ 1 Abstract ........................................................... 1 Table of Contents .................................................. 2 1 Introduction ................................................... 4 1.1 Terminology .............................................. 5 1.2 Architectural Elements ................................... 5 1.2.1 Hardware Module Requirements ..................... 7 1.2.2 Firmware Package Requirements .................... 7 1.2.3 Bootstrap Loader Requirements .................... 8 1.2.3.1 Stale Version Processing ............... 10 1.2.4 Trust Anchors .................................... 11 1.2.5 Cryptographic Algorithm Requirements ............. 11 1.3 Hardware Module Security Architecture .................... 12 1.4 ASN.1 Encoding ........................................... 13 1.5 Protected Firmware Package Loading ....................... 13 2 Firmware Package Protection .................................... 14 2.1 Firmware Package Protection CMS Content Type Profile ..... 16 2.1.1 ContentInfo ...................................... 16 2.1.2 SignedData ....................................... 16 2.1.2.1 SignerInfo ............................. 17 2.1.2.2 EncapsulatedContentInfo ................ 18 2.1.3 EncryptedData .................................... 18 2.1.3.1 EncryptedContentInfo ................... 19 2.1.4 CompressedData ................................... 19 2.1.4.1 EncapsulatedContentInfo ................ 20 2.1.5 FirmwarePkgData .................................. 20 2.2 Signed Attributes ........................................ 20 2.2.1 Content Type ..................................... 21 2.2.2 Message Digest ................................... 22 2.2.3 Firmware Package Identifier ...................... 22 2.2.4 Target Hardware Module Identifiers ............... 22 2.2.5 Decrypt Key Identifier ........................... 23 2.2.6 Implemented Crypto Algorithms .................... 23 2.2.7 Community Identifiers ............................ 24 2.2.8 Firmware Package Information ..................... 25 2.2.9 Firmware Package Message Digest .................. 26 2.2.10 Signing Time ..................................... 27 2.2.11 Content Hints .................................... 27 2.2.12 Signing Certificate .............................. 27 2.3 Unsigned Attributes ...................................... 28 2.3.1 Wrapped Firmware-Decryption Key .................. 29 Housley [Page 2] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 3 Firmware Package Load Receipt .................................. 29 3.1 Firmware Package Load Receipt CMS Content Type Profile ... 31 3.1.1 ContentInfo ...................................... 31 3.1.2 SignedData ....................................... 32 3.1.2.1 SignerInfo ............................. 33 3.1.2.2 EncapsulatedContentInfo ................ 34 3.1.3 FirmwarePackageLoadReceipt ....................... 34 3.2 Signed Attributes ........................................ 35 3.2.1 Content Type ..................................... 35 3.2.2 Message Digest ................................... 36 3.2.3 Signing Time ..................................... 36 4 Firmware Package Load Error .................................... 36 4.1 Firmware Package Load Error CMS Content Type Profile ..... 37 4.1.1 ContentInfo ....................................... 37 4.1.2 SignedData ....................................... 38 4.1.2.1 SignerInfo ............................. 38 4.1.2.2 EncapsulatedContentInfo ................ 38 4.1.3 FirmwarePackageLoadError .......................... 38 4.2 Signed Attributes ........................................ 43 4.2.1 Content Type ..................................... 43 4.2.2 Message Digest ................................... 44 4.2.3 Signing Time ..................................... 44 5 Hardware Module Name ........................................... 44 6 References ..................................................... 45 6.1 Normative References ..................................... 45 6.2 Informative References ................................... 46 7 Security Considerations ........................................ 46 8 Author Address ................................................. 48 Appendix A: ASN.1 Module .......................................... 49 Full Copyright Statement ........................................... 53 Housley [Page 3] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 1 Introduction This document describes the use of the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [CMS] to protect firmware packages. This document also describes the use of CMS for receipts for firmware package loading. The CMS is a data protection encapsulation syntax that makes use of ASN.1 [X.208-88, X.209-88]. The protected firmware can be associated with any particular hardware module; however, this specification was written with the requirements of cryptographic hardware modules in mind, since such modules have strong security requirements. The firmware package contains object code for one or more processors that make up the hardware module. The firmware package, which is treated as an opaque binary object, is digitally signed. Optional encryption and compression are also supported. When all three are used, the firmware package is compressed, and then encrypted, and then signed. Compression simply reduces the size of the firmware package, allowing more efficient processing and transmission. Encryption protects the firmware from disclosure, which allows transmission of sensitive firmware packages over insecure links. The encryption algorithm and mode employed may also provide integrity, protecting the firmware from undetected modification. The encryption protects proprietary algorithms, classified algorithms, trade secrets, and implementation techniques. The digital signature protects the firmware package from undetected modification and provides data origin authentication. The digital signature allows the hardware module to confirm that the firmware package comes from an acceptable source. If encryption is used, the firmware-decryption key must be made available to the hardware module via a secure path. This out-of-band key delivery is beyond the scope of this specification. The key might be delivered via physical media or delivered via an independent electronic path. The signature verification public key must be made available to the module in a secure fashion. CMS provides for transfer of certificates, and this facility can be used to transfer a certificate that contains the signature verification public key (a firmware- signing certificate). However, use of this facility introduces a level of indirection. Ultimately, a trust anchor public key must be made available to the hardware module. Section 1.2 establishes a requirement that the hardware module store one or more trust anchors. Hardware modules may not be capable of accessing certificate repositories or delegated path discovery (DPD) servers [DPD&DPV] to acquire certificates needed to complete a certification path. Thus, it is the responsibility of the firmware package signer to include Housley [Page 4] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 sufficient certificates to enable each module to validate the firmware-signer certificate (see Section 2.1.2). Similarly, hardware modules may not be capable of accessing a CRL repository, an OCSP responder [OCSP], or delegated path validation (DPV) server [DPD&DPV] to acquire revocation status information. Thus, if the firmware package signature cannot be validated solely with the trust anchor public key, then it is the responsibility of the entity loading a package into a hardware module to validate the firmware-signer certification path prior to loading the package into a hardware module. The means by which this external certificate revocation status checking is performed is beyond the scope of this specification. Hardware modules will only accept firmware packages with a valid digital signature. The signature is either validated directly using the trust anchor public key or using a firmware-signer certification path that is validated to the trust anchor public key. Thus, the trust anchors define the set of entities that can create firmware packages for the hardware module. The disposition of a previously loaded firmware package after the successful validation of another firmware package is beyond the scope of this specification. The amount of memory available to the hardware module will determine the range of alternatives. In some cases, hardware modules can generate digitally signed receipts to acknowledge the loading of a particular firmware package. Such receipts can be used to determine which hardware modules need to receive an updated firmware package whenever a flaw in an earlier firmware package is discovered. To generate digitally signed receipts, a hardware module is required to have a unique serial number, its own private signature key to sign the receipt, and a certificate that contains the corresponding signature validation public key. The private signature key requires secure storage. 1.1 Terminology In this document, the key words MUST, MUST NOT, REQUIRED, SHOULD, SHOULD NOT, RECOMMENDED, MAY, and OPTIONAL are to be interpreted as described in [STDWORDS]. 1.2 Architectural Elements The architecture includes the hardware module, the firmware package, and a firmware bootstrap loader. The bootstrap loader MUST have access to one or more trusted public keys, called trust anchors, to validate the signature on the firmware package. If a firmware loading receipt is generated, the bootstrap loader uses the private Housley [Page 5] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 signature key to sign the receipt and includes the signature validation certificate to aid receipt validation. To implement this optional capability, the hardware module MUST have a unique serial number, and the private signature key to sign the receipt and the certificate containing the corresponding signature validation public key MUST be installed in the hardware module before it is deployed. The private key and certificate can be generated and installed as part of the hardware module manufacture process. Figure 1 illustrates these architectural elements. ASN.1 object identifiers are used to name the architectural elements. +------------------------------------------------------+ | Hardware Module | | | | +---------------+ +--------------------------+ | | | Bootstrap | | Firmware Package | | | | Loader | | | | | +---------------+ | +------------------+ | | | | : Firmware Package : | | | +---------------+ | : Identifier and : | | | | Trust | | : Version Number : | | | | Anchor(s) | | +------------------+ | | | +---------------+ | | | | | +-------------+ | | | +---------------+ | : Algorithm 1 : | | | | Serial Num. | | +-+-----------+-+ | | | +---------------+ | : Algorithm 2 : | | | | +-+-----------+-+ | | | +---------------+ + : Algorithm n : | | | | Hardware | | +-------------+ | | | | Module Type | | | | | +---------------+ +--------------------------+ | | | | +------------------------------------+ | | | Optional Private Signature Key & | | | | Signature Validation Certificate | | | +------------------------------------+ | | | +------------------------------------------------------+ Figure 1. Architectural Elements Housley [Page 6] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 Details of managing the trust anchors are outside the scope of this specification. However, one or more trust anchors MUST be installed in the hardware module using a secure process before it is deployed. These trust anchors provide a means of controlling the acceptable sources of firmware packages. The hardware module vendor can include provisions for secure, remote management of trust anchors. One approach is to include trust anchors in the firmware packages themselves. This approach is analogous to the optional capability described later for updating the bootstrap loader. In a cryptographic hardware module, the firmware package might implement many different cryptographic algorithms. When the firmware package is encrypted, the firmware-decryption key and the firmware package MUST both be provided to the hardware module. The firmware-decryption key is authorization to use the associated firmware package. Generally, separate distribution mechanisms will be employed for the firmware-decryption key and the firmware package. 