GEOPRIV H. Schulzrinne Internet-Draft Columbia U. Expires: August 9, 2004 J. Morris CDT H. Tschofenig J. Cuellar Siemens J. Polk Cisco J. Rosenberg DynamicSoft February 9, 2004 Common Policy draft-ietf-geopriv-common-policy-00 Status of this Memo This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http:// www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. This Internet-Draft will expire on August 9, 2004. Copyright Notice Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved. Abstract This document defines a framework for authorization policies controling access to application specific data. This framework combines common location- and SIP-presence-specific authorization aspects. An XML schema specifies the language in which common policy Schulzrinne, et al. Expires August 9, 2004 [Page 1] Internet-Draft Common Policy February 2004 rules are represented. The common policy framework can be extended to other application domains. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. Modes of Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1 Passive Request-Response - PS as Server (Responder) . . . . 6 3.2 Active Request-Response - PS as Client (Initiator) . . . . . 6 3.3 Event Notification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4. Goals and Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5. Non-Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 6. Basic Data Model and Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 6.1 Identification of Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 6.2 Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 7. Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 7.1 Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 7.2 Sphere . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 7.3 Validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 8. Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 9. Transformations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 10. Procedure for Combining Permissions . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 11. Meta Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 12. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 13. XML Schema Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 14. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 15. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 15.1 Common Policy Namespace Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 15.2 Common Policy Schema Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 A. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 B. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . 35 Schulzrinne, et al. Expires August 9, 2004 [Page 2] Internet-Draft Common Policy February 2004 1. Introduction This document defines a framework for creating authorization policies for access to application specific data. This framework is the result of finding the common aspects of single authorization systems that more specifically control access to presence [2] and location information [7] and that previously had been developed separately. The benefit of combining these two authorization systems is two-fold. First, it allows to build a system which enhances the value of presences with location information in a natural way and reuses the same underlying authorization mechanism. Second, it encourages a more generic authorization framework with mechanisms for extensibility. The applicability of the framework specified in this document is not limited to policies controling access to presence and location information data, but can be extended to other applications domains. The general framework defined in this document is intended to be accompanied and enhanced by application-specific policies specified elsewhere. Using the 'Location-specific Policy' and the 'Presence-specific Policy' documents [both are currently under development - references to be included here], figure Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the 'Common Policy' framework defined in this document and application-specific enhancements of this framework. +-----------------+ | | | Common | | Policy | | | +---+---------+---+ /|\ /|\ | | +-------------------+ | | +-------------------+ | | | enhance | | | | Location-specific | | | | Presence-specific | | Policy |----+ +----| Policy | | | | | +-------------------+ +-------------------+ Figure 1: Common Policy Enhancements This document starts with an introduction to the terminology in Section 2, an illustration of basic modes of operation in Section 3, a description of goals (see Section 4) and non-goals (see Section 5) Schulzrinne, et al. Expires August 9, 2004 [Page 3] Internet-Draft Common Policy February 2004 of the authorization policy framework, followed by the data model in Section 6. The structure of a rule, namely conditions, actions and transformations, are described in Section 7, in Section 8 and in Section 9. The procedure for combining permissions is explained in Section 10 and used when more than one rule fires. An example is provided in Section 12. The XML schema will be discussed in Section 13. IANA considerations in Section 15 follow security considerations Section 14. Schulzrinne, et al. Expires August 9, 2004 [Page 4] Internet-Draft Common Policy February 2004 2. Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT","RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [1]. This document introduces the following terms: PT - Presentity / Target: The PT is the entity about whom information has been requested. RM - Rule Maker: RM is an entity which creates the authorization rules which restrict access to data items. PS - (Authorization) Policy Server: This entity has access to both the authorization policies and to the data items. In location-specific applications, the entity PS is labeled as location server (LS). WR - Watcher / Recipient: This entity requests access to data items of the PT. An access operation might be either be a read, write or any other operation. In case of access to location information it might be a read operation. An 'authorization policy' is given by a 'rule set'. A 'rule set' contains an unordered list of 'rules'. A 'rule' has a 'conditions', an 'actions' and a 'transformations' part. The term 'permission' indicates the action and transformation components of a 'rule'. The terms 'authorization policy', 'policy' and 'rule set' are used interchangable. The terms 'authorization policy rule', 'policy rule' and 'rule' are used interchangable. The term 'using protocol' is defined in [4]. It refers to the protocol which is used to request access to and to return privacy sensitive data items. Schulzrinne, et al. Expires August 9, 2004 [Page 5] Internet-Draft Common Policy February 2004 3. Modes of Operation The abstract sequence of operations can roughly be described as follows. The PS receives either a query for data items for a particular PT, via the using protocol. The using protocol provides the identity of the requestor (or more precisely the authentication protocol), either at the time of the query or at the subscription time. The authenticated identity of the WR, together with other information provided by the using protocol or generally available to the server, is then used for searching through the rule set. All matching rules are combined according to a permission combining algorithm described in Section 10. The result is returned to the WR, possibly modified by transformation policies. A single PS may authorize access to data items in more than one mode. Rather than having different rule sets for different modes all three modes are supported with a one rule set schema. Specific instances of the rule set can omit elements that are only applicable to the subscription model. The three different modes are explained below. 3.1 Passive Request-Response - PS as Server (Responder) In a passive request-response scenario, the WR queries the PS for data items about the PT. Examples of protocols following this mode of operation include HTTP, FTP, LDAP, finger or various RPC protocols, including Sun RPC, DCE, DCOM, Corba and SOAP. The PS uses the ruleset to prevent the transmission of information to the WR by refusing the request. Furthermore, the PS might filter information by removing elements or by reducing the resolution of elements. 3.2 Active Request-Response - PS as Client (Initiator) Alternatively, the PS may contact the WR and convey data items. Examples include HTTP, SIP session setup (INVITE request), H.323 session setup or SMTP. 3.3 Event Notification Event notification adds a subscription phase to the "PS as client" mode of operation. A watcher or subscriber asks to be added to the notification list for a particular presentity or event. When the presentity changes state or the event occurs, the PS sends a message to the WR containing the updated state. (Presence is a special case of event notification; thus, we often use the term interchangeably.) In addition, the subscriber may itself add a filter to the subscription, limiting the rate or content of the notifications. If an event, after filtering by the rulemaker-provided rules and by the Schulzrinne, et al. Expires August 9, 2004 [Page 6] Internet-Draft Common Policy February 2004 subscriber-provided rules, only produces the same notification content that was sent previously, no event notification is sent. Schulzrinne, et al. Expires August 9, 2004 [Page 7] Internet-Draft Common Policy February 2004 4. Goals and Assumptions Below, we summarize our design goals and constraints. Table representation: Each rule must be representable as a row in a relational database. This design goal should allow efficient policy rule implementation by utilizing standard database optimization techniques. Permit only: Rules only provide permissions rather than denying them. Allowing both 'permit' and 'deny' actions would require some rule ordering which had implications on the update operations executed on these rules. Additionally it would make distributed rule sets more complicated. Hence, only 'permit' actions are allowed which result in more efficient rule processing. This also implies that rule ordering is not important. Consequently, to make a policy decision requires processing all policy rules. Additive permissions: A query for access to data items is matched against the rules in the rule database. If several rules match, then the overall permissions granted to the WR are the union of those permissions. A more detailed discussion is provided in Section 10. Upgradeable: It should be possible to add additional rules later, without breaking PSs that have not been upgraded. Any such upgrades must not degrade privacy constraints, but PSs not yet upgraded may reveal less information