1.2.1 Hardware Module Requirements Many different vendors develop hardware modules, and each vendor typically identifies its modules by product type (family) and revision level. A unique object identifier MUST name each hardware module type and revision. Each hardware module within a family of hardware modules SHOULD have a unique permanent serial number. However, if the optional receipt generation capability is implemented, then the hardware module MUST have a unique permanent serial number, a private signature key, and a certificate containing the corresponding public signature validation key. If a serial number is present, the bootstrap loader uses it for authorization decisions (see section 2.2.7) and receipt generation (see section 3). When the hardware module includes more than one processor, the bootstrap loader distributes components of the package to the appropriate processors within the hardware module after the firmware package is validated. The bootstrap loader is discussed further in section 1.2.3. 1.2.2 Firmware Package Requirements Firmware packages are named by a combination of the firmware package object identifier and a version number. The firmware package object identifier and version number are placed in CMS signed attributes, not in the firmware package itself. A unique object identifier MUST Housley [Page 7] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 identify the collection of features that characterize the firmware package. For example, firmware packages for a cable modem and a wireless LAN network interface card warrant distinct object identifiers. Similarly, firmware packages that implement distinct suites of cryptographic algorithms and modes of operation, or which emulate different (non-programmable) cryptographic devices warrant distinct object identifiers. The version number MUST identify a particular build or release of the firmware package. The version number MUST be a monotonically increasing non-negative integer. Generally, an earlier version is replaced with a later one. In case a firmware package with a disastrous flaw is released, subsequent firmware package versions MAY designate a stale version number to prevent subsequent rollback to the stale version or versions earlier than the stale version. Firmware packages are developed to run on one or more hardware module type. The firmware package digital signature MUST bind the list of supported hardware module object identifiers to the firmware package. In many cases, the firmware package signature will be validated directly with the trust anchor public key, avoiding the need to construct certification paths. Alternatively, the trust anchor can delegate firmware package signing to another public key through a certification path. In the latter case, the firmware package SHOULD contain the certificates needed to construct the certification path that begins with a certificate issued by the trust anchors and ends with a certificate issued to the firmware signer. The firmware package MAY contain a list of community identifiers. These identifiers name the hardware modules that are authorized to load the firmware package. If the firmware package contains a list of community identifiers, then the bootstrap loader MUST reject the firmware package if the hardware module is not a member of one of the identified communities. When a hardware module includes multiple processors, the firmware package MUST contain object code for all of the processors. Internal tagging within the firmware package MUST tell the bootstrap loader which portion of the overall firmware package is intended for each processor; however, this tagging is expected to be specific to each hardware module. Since this specification treats the firmware package as an opaque binary object, the format of the firmware package is beyond the scope of this specification. 1.2.3 Bootstrap Loader Requirements The bootstrap loader can be a permanent part of the hardware module, or it can be replaced by loading a firmware package. In Figure 1, Housley [Page 8] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 the bootstrap loader is implemented as separate logic within the hardware module. Not all hardware modules will include the ability to replace or update the bootstrap loader, and this specification does not mandate such support. If the bootstrap loader is can be loaded by a firmware package, an initial bootstrap loader MUST be installed in non-volatile memory prior to deployment. The firmware package containing the bootstrap loader MAY also contain other routines. Regardless of how the bootstrap loader is implemented, the trust anchors MUST be installed in non-volatile memory prior to deployment. The bootstrap loader requires access to cryptographic routines. These routines can be implemented specifically for the bootstrap loader, or they can be shared with other hardware module features. The bootstrap loader MUST have access to a one-way hash function and digital signature verification routines to validate the digital signature on the firmware package and to validate the certification path for the firmware-signing certificate. If firmware packages are encrypted, the bootstrap loader MUST have access to a decryption routine. Access to a corresponding encryption function is not required, since hardware modules need not be capable of generating firmware packages. Since some symmetric encryption algorithm implementations (such as AES [AES]), employ separate logic for encryption and decryption, some hardware module savings might result. If firmware packages are compressed, the bootstrap loader MUST also have access to decompression function. The decompression function can be implemented specifically for the bootstrap loader, or they can be shared with other hardware module features. Access to a corresponding compression function is not required, since hardware modules need not be capable of generating firmware packages. The bootstrap loader requires access to one or more trusted public keys, called trust anchors, to validate the firmware package digital signature. The bootstrap loader MUST reject a firmware package if it cannot validate the signature, which MAY require the construction of a valid certification path from the firmware-signing certificate to one of the trust anchors [PROFILE]. However, in many cases, the firmware package signature will be validated directly with the trust anchor public key, avoiding the need to construct certification paths. The bootstrap loader MUST reject a firmware package if the list of supported hardware modules within the firmware package does not Housley [Page 9] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 include the object identifier of the hardware module. The bootstrap loader MUST reject a firmware package if the firmware package includes a list of community identifiers and the hardware module is not a member of one of the listed communities. The means of determining community membership is beyond the scope of this specification. The bootstrap loader MUST reject a firmware package if it cannot successfully decrypt the firmware package using the firmware- decryption key available to the hardware module. The firmware package contains an identifier of the firmware-decryption key needed for decryption. When an earlier version of a firmware package is replacing a later one, the bootstrap loader SHOULD generate a warning. In case a firmware package with a disastrous flaw is released and subsequent firmware package versions designate a stale version number, the bootstrap loader SHOULD prevent loading of the stale version and versions earlier than the stale version. 1.2.3.1 Stale Version Processing In case a firmware package with a disastrous flaw is released, subsequent firmware package versions MAY include a stale version number to prevent subsequent rollback to the stale version or versions earlier than the stale version. As described in the Security Considerations section of this document, the inclusion of a stale version number in a firmware package cannot completely prevent subsequent use of the stale firmware package. However, many hardware modules are expected to have very few firmware packages written for them, allowing the stale firmware version feature provide important protections. Non-volatile storage for stale version number is needed. The number of stale version numbers that can be stored depends on the amount of storage that is available. When a firmware package is loaded and it contains a stale version number, then the object identifier of the firmware package and the stale version number SHOULD be added to a list that is kept in non-volatile storage. When subsequent firmware packages are loaded, the object identifier and version number of the new package is are compared to the list in non-volatile storage. If there is a match, then the new firmware packages SHOULD be rejected. The amount of non-volatile storage that needs to be dedicated to saving firmware package identifiers and version numbers depends on the number of firmware packages that are likely to be developed for the hardware module. Housley [Page 10] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 1.2.4 Trust Anchors A trust anchor MUST consist of a public key signature algorithm and associated public key, which MAY optionally include parameters. A trust anchor MUST also include a public key identifier. A trust anchor MAY also include an issuer name. The trust anchor public key is used in conjunction with the signature validation algorithm in two different ways. First, the trust anchor public key is used directly to validate the firmware package signature. Second, the trust anchor public key is used to validate an X.509 certification path, and then the subject public key in the final certificate in the certification path is used to validate the firmware package signature. The public key identifier names the trust anchor, and it is used when the trust anchor is used directly to validate firmware package signatures. This key identifier can be stored with the trust anchor, or if the recommended method of computing the key identifier is followed, it can be computed from the public key whenever needed. The key identifier is RECOMMENDED to be the 160-bit SHA-1 hash [SHA1] of the public key. X.509 certificates encode public keys as a BIT STRING [PROFILE]. The public key is encoded in this format, and then the SHA-1 hash is computed on the BIT STRING value, excluding the tag, length, and number of unused bits. The optional trusted issuer name can be used when the trust anchor public key is used to validate an X.509 certification path. 1.2.5 Cryptographic Algorithm Requirements Firmware for cryptographic hardware modules includes cryptographic algorithm implementations. In addition, firmware for non- cryptographic hardware modules will likely include cryptographic algorithm implementations to support the Bootstrap Loader in the validation of firmware packages. A unique algorithm object identifier MUST be assigned for each algorithm and mode implemented by a firmware package. The algorithm object identifiers can be used to determine whether a particular firmware package satisfies the needs of a particular application. To facilitate the development of algorithm agile applications, the cryptographic module interface SHOULD allow applications to query the cryptographic module for the object identifiers associated with each cryptographic algorithm contained in the currently loaded firmware package. Applications SHOULD also be able to query the cryptographic module to determine attributes associated with each algorithm. Such Housley [Page 11] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 attributes might include the algorithm type (symmetric encryption, asymmetric encryption, key agreement, one-way hash function, digital signature, and so on), the algorithm block size or modulus size, and parameters for asymmetric algorithms. This specification does not establish the conventions for the retrieval of algorithm identifiers or algorithm attributes. 