than the rulemaker would have chosen. Versioning support: In addition to the previous goal, a RM should be able to determine which types of rules are supported by the PS. The mechanism used to determine the capability of a PS will be covered in future versions of the document. Protocol-independent: The rule set supports constraints on both notifications or queries as well as subscriptions for event-based systems such as presence systems. No false assurance: It appears more dangerous to give the user the impression that the system will prevent disclosure automatically, but fail to do so with a significant probability of operator error or misunderstanding, than to force the user to explicitly invoke simpler rules. For example, rules based on weekday and time-of-day ranges seem particularly subject to misinterpretation and false assumptions on part of the RM. (For example, a non-technical RM would probably assume that the rules are based on the timezone of his current location, which may not be known to other components Schulzrinne, et al. Expires August 9, 2004 [Page 8] Internet-Draft Common Policy February 2004 of the system.) Schulzrinne, et al. Expires August 9, 2004 [Page 9] Internet-Draft Common Policy February 2004 5. Non-Goals We explicitly decided that a number of possibly worthwhile capabilities are beyond the scope of this first version. Future versions may include these capabilities, using the extension mechanism described in this document. Non-goals include: No external references: Attributes within specific rules cannot refer to external rule sets, databases, directories or other network elements. Any such external reference would make simple database implementation difficult and hence they are not supported in this version. No regular expression or wildcard matching: Conditions are matched on equality or 'greater-than'-style comparisons, not regular expressions, partial matches such as the SQL LIKE operator (e.g., LIKE "%foo%") or glob-style matches ("*@example.com"). Most of these are better expressed as explicit elements. No all-except conditions: It is not possible to express exclusion conditions based on identities such as "everybody except Alice". However, this restriction does not prevent all forms of blacklisting. It is still possible to express an authorization rule like 'I allow access to my location information for everyone of domain example.com except for John'. See the example in section Section 7.1 describing how exceptions can be made work. No repeat times: Repeat times are difficult to make work correctly, due to the different time zones that PT, WR, PS and RM may occupy. It appears that suggestions for including time intervals are often based on supporting work/non-work distinctions, which unfortunately are difficult to capture by time alone. Schulzrinne, et al. Expires August 9, 2004 [Page 10] Internet-Draft Common Policy February 2004 6. Basic Data Model and Processing A rule set (or synonymously, a policy) consists of zero or more rules. The ordering of these rules is immaterial. The rule set can be stored at the PS and conveyed from RM to PS as a single document, in subsets or as individual rules. A rule consists of three parts - conditions (see section Section 7), actions (see Section 8), and transformations (see Section 9). The conditions part is a set of expressions, each of which evaluates to either TRUE or FALSE, i.e., each of which is equipped with a value of either TRUE or FALSE by the PS. When a WR asks for information about a PT, the PS goes through each rule in the rule set. For each rule, it evaluates the expressions in the conditions part. If all of the expressions evaluate to TRUE, then the rule is applicable to this request. Generally, each expression specifies a condition based on some variable that is associated with the context of the request. These variables can include the identity of the WR, the domain of the WR, the time of day, or even external variables, such as the temperature or the mood of the PT. Assuming that the rule is applicable to the request, the actions and transformations (commonly referred to as permissions) in the rule specify how the PS is supposed to handle this request. If the request is to view the location of the PT, or to view its presence, the typical action is "permit", which allows the request to proceed. Assuming the action allows the request to proceed, the transformations part of the rule specifies how the information about the PT - their location information, their presence, etc. - is modified before being presented to the WR. These transformations are in the form of positive permissions. That is, they always specify a piece of information which is allowed to be seen by the WR. When a PS processes a request, it takes the transformations specified across all rules that match, and creates the union of them. The means for computing this union depend on the data type - Integer, Boolean, Set, or the Undef data type - and are described in more detail in section Section 10. The resulting union effectively represents a "mask" - it defines what information is exposed to the WR. This mask is applied to the actual location or presence data for the PT, and the data which is permitted by the mask is shown to the WR. If the WR request a subset of information only (such as city-level civil location data only, instead of the full civil location information), the information delivered to the WR SHOULD be the intersection of the permissions granted to the WR and the data requested by the WR. In accordance to this document, rules are encoded in XML. To this end, section Section 13 contains an XML schema defining the Common Schulzrinne, et al. Expires August 9, 2004 [Page 11] Internet-Draft Common Policy February 2004 Policy Markup Language. This, however, is purely an exchange format between RM and PS. The format does not imply that the RM or the PS use this format internally, e.g., in matching a query with the policy rules. The rules are designed so that a PS may translate the rules into a relational database table, with each rule represented by one row in the database. The database representation is by no means mandatory; we will use it as a convenient and widely-understood example of an internal representation. The database model has the advantage that operations on rows have tightly defined meanings. In addition, it appears plausible that larger-scale implementations will employ a backend database to store and query rules, as they can then benefit from existing optimized indexing, access control, scaling and integrity constraint mechanisms. Smaller-scale implementations may well choose different implementations, e.g., a simple traversal of the set of rules. 6.1 Identification of Rules Each rule is equipped with a parameter that identifies the rule. This rule identifier is an opaque token chosen by the RM. A RM MUST NOT use the same identifier for two rules that are available to the PS at the same time for a given PT. The combination uniquely identifies a rule. 6.2 Extensions The authorization policy framework defined in this document is meant to be extensible towards specific application domains. Such an extension is accomplished by defining conditions, actions and transformations that are specific to the desired application domain. Each extension MUST define its own namespace and indicate its version number. Schulzrinne, et al. Expires August 9, 2004 [Page 12] Internet-Draft Common Policy February 2004 7. Conditions The access to data items needs to be matched with the rule set stored at the PS. Each instance of a request has different attributes (e.g., the identity of the requestor) which are used for authorization. A rule in a rule set might have a number of conditions which need to be verified before executing the remaining parts of a rule (i.e., actions and transformations). Details about rule matching are described in Section 10. This document specifies only a few conditions (namely identity, sphere, and validity). Other conditions are left for extensions of this document. 7.1 Identity The policy framework specified in this document supports the usage of authenticated identities as input to access authorization decision processes. This framework, however, abstracts from the particularities of concrete authentication mechanisms employed by different using protocols and is therefore unable to specify explicitly the details of identity relevant information. Documents that enhance this framework should describe how a particular using protocol is able to provide identity information in a meaningful way. Such an enhancement needs to map the identity used by the authentication protocol employed in the using protocol to an identity used in the authorization policy. It is necessary to clearly define a mapping between the authenticated identity of the user (and the domain of the user) and the identities used in the authorization policies. This mapping needs to consider the large number of possible identities used in various authentication protocols and also to consider identities in using protocols. Furthermore, it is important to designate an identifier that denotes an 'anonymous user', i.e., a user that has not authenticated itself to the PS. The authors suggest to treat anonymous users by omitting this attribute in the rule which causes a 'NULL' value to be created in the ruleset table of a relational database. Any request for a data item (for a given PT) would match with respect to this attribute in a rule. Furthermore, pseudonyms need to be addressed as part of this mapping process. This specification provides an element which belongs to the group of condition elements. It can have either the or the element as child elements. The element contains a list of elements and allows to implement a simple blacklist mechanism. The domain value of the element MUST match the value in the domain part of the URI in the element. The following example illustrates conditions based on an identity. Schulzrinne, et al. Expires August 9, 2004 [Page 13] Internet-Draft Common Policy February 2004 jack@example.com The next example shows how exceptions are implemented. A request MUST match the domain part and all three exceptions parts in an atomic fashion to be a successful match. example.com joe@example.com tony@example.com mike@example.com 7.2 Sphere The element belongs to the group of condition elements. It can be used to indicate a state (e.g., 'work', 'home', 'meeting', 'travel') the PT is currently in. A sphere condition matches only if the PT is currently in the state indicated. The state may be conveyed by manual configuration or by some protocol. For example, RPID [5] provides the ability to inform the PS of its current sphere. Switching from one sphere to another causes to switch between different modes of visibility. As a result different subsets of rules might be applicable. An example of a rule fragment is shown below: work bob@example.com home alice@example.com Schulzrinne, et al. Expires August 9, 2004 [Page 14] Internet-Draft Common Policy February 2004 The code snippet above illustrates that the rule with the entity bob@example.com matches if the sphere is been set to 'work'. In the second rule with the entity alice@example.com matches if the sphere is set to 'home'. 