1.3 Hardware Module Security Architecture In most hardware module designs, the firmware execution environment offers a single address space. When a single address space is offered, the firmware package MUST contain a complete firmware load for hardware module. That is, the firmware package cannot be a partial or incremental set of functions. This requirement is motivated by a desire to minimize complexity and avoid potential security problems. From a complexity perspective, if the incremental loading of packages were permitted, it would be necessary for each package to identify any other packages that are required (its dependencies), and the bootstrap loader would have to verify that all of the dependencies were satisfied before attempting to execute the firmware. Two security-relevant observations motivate this requirement. First, if the hardware module were based on a general purpose processor or a digital signal processor, it would be dangerous to allow such packages to be loaded simultaneously unless there is a reference monitor to ensure that independent portions of the code cannot interfere with one another. Second, it is difficult evaluate arbitrary combinations of software modules [SECREQMTS]. Even when a single address space is offered by the execution environment, the hardware module MAY accommodate separate loading of the bootstrap loader and the firmware package. In this hardware module design, the bootstrap loader and the rest of the firmware are stored in separate portions of non-volatile memory. The firmware package MAY depend on routines that are part of the bootstrap loader such as a memory manager, heap manager, one-way hash function, or digital signature processing. To minimize the security evaluation complexity of this hardware module employing such a design, the firmware package MUST identify the package identifier and minimum version number of the bootstrap loader. The bootstrap loader MUST reject a firmware package load if it contains a bootstrap loader identifier other than the one that is executing or the identified bootstrap loader version is greater than the one that is executing. A few hardware module architectures employ a separation kernel to provide more than one space for firmware execution. In this architecture, the bootstrap loader is used to separately load the separation kernel and firmware packages. The bootstrap loader MAY be permanently stored in read-only memory or separately loaded into non- Housley [Page 12] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 volatile memory as discussed above. The separation kernel and the other firmware packages are each stored in separate portions of non- volatile memory. The firmware packages MAY have dependencies on routines provided by the separation kernel or the bootstrap loader. To minimize the security evaluation complexity of this hardware module employing such a design, the firmware package must identify the package identifiers and minimum version numbers of the separation kernel and bootstrap loader. The bootstrap loader MUST reject a firmware package load if it contains a separation kernel identifier other than the one that is already loaded or the identified separation kernel version is greater than the one that is already loaded. Likewise, the bootstrap loader MUST reject a firmware package load if it contains a bootstrap loader identifier other than the one that is executing or the identified bootstrap loader version is greater than the one that is executing. 1.4 ASN.1 Encoding The CMS makes use of Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) [X.208-88, X.209-88]. ASN.1 is a formal notation used for describing data protocols, regardless of programming language used by the implementation. Encoding rules describe how the values defined in ASN.1 will be represented for transmission. The Basic Encoding Rules (BER) are the most widely employed rule set, but they offer more than one way to represent data structures. For example, definite length encoding and indefinite length encoding are supported. This flexibility is not desirable when digital signatures are use in a system. As a result, the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) [X.509-88] were invented. DER is a subset of BER which ensures a single way to represent a given value. For example, DER always employs definite length encoding. In this specification, digitally signed structures MUST be encoded with DER. Other structures do not require DER, but the use of definite length encoding is strongly RECOMMENDED. By always using definite length encoding, the bootstrap loader will have fewer options to implement. 1.5 Protected Firmware Package Loading This document does not attempt to specify a protocol for loading firmware packages. Many different delivery mechanisms are envisioned, including portable memory devices, file transfer, and web pages. Section 2 of this specification defines the format that MUST be presented to the hardware module regardless of the interface that is used. This specification also specifies the format of the response that MAY be generated by the hardware module. Section 3 of this specification defines the format that MAY be returned by the Housley [Page 13] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 hardware module when a firmware package loads successfully. Section 4 of this specification defines the format that MAY be returned by the hardware module when a firmware package load is unsuccessful. The firmware package load receipts and firmware package load error reports can be either signed or unsigned. 2 Firmware Package Protection The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) is used to protect firmware, which is treated as an opaque binary object. A digital signature is used to protect the firmware package from undetected modification and provide data origin authentication. Encryption is optionally used to protect the firmware from disclosure, and compression is optionally used to reduce the size of the protected firmware package. The CMS ContentInfo content type MUST always be present, and it MUST encapsulate the CMS SignedData content type. If the firmware package is encrypted, then the CMS SignedData content type MUST encapsulate the CMS EncryptedData content type. If the firmware package is compressed, then either the CMS SignedData content type (when encryption is not used) or the CMS EncryptedData content type (when encryption is used) MUST encapsulate the CMS CompressedData content type. Finally, either the CMS SignedData content type (when neither encryption nor compression is used) or the CMS EncryptedData content type (when encryption is used, but compression is not used) or CMS CompressedData content type (when compression is used) MUST encapsulate the simple firmware package using the FirmwarePkgData content type defined in this specification (see section 2.1.5). The firmware protection is summarized by (see [CMS] for the full syntax): ContentInfo { contentType id-signedData, -- (1.2.840.113549.1.7.2) content SignedData } SignedData { version CMSVersion, digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers, encapContentInfo EncapsulatedContentInfo, certificates CertificateSet, -- Signer certification path crls CertificateRevocationLists, -- Omit signerInfos SET OF SignerInfo -- Only one } Housley [Page 14] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 SignerInfo { version CMSVersion, sid SignerIdentifier, digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier, signedAttrs SignedAttributes, -- Required signatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier, signature SignatureValue, unsignedAttrs UnsignedAttributes -- Optional } EncapsulatedContentInfo { eContentType id-encryptedData, -- (1.2.840.113549.1.7.6) -- OR -- id-ct-compressedData, -- (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.9) -- OR -- id-ct-firmwarePackage, -- (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.16) eContent OCTET STRING -- Contains EncryptedData OR -- CompressedData OR FirmwarePkgData } EncryptedData { version CMSVersion, encryptedContentInfo EncryptedContentInfo, unprotectedAttrs UnprotectedAttributes -- Omit } EncryptedContentInfo { contentType id-ct-compressedData, -- (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.9) -- OR -- id-ct-firmwarePackage, -- (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.16) contentEncryptionAlgorithm ContentEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier, encryptedContent OCTET STRING -- Contains CompressedData OR -- FirmwarePkgData } CompressedData { version CMSVersion, compressionAlgorithm CompressionAlgorithmIdentifier, encapContentInfo EncapsulatedContentInfo } Housley [Page 15] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 EncapsulatedContentInfo { eContentType id-ct-firmwarePackage, -- (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.16) eContent OCTET STRING -- Contains FirmwarePkgData } FirmwarePkgData OCTET STRING -- Contains the firmware 2.1 Firmware Package Protection CMS Content Type Profile This section specifies the conventions for using the CMS ContentInfo, SignedData, EncryptedData, and CompressedData content types. It also defines the FirmwarePkgData content type. 2.1.1 ContentInfo The CMS requires the outer most encapsulation to be ContentInfo [CMS]. The fields of ContentInfo are used as follows: contentType indicates the type of the associated content, and in this case, the encapsulated type is always SignedData. The id- signedData (1.2.840.113549.1.7.2) object identifier MUST be present in this field. content holds the associated content, and in this case, the encapsulated SignedData MUST be present in this field. 2.1.2 SignedData The SignedData content type [CMS] contains the signed firmware package (which might be compressed, encrypted, or compressed and then encrypted prior to signature), the certificates needed to validate the signature, and one digital signature value. The fields of SignedData are used as follows: version is the syntax version number, and in this case, it MUST be set to 3. digestAlgorithms is a collection of message digest algorithm identifiers, and in this case, it MUST contain a single message digest algorithm identifier. The message digest algorithm employed by the firmware signer MUST be present. encapContentInfo is the signed content, consisting of a content type identifier and the content itself. The use of the EncapsulatedContentInfo type is discussed further in section 2.1.2.2. Housley [Page 16] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 certificates is an optional collection of certificates. If the trust anchor directly signed the firmware package, then certificates SHOULD be omitted. If the trust anchor signed a certificate, then certificates MUST include the X.509 certificate of the firmware signer. The set of certificates MAY be sufficient for the bootstrap loader to construct a certification path from the trust anchor to the firmware signer's certificate. PKCS#6 extended certificates [PKCS#6] and attribute certificates (either version 1 or version 2) [X.509-97, X.509-00, ACPROFILE] MUST NOT be included in the set of certificates. crls is an optional collection of certificate revocation lists (CRLs), and in this case, CRLs MUST NOT be included. It is anticipated that firmware packages may be generated, signed, and made available in repositories for downloading into hardware modules. In such contexts, it would be difficult to include timely CRLs in the firmware package. signerInfos is a collection of per-signer information, and in this case, the collection MUST contain exactly one SignerInfo. The use of the SignerInfo type is discussed further in section 2.1.2.1. 2.1.2.1 SignerInfo The firmware signer is represented in the SignerInfo type. The fields of SignerInfo are used as follows: version is the syntax version number, and it MUST be 3. sid identifies the signer's public key. CMS supports two alternatives: issuerAndSerialNumber and subjectKeyIdentifier. However, the bootstrap loader MUST support the subjectKeyIdentifier alternative. The subjectKeyIdentifier alternative identifies the signer's public key directly. When this public key is contained in a certificate, this identifier appears in the X.509 subjectKeyIdentifier extension. Public key identifiers SHOULD be assigned using one of the methods specified in section 4.2.1.2 of RFC 3280 [PROFILE]. digestAlgorithm identifies the message digest algorithm, and any associated parameters, used by the firmware signer. It MUST contain the message digest algorithms employed by the signer of the encrypted firmware package. (Note that this message digest algorithm identifier MUST be the same as the one carried in the digestAlgorithms value in SignedData.) signedAttrs is an optional collection of attributes that are signed along with the content. The signedAttrs are optional in Housley [Page 17] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 the CMS, but in this specification, signedAttrs are REQUIRED for the firmware package. However, implementations MAY ignore unrecognized signed attributes. The SET OF attributes MUST be DER encoded [X.509-88]. Section 2.2 of this document lists the attributes that MUST be included in the collection; other attributes MAY be included as well. signatureAlgorithm identifies the signature algorithm, and any associated parameters, used by the firmware signer to generate the digital signature. signature is the digital signature value. unsignedAttrs is an optional SET of attributes that are not signed. As described in section 2.3, this set can only contain a single instance of the wrapped-firmware-decryption-key attribute and no others. 2.1.2.2 EncapsulatedContentInfo The EncapsulatedContentInfo content type encapsulates the firmware package, which might be compressed, encrypted, or compressed and then encrypted prior to signature. The firmware package, in any of these formats, is carried within the EncapsulatedContentInfo type. The fields of EncapsulatedContentInfo are used as follows: eContentType is an object identifier that uniquely specifies the content type, and in this case, the value MUST be either id- encryptedData (1.2.840.113549.1.7.6), id-ct-compressedData (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.9), or id-ct-firmwarePackage (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.16). When it contains id-encryptedData, then the firmware packages was encrypted prior to signing, and the firmware package may also have been compressed prior to encryption. When it contains id-ct-compressedData, then the firmware package was compressed prior to signing, but the firmware package was not encrypted. When it contains id-ct- firmwarePackage, then the firmware package was not compressed or encrypted prior to signing. eContent is the encrypted firmware, encoded as an octet string. The eContent octet string need not be DER encoded. 2.1.3 EncryptedData The EncryptedData content type [CMS] contains the encrypted firmware package (which might be compressed prior to encryption). However, if the firmware package was not encrypted, the EncryptedData content type is not present. The fields of EncryptedData are used as Housley [Page 18] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 follows: version is the syntax version number, and in this case, version MUST be 0. encryptedContentInfo is the encrypted content information. The use of the EncryptedContentInfo type is discussed further in section 2.1.3.1. unprotectedAttrs is an optional collection of unencrypted attributes, and in this case, unprotectedAttrs MUST NOT be present. 2.1.3.1 EncryptedContentInfo The encrypted firmware package is encapsulated in the EncryptedContentInfo type. The fields of EncryptedContentInfo are used as follows: contentType indicates the type of content, and in this case, it MUST contain either id-ct-compressedData (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.9) or id-ct-firmwarePackage (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.16). When it contains id-ct- compressedData, then the firmware package was compressed prior to encryption. When it contains id-ct-firmwarePackage, then the firmware package was not compressed prior to encryption. contentEncryptionAlgorithm identifies the firmware-encryption algorithm, and any associated parameters, used to encrypt the firmware package. encryptedContent is the result of encrypting the firmware package. The field is optional; however, in this case, it MUST be present. 2.1.4 CompressedData The CompressedData content type [COMPRESS] contains the compressed firmware package. If the firmware package was not compressed, then the CompressedData content type is not present. The fields of CompressedData are used as follows: version is the syntax version number; in this case, it MUST be 0. compressionAlgorithm identifies the compression algorithm, and any associated parameters, used to compress the firmware package. encapContentInfo is the compressed content, consisting of a content type identifier and the content itself. The use of the Housley [Page 19] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 EncapsulatedContentInfo type is discussed further in section 2.1.4.1. 2.1.4.1 EncapsulatedContentInfo The CompressedData content type encapsulates the compressed firmware package, and it carried within the EncapsulatedContentInfo type. The fields of EncapsulatedContentInfo are used as follows: eContentType is an object identifier that uniquely specifies the content type, and in this case, it MUST be the value of id-ct- firmwarePackage (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.16). eContent is the compressed firmware, encoded as an octet string. The eContent octet string need not be DER encoded. 2.1.5 FirmwarePkgData The FirmwarePkgData content type contains the firmware package. It is a straightforward encapsulation in an octet string, and it need not be DER encoded. The FirmwarePkgData content type is identified by the id-ct- firmwarePackage object identifier: id-ct-firmwarePackage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) ct(1) 16 } The FirmwarePkgData content type is a simple octet string: FirmwarePkgData ::= OCTET STRING 2.2 Signed Attributes The firmware signer MUST digitally sign a collection of attributes along with the firmware package. Each attribute in the collection MUST be DER encoded [X.509-88]. The syntax for attributes is defined in [CMS], but it is repeated here for convenience: Attribute ::= SEQUENCE { attrType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, attrValues SET OF AttributeValue } AttributeValue ::= ANY Each of the attributes used with this profile has a single attribute value, even though the syntax is defined as a SET OF AttributeValue. Housley [Page 20] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 There MUST be exactly one instance of AttributeValue present. The SignedAttributes syntax within signerInfo is defined as a SET OF Attributes. The SignedAttributes MUST include only one instance of any particular attribute. The firmware signer MUST include the following four attributes: content-type, message-digest, firmware-package-identifier, and target-hardware-module-identifiers. If the firmware package is encrypted, then the firmware signer MUST also include the decrypt-key-identifier attribute. If the firmware package implements cryptographic algorithms, then the firmware signer MUST also include the implemented-crypto-algorithms attribute. If the firmware package is intended for use only by specific communities, then the firmware signer MUST also include the community-identifiers attribute. If the firmware package contains a bootstrap loader or a separation kernel, then the firmware signer MUST also include the firmware- package-info attribute. Also, if the firmware package contains a dependency on a particular bootstrap loader or separation kernel, then the firmware signer MUST also include the firmware-package-info attribute. The firmware signer SHOULD also include the three following attributes: firmware-package-message-digest, signing-time, and content-hints. Additionally, if the firmware signer has a certificate (meaning that the firmware signer in not always configured as a trust anchor), then the firmware signer SHOULD also include signing-certificate attribute. The firmware signer MAY include any other attribute that it deems appropriate. 2.2.1 Content Type The firmware signer MUST include a content-type attribute with the value of id-encryptedData (1.2.840.113549.1.7.6), id-ct- compressedData (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.9), or id-ct-firmwarePackage (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.16). When it contains id-encryptedData, then the firmware packages was encrypted prior to signing. When it contains id-ct-compressedData, then the firmware package was compressed prior to signing, but the firmware package was not encrypted. When it contains id-ct-firmwarePackage, then the firmware Housley [Page 21] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 package was not compressed or encrypted prior to signing. Section 11.1 of [CMS] defines the content-type attribute. 2.2.2 Message Digest The firmware signer MUST include a message-digest attribute, having as its value the message digest computed on the encapContentInfo eContent octet string. This octet string contains the firmware package, and it MAY be compressed, encrypted, or both compressed and encrypted. Section 11.2 of [CMS] defines the message-digest attribute. 2.2.3 Firmware Package Identifier The firmware-package-identifier attribute type names the protected firmware package with an object identifier and a version number. The object identifier names a collection of functions implemented by the firmware package, and the version number is a non-negative integer that identifies a particular build or release of the firmware package. In case a firmware package with a disastrous flaw is released, the firmware package that repairs the previously distributed flaw MAY designate a stale version number to prevent the reloading of the flawed version. The hardware module bootstrap loader SHOULD prevent subsequent rollback to the stale version or versions earlier than the stale version. The following object identifier identifies the firmware-package- identifier attribute: id-aa-firmwarePackageID OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) aa(2) 35 } The firmware-package-identifier attribute values have ASN.1 type FirmwarePackageIdentifier: FirmwarePackageIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { fwPkgID OBJECT IDENTIFIER, verNum INTEGER (0..MAX), staleVerNum INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL } 2.2.4 Target Hardware Module Identifiers The target-hardware-module-identifiers attribute type names the types of hardware modules that the firmware package supports. A unique object identifier names each supported hardware model and revision. Housley [Page 22] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 The following object identifier identifies the target-hardware- module-identifiers attribute: id-aa-targetHardwareIDs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) aa(2) 36 } The target-hardware-module-identifiers attribute values have ASN.1 type TargetHardwareIdentifiers: TargetHardwareIdentifiers ::= SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER 2.2.5 Decrypt Key Identifier The decrypt-key-identifier attribute type names the symmetric key needed to decrypt the encapsulated firmware package. No particular structure is imposed on the key identifier. The means by which the firmware-decryption key is securely distributed to all modules that are authorized to use the associated firmware package is beyond the scope of this specification. The following object identifier identifies the decrypt-key-identifier attribute: id-aa-decryptKeyID OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) aa(2) 37 } The decrypt-key-identifier attribute values have ASN.1 type DecryptKeyIdentifier: DecryptKeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING 2.2.6 Implemented Crypto Algorithms The implemented-crypto-algorithms attribute type names the cryptographic algorithms that are implemented by the firmware package and available to applications. Only those algorithms that are made available at the interface of the cryptographic module are to be listed. Any cryptographic algorithm that is used internally and not accessible via the cryptographic module interface MUST NOT be listed. For example, if the firmware package implements the decryption algorithm for future firmware installations and this algorithm is not made available outside the cryptographic module, then the firmware- decryption algorithm would not be listed. The object identifier portion of its AlgorithmIdentifier identifies Housley [Page 23] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 each algorithm. The following object identifier identifies the implemented-crypto- algorithms attribute: id-aa-implCryptoAlgs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) aa(2) 38 } The implemented-crypto-algorithms attribute values have ASN.1 type ImplementedCryptoAlgorithms: ImplementedCryptoAlgorithms ::= SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER 2.2.7 Community Identifiers The community-identifiers attribute type names the communities that are permitted to execute the firmware package. The bootstrap loader MUST reject the firmware package if the hardware module is not a member of one of the identified communities. The means of assigning community membership is beyond the scope of this specification. The community-identifiers attribute type names the authorized communities by a list of community object identifiers, by a list of hardware module identifiers, or by a combination of the two lists. A hardware module identifier is an object identifier that names the hardware module type and a serial number. To facilitate compact representation of serial numbers, a contiguous block can be specified by the lowest authorized serial number and the highest authorized serial number. If the bootstrap loader does not have a mechanism for obtaining a list of object identifiers that identify the communities to which the hardware module is a member, then the bootstrap loader MUST behave as though the list is empty. Similarly, if the bootstrap loader does not have access to the hardware module serial number, then the bootstrap loader MUST behave as though the hardware module is not included on the list of authorized hardware modules. The following object identifier identifies the community-identifiers attribute: id-aa-communityIdentifiers OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) aa(2) 40 } Housley [Page 24] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 The community-identifiers attribute values have ASN.1 type CommunityIdentifiers: CommunityIdentifiers ::= SEQUENCE OF CommunityIdentifier CommunityIdentifier ::= CHOICE { communityOID OBJECT IDENTIFIER, hwModuleList HardwareModules } HardwareModules ::= SEQUENCE { hwType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, hwSerialEntries SEQUENCE OF HardwareSerialEntry } HardwareSerialEntry ::= CHOICE { single OCTET STRING, block SEQUENCE { low OCTET STRING, high OCTET STRING } } 2.2.8 Firmware Package Information If the firmware package contains a bootstrap loader or a separation kernel, then the firmware signer MUST also include the firmware- package-info attribute to identify the firmware package type. Also, if the firmware package contains a dependency on another formware package, then the firmware signer MUST also include the firmware- package-info attribute to explicitly identify the dependencies. The firmware-package-info attribute identifies the firmware package type as a bootstrap loader, a separation kernel, or an application. The firmware-package-info attribute optionally identifies dependencies. Bootstrap loader packages MUST NOT contain any dependencies. Separation kernel packages SHOULD only contain dependencies on the bootstrap loader. Application packages SHOULD only contain dependencies on the bootstrap loader and the separation kernel. Dependencies are identified by the firmware package identifier, which is an object identifier, and the minimum version of that firmware package, which is an integer. The bootstrap loader MUST reject a firmware package load if it identifies a dependency on a bootstrap loader identifier other than the one that is executing or the identified bootstrap loader version is greater than the one that is executing. The bootstrap loader MUST reject a firmware package load if it identifies a dependency on a separation kernel identifier other than the one that is already loaded or the identified separation kernel Housley [Page 25] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 version is greater than the one that is already loaded. The following object identifier identifies the firmware-package-info attribute: id-aa-firmwarePackageInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) aa(2) 42 } The firmware-package-info attribute values have ASN.1 type FirmwarePackageInfo: FirmwarePackageInfo ::= SEQUENCE { fwPkgType FWPackageType DEFAULT firmwarePackage, dependencies SEQUENCE OF FWPackageRef OPTIONAL } FWPackageType ::= ENUMERATED { bootstrapLoader (1), separationKernel (2), application (3) } FWPackageRef ::= SEQUENCE { fwPkgID OBJECT IDENTIFIER, minVerNum INTEGER } 2.2.9 Firmware Package Message Digest The firmware signer SHOULD include a firmware-package-message-digest attribute, which provides the message digest algorithm and the message digest value computed on the firmware package. The message digest is computed on the firmware package prior to any compression, encryption, or signature processing. The bootstrap loader MAY use this message digest to confirm that the intended firmware package has been recovered after all of the layers of encapsulation are removed. The following object identifier identifies the firmware-package- message-digest attribute: id-aa-fwPkgMessageDigest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) aa(2) 41 } The firmware-package-message-digest attribute values have ASN.1 type FirmwarePackageMessageDigest: FirmwarePackageMessageDigest ::= SEQUENCE { algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, Housley [Page 26] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 msgDigest OCTET STRING } 2.2.10 Signing Time The firmware signer SHOULD include a signing-time attribute, specifying the time at which the signature was applied to the encrypted firmware. Section 11.3 of [CMS] defines the signing-time attribute. 2.2.11 Content Hints The firmware signer SHOULD include a content-hints attribute, including a brief text description of the firmware package. The text is encoded in UTF-8, which supports most of the world's writing systems [UTF-8]. Section 2.9 of [ESS] defines the content-hints attribute. The configuration management systems employed by firmware package developers will probably not align with the firmware package naming convention required by this specification. A firmware package name associated with such a configuration management system might look something like "R1234.C0(AJ11).D62.A02.11(b)" and these strings are only meaningful to the developers. Including these firmware package names in the text description may be helpful to developers by providing a clear linkage between the two kinds of names. The content-hints attribute contains two fields, and in this case, both fields MUST be present. The fields of ContentHints are used as follows: contentDescription provides a brief text description of the firmware package. contentType provides the content type of the inner most content type, and in this case, it MUST be id-ct-firmwarePackage (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.16). 2.2.12 Signing Certificate When this firmware signer's public key is contained in a certificate, firmware signer SHOULD include a signing-certificate attribute to identify the certificate that was employed. However, if the firmware package signature does not have a certificate (meaning that the signature will only be validated with the trust anchor public key), then the firmware signer is unable to include a signing-certificate attribute. Section 5.4 of [ESS] defines the signing-certificate attribute. Housley [Page 27] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 The signing-certificate attribute contains two fields: certs and policies. The certs field MUST be present, and the policies field MAY be present. The fields of SigningCertificate are used as follows: certs contains a sequence of certificate identifiers. In this case, sequence of certificate identifiers contains a single entry. The certs field MUST contain only the certificate identifier of the certificate that contains the public key used to verify the firmware signature. The certs field uses the ESSCertID syntax specified in section 5.4 of [ESS], and it is comprised of the SHA-1 hash [SHA1] of the entire ASN.1 DER encoded certificate and, optionally, the certificate issuer and the certificate serial number. The SHA-1 hash value MUST be present. The certificate issuer and the certificate serial number SHOULD be present. policies is optional, and when it is present, it contains a sequence of policy information. In this case, the sequence of policy information contains a single entry. The policies field, when present, MUST contain only one entry, and that entry MUST match one of the certificate policies in the certificate policies extension of the certificate that contains the public key used to verify the firmware signature. The policies field uses the PolicyInformation syntax specified in section 4.2.1.5 of [PROFILE], and it is comprised of the certificate policy object identifier and, optionally, certificate policy qualifiers. The certificate policy object identifier MUST be present. The certificate policy qualifiers SHOULD NOT be present. 2.3 Unsigned Attributes CMS allows a SET of unsigned attributes to be included; however, in this specification, the set MUST be absent or include a single instance of the wrapped-firmware-decryption-key attribute. Since the digital signature does not cover this attribute, it can be altered at any point in the delivery path from the firmware signer to the hardware module. This property can be employed to distribute the firmware-decryption key along with an encrypted and signed firmware package, allowing the firmware-decryption key to be wrapped with a different key-encryption key for each link in the distribution chain. The syntax for attributes is defined in [CMS], and it is repeated at the beginning of section 2.2 of this document for convenience. Each of the attributes used with this profile has a single attribute value, even though the syntax is defined as a SET OF AttributeValue. There MUST be exactly one instance of AttributeValue present. The UnsignedAttributes syntax within signerInfo is defined as a SET Housley [Page 28] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 OF Attributes. The UnsignedAttributes MUST include only one instance of any particular attribute. 2.3.1 Wrapped Firmware Decryption Key The firmware signer, or any other party in the distribution chain, MAY include a wrapped-firmware-decryption-key attribute. The following object identifier identifies the wrapped-firmware- decryption-key attribute: id-aa-wrappedFirmwareKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) aa(2) 39 } The wrapped-firmware-decryption-key attribute values have ASN.1 type of EnvelopedData. Section 6 of [CMS] defines the EnvelopedData content type, which is used to construct the value of the attribute. EnvelopedData permits the firmware-decryption key to be protected using symmetric or asymmetric techniques. The EnvelopedData does not include an encrypted content, as the key normally used to decrypt the encapsulated content is the firmware-decryption key. Section 6 of [CMS] refers to this key as the content-encryption key. The EnvelopedData syntax support many different key management algorithms. Four general techniques are supported: key transport, key agreement, symmetric key-encryption keys, and passwords. The EnvelopedData content type is profiled for the wrapped-firmware- decryption-key attribute. The EnvelopedData fields are described fully in Section 6 of [CMS]. Additional rules apply when EnvelopedData is used as a wrapped-firmware-decryption-key attribute. Within the EnvelopedData structure: - The set of certificates included in OriginatorInfo MUST NOT include certificates with a type of extendedCertificate or v1AttrCert. - The optional unprotectedAttrs field MUST NOT be present. Housley [Page 29] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 Within the EncryptedContentInfo structure: - contentType MUST contain id-data (1.2.840.113549.1.7.1). - contentEncryptionAlgorithm identifies the firmware-encryption algorithm, and any associated parameters, used to encrypt the firmware package. - encryptedContent is optional, and in this case, it MUST NOT be present. 3 Firmware Package Load Receipt The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) is used to indicate that a firmware package loaded successfully. Support for firmware package load receipts is OPTIONAL. However, those hardware modules that choose to generate such receipts MUST follow the conventions specified in this section. Since not all hardware modules will have private signature keys, the firmware package load receipt can either be signed or unsigned. Use of the signed firmware package load receipt is RECOMMENDED. Hardware modules that support receipt generation MUST have a unique serial number. Hardware modules that support signed receipt generation MUST have a private signature key to sign the receipt, and a corresponding signature validation certificate to include in the receipt to aid validation. The unsigned firmware package load receipt is encapsulated by ContentInfo. Alternatively, the signed firmware package load error report is encapsulated by SignedData, which is in turn encapsulated by ContentInfo. The firmware package load receipt protection is summarized by (see [CMS] for the full syntax): ContentInfo { contentType id-signedData, -- (1.2.840.113549.1.7.2) -- OR -- id-ct-firmwareLoadReceipt, -- (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.17) content SignedData -- OR -- OCTET STRING -- which encapsulates -- FirmwarePackageLoadReceipt } Housley [Page 30] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 SignedData { version CMSVersion, digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers, encapContentInfo EncapsulatedContentInfo, certificates CertificateSet, -- Module certificate crls CertificateRevocationLists, -- Omit signerInfos SET OF SignerInfo -- Only one } SignerInfo { version CMSVersion, sid SignerIdentifier, digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier, signedAttrs SignedAttributes, -- Required signatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier, signature SignatureValue, unsignedAttrs UnsignedAttributes -- Omit } EncapsulatedContentInfo { eContentType id-ct-firmwareLoadReceipt, -- (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.17) eContent OCTET STRING -- Contains receipt } FirmwarePackageLoadReceipt { hwType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- Hardware module type hwSerialNum OCTET STRING, -- H/W module serial number fwPkgID OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- Package identifier verNum INTEGER, -- Release or build number trustAnchorKeyID OCTET STRING, -- Optional decryptKeyID OCTET STRING -- Optional } 3.1 Firmware Package Load Receipt CMS Content Type Profile This section specifies the conventions for using the CMS ContentInfo and SignedData content types for firmware package load receipts. It also defines the firmware package load receipt content type. 3.1.1 ContentInfo The CMS requires the outer most encapsulation to be ContentInfo [CMS]. The fields of ContentInfo are used as follows: contentType indicates the type of the associated content. If the firmware load receipt is signed, then the encapsulated type MUST be SignedData, and the id-signedData (1.2.840.113549.1.7.2) object Housley [Page 31] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 identifier MUST be present in this field. If the firmware load receipt is not signed, then the encapsulated type MUST be FirmwarePackageLoadReceipt, and the id-ct-firmwareLoadReceipt (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.17) object identifier MUST be present in this field. content holds the associated content. If the firmware load receipt is signed, then the encapsulated SignedData MUST be present in this field. If the firmware load error report is not signed, then this field MUT contain an OCTET STRING, and that OCTET STRING MUST encapsulate the FirmwarePackageLoadReceipt. 3.1.2 SignedData The SignedData content type consists the firmware package load receipt, the hardware module certificate, and one digital signature. The fields of SignedData are used as follows: version is the syntax version number, and in this case, is MUST be set to 3. digestAlgorithms is a collection of message digest algorithm identifiers, and in this case, it MUST contain a single message digest algorithm identifier. The message digest algorithms employed by the hardware module MUST be present. encapContentInfo is the signed content, consisting of a content type identifier and the content itself. The use of the EncapsulatedContentInfo type is discussed further in section 3.1.2.2. certificates is an optional collection of certificates, and in this case, it MUST include the X.509 certificate of the hardware module. PKCS#6 extended certificates [PKCS#6] and attribute certificates (either version 1 or version 2) [X.509-97, X.509-00, ACPROFILE] MUST NOT be included in the set of certificates. crls is an optional collection of certificate revocation lists (CRLs), and in this case, CRLs MUST NOT be included. (Hardware modules will probably not have the ability to obtain the most recent CRLs for inclusion.) signerInfos is a collection of per-signer information, and in this case, the collection MUST contain exactly one SignerInfo. The use of the SignerInfo type is discussed further in section 3.1.2.1. Housley [Page 32] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 3.1.2.1 SignerInfo The hardware module is represented in the SignerInfo type. The fields of SignerInfo are used as follows: version is the syntax version number, and it MUST be either 1 or 3, depending on the method used to identify the hardware module's public key. The use of the subjectKeyIdentifier is RECOMMENDED, which results in the use of version 3. sid specifies the hardware module's certificate (and thereby the hardware module's public key). CMS supports two alternatives: issuerAndSerialNumber and subjectKeyIdentifier. However, the hardware module MUST support only one of the alternatives. The issuerAndSerialNumber alternative identifies the hardware module's certificate by the issuer's distinguished name and the certificate serial number. The identified certificate, in turn, contains the hardware module's public key. The subjectKeyIdentifier alternative identifies the hardware module's public key directly. When this public key is contained in a certificate, this identifier appears in the X.509 subjectKeyIdentifier extension. Public key identifiers SHOULD be assigned using one of the methods specified in section 4.2.1.2 of RFC 3280 [PROFILE]. The use of the subjectKeyIdentifier by hardware modules is RECOMMENDED. digestAlgorithm identifies the message digest algorithm, and any associated parameters, used by the hardware module. It MUST contain the message digest algorithms employed to sign the receipt. (Note that this message digest algorithm identifier MUST be the same as the one carried in the digestAlgorithms value in SignedData.) signedAttrs is an optional collection of attributes that are signed along with the content. The signedAttrs are optional in the CMS, but in this specification, signedAttrs are REQUIRED for use with the firmware package load receipt content. The SET OF attributes MUST be DER encoded [X.509-88]. Section 3.2 of this document lists the attributes that MUST be included in the collection. signatureAlgorithm identifies the signature algorithm, and any associated parameters, used by to sign the receipt. signature is the digital signature. unsignedAttrs is an optional collection of attributes that are not signed, and in this case, there MUST NOT be any unsigned attributes present. Housley [Page 33] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 3.1.2.2 EncapsulatedContentInfo The FirmwarePackageLoadReceipt is encapsulated in an OCTET STRING, and it is carried within the EncapsulatedContentInfo type. The fields of EncapsulatedContentInfo are used as follows: eContentType is an object identifier that uniquely specifies the content type, and in this case, it MUST be the value of id-ct- firmwareLoadReceipt (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.17). eContent is the firmware package load receipt, encapsulated in an OCTET STRING. The eContent octet string need not be DER encoded. 3.1.3 FirmwarePackageLoadReceipt The following object identifier identifies the firmware package load receipt content type: id-ct-firmwareLoadReceipt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) ct(1) 17 } The firmware package load receipt content type has the ASN.1 type FirmwarePackageLoadReceipt: FirmwarePackageLoadReceipt ::= SEQUENCE { hwType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, hwSerialNum OCTET STRING, fwPkgID OBJECT IDENTIFIER, verNum INTEGER (0..MAX), trustAnchorKeyID [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, decryptKeyID [2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL } The fields of the FirmwarePackageLoadReceipt type have the following meanings: hwType is an object identifier that identifies the type of hardware module on which the firmware package was loaded. hwSerialNum is the serial number of the hardware module on which the firmware package was loaded. No particular structure is imposed on the serial number; it need not be an integer. However, the combination of the hwType and hwSerialNum uniquely identifies the hardware module. fwPkgID identifies the type of firmware package that was loaded. verNum identifies the version of firmware package that was loaded. Housley [Page 34] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 The combination of the fwPkgID and verNum specify a particular firmware package. The version number is a non-negative integer that identifies a particular build or release of the firmware package. trustAnchorKeyID identifies the trust anchor that was used to validate the firmware package signature. decryptKeyID is optional, and when it is present it identifies the firmware-decryption key that was used to decrypt the firmware package. The Firmware Package Load Receipt MUST include the hwType, hwSerialNum, fwPkgID, and verNum fields, and it SHOULD include the trustAnchorKeyID field. The Firmware Package Load Receipt MUST include the decryptKeyID only if the firmware package associated with the receipt is encrypted, the firmware-decryption key is available, and the firmware package was successfully decrypted. 3.2 Signed Attributes The hardware module MUST digitally sign a collection of attributes along with the firmware package load receipt. Each attribute in the collection in MUST be DER encoded [X.509-88]. The syntax for attributes is defined in [CMS], and it was repeated in section 2.2 for convenience. Each of the attributes used with this profile has a single attribute value, even though the syntax is defined as a SET OF AttributeValue. There MUST be exactly one instance of AttributeValue present. The SignedAttributes syntax within signerInfo is defined as a SET OF Attributes. The SignedAttributes MUST include only one instance of any particular attribute. The hardware module MUST include the content-type and message-digest attributes. If the hardware module includes a real-time clock, then the hardware module SHOULD also include the signing-time attribute. The hardware module MAY include any other attribute that it deems appropriate. 3.2.1 Content Type The hardware module MUST include a content-type attribute with the value of id-ct-firmwareLoadReceipt (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.17). Section 11.1 of [CMS] defines the content-type attribute. Housley [Page 35] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 3.2.2 Message Digest The hardware module MUST include a message-digest attribute, having as its value the message digest of the FirmwarePackageLoadReceipt content. Section 11.2 of [CMS] defines the message-digest attribute. 3.2.3 Signing Time If the hardware module includes a real-time clock, then hardware module SHOULD include a signing-time attribute, specifying the time at which the receipt was generated. Section 11.3 of [CMS] defines the signing-time attribute. 4 Firmware Package Load Error The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) is used to indicate that an error has occurred while attempted to load a protected firmware package. Support for firmware package load error reports is OPTIONAL. However, those hardware modules that choose to generate such error reports MUST follow the conventions specified in this section. Hardware modules that support error report generation MUST have a unique serial number. Hardware modules that support signed error report generation MUST also have a private signature key to sign the error report, and a corresponding signature validation certificate to include in the error report to aid validation. The unsigned firmware package load error report is encapsulated by ContentInfo. Alternatively, the signed firmware package load error report is encapsulated by SignedData, which is in turn encapsulated by ContentInfo. The firmware package load receipt protection is summarized by (see [CMS] for the full syntax): ContentInfo { contentType id-signedData, -- (1.2.840.113549.1.7.2) -- OR -- id-ct-firmwareLoadError, -- (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.18) content SignedData -- OR -- OCTET STRING -- which encapsulates -- FirmwarePackageLoadError } Housley [Page 36] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 SignedData { version CMSVersion, digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers, encapContentInfo EncapsulatedContentInfo, certificates CertificateSet, -- Module certificate crls CertificateRevocationLists, -- Omit signerInfos SET OF SignerInfo -- Only one } SignerInfo { version CMSVersion, sid SignerIdentifier, digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier, signedAttrs SignedAttributes, -- Required signatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier, signature SignatureValue, unsignedAttrs UnsignedAttributes -- Omit } EncapsulatedContentInfo { eContentType id-ct-firmwareLoadError, -- (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.18) eContent OCTET STRING -- Contains error report } FirmwarePackageLoadError { hwType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- Hardware module type hwSerialNum OCTET STRING, -- H/W module serial number fwPkgID OBJECT IDENTIFIER, -- Package identifier verNum INTEGER, -- Release or build number errorCode INTEGER -- Identifies the error } 4.1 Firmware Package Load Error CMS Content Type Profile This section specifies the conventions for using the CMS ContentInfo and SignedData content types for firmware package load error reports. It also defines the firmware package load error content type. 4.1.1 ContentInfo The CMS requires the outer most encapsulation to be ContentInfo [CMS]. The fields of ContentInfo are used as follows: contentType indicates the type of the associated content. If the firmware load error report is signed, then the encapsulated type MUST be SignedData, and the id-signedData (1.2.840.113549.1.7.2) Housley [Page 37] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 object identifier MUST be present in this field. If the firmware load error report is not signed, then the encapsulated type MUST be FirmwarePackageLoadError, and the id-ct-firmwareLoadError (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.18) object identifier MUST be present in this field. content holds the associated content. If the firmware load error report is signed, then the encapsulated SignedData MUST be present in this field. If the firmware load error report is not signed, then this field MUT contain an OCTET STRING, and that OCTET STRING MUST encapsulate the FirmwarePackageLoadError. 4.1.2 SignedData The SignedData content type consists the firmware package load error report, the hardware module certificate, and one digital signature. The fields of SignedData are used exactly as described in section 3.1.2. 4.1.2.1 SignerInfo The hardware module is represented in the SignerInfo type. The fields of SignerInfo are used exactly as described in section 3.1.2.1. 4.1.2.2 EncapsulatedContentInfo The FirmwarePackageLoadError is encapsulated in an OCTET STRING, and it is carried within the EncapsulatedContentInfo type. The fields of EncapsulatedContentInfo are used as follows: eContentType is an object identifier that uniquely specifies the content type, and in this case, it MUST be the value of id-ct- firmwareLoadError (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.18). eContent is the firmware package load error report, encapsulated in an OCTET STRING. The eContent octet string need not be DER encoded. 4.1.3 FirmwarePackageLoadError The following object identifier identifies the firmware package load error report content type: id-ct-firmwareLoadError OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) ct(1) 18 } Housley [Page 38] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 The firmware package load error report content type has the ASN.1 type FirmwarePackageLoadError: FirmwarePackageLoadError ::= SEQUENCE { hwType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, hwSerialNum OCTET STRING, fwPkgID OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL, verNum INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL, errorCode FirmwarePackageLoadErrorCode } FirmwarePackageLoadErrorCode ::= ENUMERATED { decodeFailure (1), badContentInfo (2), badSignedData (3), badEncapContent (4), badCertificate (5), badSignerInfo (6), badSignedAttrs (7), badUnsignedAttrs (8), missingContent (9), noTrustAnchor (10), notAuthorized (11), badDigestAlgorithm (12), badSignatureAlgorithm (13), unsupportedKeySize (14), signatureFailure (15), contentTypeMismatch (16), badEncryptedData (17), unprotectedAttrsPresent (18), badEncryptContent (19), badEncryptAlgorithm (20), missingCiphertext (21), noDecryptKey (22), decryptFailure (23), badCompressAlgorithm (24), missingCompressedContent (25), decompressFailure (26), wrongHardware (27), stalePackage (28), notInCommunity (29), unsupportedPackageType (30), wrongBootstrapLoader (31), wrongSeparationKernel (32), insufficientMemory (33), badFirmware (34), other (99) } Housley [Page 39] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 The fields of the FirmwarePackageLoadError type have the following meanings: hwType is an object identifier that identifies the type of hardware module on which the firmware package load was attempted. hwSerialNum is the serial number of the hardware module on which the firmware package load was attempted. No particular structure is imposed on the serial number; it need not be an integer. However, the combination of the hwType and hwSerialNum uniquely identifies the hardware module. fwPkgID identifies the type of firmware package that was trying to be loaded. The field is OPTIONAL so that it can be omitted when an error is detected parsing the firmware package. verNum identifies the version of firmware package that was trying to be loaded. The field is OPTIONAL so that it can be omitted when an error is detected parsing the firmware package. The combination of the fwPkgID and verNum specify a particular firmware package. The version number is a non-negative integer that identifies a particular build or release of the firmware package. errorCode identifies the error that occurred. The errorCode values have the following meanings: decodeFailure: The ASN.1 decode of the firmware load package failed. The provided input did not conform to BER, or it was not ASN.1 at all. badContentInfo: Invalid ContentInfo syntax, or the contentType carried within the ContentInfo is unknown or unsupported. badSignedData: Invalid SignedData syntax, the version is unknown or unsupported, or more than one entry is present in digestAlgorithms. badEncapContent: Invalid EncapsulatedContentInfo syntax, or the contentType carried within the eContentType is unknown or unsupported. This error can be generated due to problems located in SignedData or CompressedData. badCertificate: Invalid syntax for one or more certificates in CertificateSet. Housley [Page 40] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 badSignerInfo: Invalid SignerInfo syntax, or the version is unknown or unsupported. badSignedAttrs: Invalid signedAttrs syntax within SignerInfo, or an unknown or unsupported signed attribute is present. badUnsignedAttrs: The unsignedAttrs within SignerInfo contains an attribute other than the wrapped-firmware-decryption-key attribute, which is the only unsigned attribute supported by this specification. missingContent: The optional eContent is missing in EncapsulatedContentInfo, which is required in this specification. This error can be generated due to problems located in SignedData or CompressedData. noTrustAnchor: The sid within SignerInfo does not match to a trust anchor associated with firmware package signing. Two situations can lead to this error. In one case, the subjectKeyIdentifier does not identify the public key of a trust anchor or a certification path that terminates with an installed trust anchor. In the other case, the issuerAndSerialNumber and subjectKeyIdentifier does not identify the public key of a trust anchor or a certification path that terminates with an installed trust anchor. notAuthorized: The sid within SignerInfo leads to an installed trust anchor, but that trust anchor is not an authorized firmware package signer. badDigestAlgorithm: The digestAlgorithm in either SignerInfo or SignedData is unknown or unsupported. badSignatureAlgorithm: The signatureAlgorithm in SignerInfo is unknown or unsupported. unsupportedKeySize: The signatureAlgorithm in SignerInfo is known and supported, but the firmware package signature could not be validated because an unsupported key size was employed by the signer. signatureFailure: The signatureAlgorithm in SignerInfo is known and supported, but the signature in signature in SignerInfo could not be validated. contentTypeMismatch: The contentType carried within the eContentType does not match the content type carried in the signed attribute. Housley [Page 41] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 badEncryptedData: Invalid EncryptedData syntax, the version is unknown or unsupported, or more than one entry is present in digestAlgorithms. unprotectedAttrsPresent: EncryptedData contains unprotectedAttrs, which are not permitted in this specification. badEncryptContent: Invalid EncryptedContentInfo syntax, or the contentType carried within the contentType is unknown or unsupported. badEncryptAlgorithm: The firmware-encryption algorithm identified by contentEncryptionAlgorithm in EncryptedContentInfo is unknown or unsupported. missingCiphertext: The optional encryptedContent is missing in EncryptedContentInfo, which is required in this specification. noDecryptKey: The hardware module does not have the firmware- decryption key named in the decrypt key identifier assigned attribute. decryptFailure: The firmware package did not decrypt properly. badCompressAlgorithm: The compression algorithm identified by compressionAlgorithm in CompressedData is unknown or unsupported. missingCompressedContent: The optional eContent is missing in EncapsulatedContentInfo, which is required in this specification. decompressFailure: The firmware package did not decompress properly. wrongHardware: The processing hardware module is not listed in the target hardware module identifiers signed attribute. stalePackage: The firmware package is rejected because it is stale. notInCommunity: The hardware module is not a member of the community described in the community identifiers signed attribute. unsupportedPackageType: The firmware package type identified in the firmware package information signed attribute is not supported by the combination of the hardware module and the bootstrap loader. Housley [Page 42] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 wrongBootstrapLoader: The firmware package depends on routines that are part of the bootstrap loader, and the current bootstrap loader does not fulfill the dependencies. wrongSeparationKernel: The firmware package depends on routines that are part of the separation kernel, and the current separation kernel does not fulfill the dependencies. insufficientMemory: The firmware package could not be loaded because the hardware module did not have sufficient memory. badFirmware: The signature on the firmware package was validated, but the firmware package itself was not in an acceptable format. The details will be specific to each hardware module. For example, a hardware module that is composed of multiple processors could not find the internal tagging within the firmware package to distribute object code to each of the processors. other: An error occurred that does not fit any of the previous error codes. 4.2 Signed Attributes The hardware module MUST digitally sign a collection of attributes along with the firmware package load error report. Each attribute in the collection in MUST be DER encoded [X.509-88]. The syntax for attributes is defined in [CMS], and it was repeated in section 2.2 for convenience. Each of the attributes used with this profile has a single attribute value, even though the syntax is defined as a SET OF AttributeValue. There MUST be exactly one instance of AttributeValue present. The SignedAttributes syntax within signerInfo is defined as a SET OF Attributes. The SignedAttributes MUST include only one instance of any particular attribute. The hardware module MUST include the content-type and message-digest attributes. If the hardware module includes a real-time clock, then the hardware module SHOULD also include the signing-time attribute. The hardware module MAY include any other attribute that it deems appropriate. 4.2.1 Content Type The hardware module MUST include a content-type attribute with the value of id-ct-firmwareLoadError (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.18). Section 11.1 of [CMS] defines the content-type attribute. Housley [Page 43] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 4.2.2 Message Digest The hardware module MUST include a message-digest attribute, having as its value the message digest of the FirmwarePackageLoadError content. Section 11.2 of [CMS] defines the message-digest attribute. 4.2.3 Signing Time If the hardware module includes a real-time clock, then hardware module SHOULD include a signing-time attribute, specifying the time at which the firmware package load error report was generated. Section 11.3 of [CMS] defines the signing-time attribute. 5 Hardware Module Name Support for firmware package load receipts, as discussed in section 3, is OPTIONAL. Hardware modules that support receipt generation MUST have a unique serial number, a private signature key to sign the receipt, and a corresponding signature validation certificate [PROFILE] to include in the receipt to aid validation. The conventions for hardware module naming in the signature validation certificates are specified in this section. The hardware module vendor or a trusted third party MUST issue the signature validation certificate prior to deployment of the hardware module. The certificate is likely to be issued at the time of manufacture. The subject alternative name in this certificate identifies the hardware module. The subject distinguished name is empty, but a critical subject alternative name extension contains the hardware module name. The otherName choice within the GeneralName structure is used. The hardware module name form is identified by the id-on- hardwareModuleName object identifier: id-on-hardwareModuleName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) on(8) 4 } A HardwareModuleName is composed of an object identifier and an octet string: HardwareModuleName ::= SEQUENCE { hwType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, hwSerialNum OCTET STRING } Housley [Page 44] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 The fields of the HardwareModuleName type have the following meanings: hwType is an object identifier that identifies the type of hardware module. A unique object identifier names a hardware model and revision. hwSerialNum is the serial number of the hardware module. No particular structure is imposed on the serial number; it need not be an integer. However, the combination of the hwType and hwSerialNum uniquely identifies the hardware module. 6 References This section provides normative and informative references. 6.1 Normative References COMPRESS Gutmann, P. Compressed Data Content Type for Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). RFC 3274. June 2002. CMS Housley, R. Cryptographic Message Syntax. RFC 3369. August 2002. ESS Hoffman, P. Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME. RFC 2634. June 1999. PROFILE Housley, R., W. Polk, W. Ford, and D. Solo. Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile. RFC 3280. April 2002. SHA1 National Institute of Standards and Technology. FIPS Pub 180-1: Secure Hash Standard. 17 April 1995. STDWORDS Bradner, S. Key Words for Use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels. RFC 2119. March 1997. UTF-8 Yergeau, F. UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646. RFC 2279. January 1998. X.208-88 CCITT. Recommendation X.208: Specification of Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1). 1988. X.209-88 CCITT. Recommendation X.209: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules for Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1). 1988. Housley [Page 45] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 X.509-88 CCITT. Recommendation X.509: The Directory - Authentication Framework. 1988. 6.2 Informative References ACPROFILE Farrell, S., and R. Housley. An Internet Attribute Certificate Profile for Authorization. RFC 3281. April 2002. AES National Institute of Standards and Technology. FIPS Pub 197: Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). 26 November 2001. DPD&DPV Pinkas, D., and R. Housley. Delegated Path Validation and Delegated Path Discovery Protocol Requirements. RFC 3379. September 2002. DSS National Institute of Standards and Technology. FIPS Pub 186: Digital Signature Standard. 19 May 1994. OCSP Myers, M., R. Ankney, A. Malpani, S. Galperin, and C. Adams. X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure - Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP). RFC 2560. June 1999. PKCS#6 RSA Laboratories. PKCS #6: Extended-Certificate Syntax Standard, Version 1.5. November 1993. RANDOM Eastlake, D., S. Crocker, and J. Schiller. Randomness Recommendations for Security. RFC 1750. December 1994. SECREQMTS National Institute of Standards and Technology. FIPS Pub 140-2: Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules. 25 May 2001. X.509-97 ITU-T. Recommendation X.509: The Directory - Authentication Framework. 1997. X.509-00 ITU-T. Recommendation X.509: The Directory - Authentication Framework. 2000. 7 Security Considerations Private signature keys must be protected. Compromise of the private key used to sign firmware packages permits unauthorized parties to generate firmware packages that are acceptable to hardware modules. Compromise of the hardware module private key permits unauthorized parties to generate firmware package load receipts. Housley [Page 46] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 The firmware-decryption key must be protected. Compromise of the key may result in the disclosure of the firmware to unauthorized parties. Cryptographic algorithms become weaker with time. As new cryptanalysis techniques are developed and computing performance improves, the work factor to break a particular cryptographic algorithm will be reduced. The ability to change the firmware package provides an opportunity to update or replace cryptographic algorithms. While this capability is desirable, cryptographic algorithm replacement can lead to interoperability failures. Therefore, the roll out of new cryptographic algorithms must be managed. Generally, the previous generation of cryptographic algorithms needs to be supported at the same time as their replacements to facilitate an orderly transition. The use of a stale version number in a firmware package cannot completely prevent subsequent use of the stale firmware package. Despite this shortcoming, the feature is included since it is useful in some important situations. By loading different types of firmware packages, each with their own stale firmware version number, until the internal storage for the stale version number is exceeded, the user can circumvent the mechanism. Consider a hardware module that has storage for two stale version numbers. Suppose that FWPKG-A version 3 is loaded, indicating that FWPKG-A version 2 is stale. The user can sequentially load the following: - FWPKG-B version 8, indicating that FWPKG-B version 4 is stale. (Note: The internal storage indicates that FWPKG-A version 2 and FWPKG-B version 4 are stale.) - FWPKG-C version 5, indicating that FWPKG-C version 3 is stale. (Note: The internal storage indicates that FWPKG-B version 4 and FWPKG-C version 3 are stale.) - FWPKG-A version 2. Since many hardware modules are expected to have very few firmware packages written for them, the stale firmware version feature provides important protections. The amount of non-volatile storage that needs to be dedicated to saving firmware package identifiers and version numbers depends on the number of firmware packages that are likely to be developed for the hardware module. When a firmware package includes a community identifier, the confidence that the package is only used by the intended community depends on the mechanism used to configure community membership. This document does not specify a mechanism for the assignment of community membership to hardware modules, and the various Housley [Page 47] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 alternatives have different security properties. Also, the authority that makes community identifier assignments to hardware modules might be different than the authority that generates firmware packages. When firmware packages are encrypted, the source of the firmware package must randomly generate firmware-encryption keys. Also, the generation of public/private signature key pairs relies on a random numbers. The use of inadequate pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs) to generate cryptographic keys can result in little or no security. An attacker may find it much easier to reproduce the PRNG environment that produced the keys, searching the resulting small set of possibilities, rather than brute force searching the whole key space. The generation of quality random numbers is difficult. RFC 1750 [RANDOM] offers important guidance in this area, and Appendix 3 of FIPS Pub 186 [DSS] provides one quality PRNG technique. 8 Author Address Russell Housley Vigil Security, LLC 918 Spring Knoll Drive Herndon, VA 20170 USA housley@vigilsec.com Housley [Page 48] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 Appendix A: ASN.1 Module The ASN.1 module contained in this appendix defines the structures that are needed to implement the CMS-based firmware package wrapper. It is expected to be used in conjunction with the ASN.1 modules in [CMS], [COMPRESS], and [PROFILE]. CMSFirmwareWrapper { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) cms-firmware-wrap(22) } DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN IMPORTS EnvelopedData, id-data FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) cms-2001(14) }; -- Firmware Package Content Type and Object Identifier id-ct-firmwarePackage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) ct(1) 16 } FirmwarePkgData ::= OCTET STRING -- Firmware Package Signed Attributes and Object Identifiers id-aa-firmwarePackageID OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) aa(2) 35 } FirmwarePackageIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { fwPkgID OBJECT IDENTIFIER, verNum INTEGER (0..MAX), staleVerNum INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL } id-aa-targetHardwareIDs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) aa(2) 36 } TargetHardwareIdentifiers ::= SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER Housley [Page 49] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 id-aa-decryptKeyID OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) aa(2) 37 } DecryptKeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING id-aa-implCryptoAlgs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) aa(2) 38 } ImplementedCryptoAlgorithms ::= SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER id-aa-communityIdentifiers OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) aa(2) 40 } CommunityIdentifiers ::= SEQUENCE OF CommunityIdentifier CommunityIdentifier ::= CHOICE { communityOID OBJECT IDENTIFIER, hwModuleList HardwareModules } HardwareModules ::= SEQUENCE { hwType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, hwSerialEntries SEQUENCE OF HardwareSerialEntry } HardwareSerialEntry ::= CHOICE { single OCTET STRING, block SEQUENCE { low OCTET STRING, high OCTET STRING } } id-aa-firmwarePackageInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) aa(2) 42 } FirmwarePackageInfo ::= SEQUENCE { fwPkgType FWPackageType DEFAULT application, dependencies SEQUENCE OF FWPackageRef OPTIONAL } Housley [Page 50] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 FWPackageType ::= ENUMERATED { bootstrapLoader (1), separationKernel (2), application (3) } FWPackageRef ::= SEQUENCE { fwPkgID OBJECT IDENTIFIER, minVerNum INTEGER } -- Firmware Package Unsigned Attributes and Object Identifiers id-aa-wrappedFirmwareKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) aa(2) 39 } WrappedFirmwareKey ::= EnvelopedData -- Firmware Package Load Receipt Content Type and Object Identifier id-ct-firmwareLoadReceipt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) ct(1) 17 } FirmwarePackageLoadReceipt ::= SEQUENCE { hwType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, hwSerialNum OCTET STRING, fwPkgID OBJECT IDENTIFIER, verNum INTEGER (0..MAX), decryptKeyID OCTET STRING OPTIONAL } -- Firmware Package Load Error Report Content Type and Object Identifier id-ct-firmwareLoadError OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) ct(1) 18 } FirmwarePackageLoadError ::= SEQUENCE { hwType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, hwSerialNum OCTET STRING, fwPkgID OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL, verNum INTEGER (0..MAX) OPTIONAL, errorCode FirmwarePackageLoadErrorCode } Housley [Page 51] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 FirmwarePackageLoadErrorCode ::= ENUMERATED { decodeFailure (1), badContentInfo (2), badSignedData (3), badEncapContent (4), badCertificate (5), badSignerInfo (6), badSignedAttrs (7), badUnsignedAttrs (8), missingContent (9), noTrustAnchor (10), notAuthorized (11), badDigestAlgorithm (12), badSignatureAlgorithm (13), unsupportedKeySize (14), signatureFailure (15), contentTypeMismatch (16), badEncryptedData (17), unprotectedAttrsPresent (18), badEncryptContent (19), badEncryptAlgorithm (20), missingCiphertext (21), noDecryptKey (22), decryptFailure (23), badCompressAlgorithm (24), missingCompressedContent (25), decompressFailure (26), wrongHardware (27), stalePackage (28), notInCommunity (29), unsupportedPackageType (30), wrongBootstrapLoader (31), wrongSeparationKernel (32), insufficientMemory (33), badFirmware (34), other (99) } Housley [Page 52] INTERNET DRAFT September 2003 -- Other Name syntax for Hardware Module Name id-on-hardwareModuleName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) on(8) 4 } HardwareModuleName ::= SEQUENCE { hwType OBJECT IDENTIFIER, hwSerialNum OCTET STRING } END Full Copyright Statement Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved. This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are included on all such copies and derivative works. In addition, the ASN.1 module presented in Appendix A may be used in whole or in part without inclusion of the copyright notice. However, this document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process shall be followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than English. The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. This document and the information contained herein is provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. Housley [Page 53]