7.3 Validity The element is the third condition element specified in this document. It expresses the rule validity period by two attributes, a starting and a ending time. Times are expressed in XML dateTime format. Expressing the lifetime of a rule implements a garbage collection mechanism. A rule maker might not have always access to the PS to remove some rules which grant permissions. Hence this mechanisms allows to remove or invalidate granted permissions automatically without further interaction between the rule maker and the PS. An example of a rule fragment is shown below: 2003-08-15T10:20:00.000-05:00 2003-09-15T10:20:00.000-05:00 Schulzrinne, et al. Expires August 9, 2004 [Page 15] Internet-Draft Common Policy February 2004 8. Actions While conditions are the 'if'-part of rules, actions and transformations build the 'then'-part of them. The actions and transformations parts of a rule determine which operations the PS MUST execute after having received from a WR a data access request that matches all conditions of this rule. Actions and transformations only permit certain operations; there is no 'deny' functionality. Transformations exclusively specify PS-side operations that lead to a modification of the data items requested by the WR. Regarding location data items, for instance, a transformation could force the PS to lower the precision of the location information which is returned to the WR. Actions, on the other hand, specify all remaining types of operations the PS is obliged to execute, i.e., all operations that are not of transformation type. For example, this document introduces the 'confirmation' action for using protocols that follow the subscription model. To this end, the common policy markup language contains the element of boolean type. If it is set to 'true', the PS MUST bring in a subscription approval or disapproval from the PT and grant subscription to the requesting WR only in case of an approval. In case of 'false' or if this element is omitted, the PS SHOULD NOT ask the PT for subscription approval or disapproval. The subscription is marked as 'pending' while the PS waits for the PT to decide. The approval mechanism depends on the using protocol and is beyond the scope of this document. As an example, SIP defines a mechanism where the presentity is notified of a subscription attempt [3] and then either allows or refuses the subscription. Schulzrinne, et al. Expires August 9, 2004 [Page 16] Internet-Draft Common Policy February 2004 9. Transformations Two sub-parts follow the conditions part of a rule: transformations and actions. As defined in section Section 8, transformations specify operations that the PS MUST execute and that modify the result which is returned to the WR. This functionality is particularly helpful in reducing the granularity of information provided to the WR, as for example required by location information. This document does not define any transformations since they depend on the application domain. A simple transformation example is provided in Section 10. Schulzrinne, et al. Expires August 9, 2004 [Page 17] Internet-Draft Common Policy February 2004 10. Procedure for Combining Permissions We use the following terminology (which in parts has already been introduced in previous sections): The term 'permission' stands for an action or a transformation. The notion 'attribute' terms a condition, an action, or a transformation. An attribute MUST specify its name. An attribute MUST either be equipped with a value of a certain data type or it is not equipped with a value. In the latter case the value of this attribute automatically equals 'undef' of data type 'Undef'. For example, the name of the attribute discussed in section Section 7 is 'sphere', its data type is 'string', and its value may be set to 'home'. The values of attributes of the same name MUST all be of the same data type or of the Undef data type. To evaluate a condition means to associate either TRUE or FALSE to the condition. A rule matches if all conditions contained in the conditions part of a rule evaluate to TRUE. When the PS receives a request for access to privacy-sensitive data then it needs to be matched against a rule set. The conditions part of each individual rule is evaluated and as a result one or more rules might match. If only a single rule matches then the result is determined by executing the actions and the transformations part following the conditions part of a rule. However, it can also be the case that two or more matching rules contain a permission of the same name (e.g., two rules contain a permission named 'precision of geospatial location information'), but do not specify the same value for that permission (e.g., the two rule might specify values of '10 km' and '200 km', respectively, for the permission named 'precision of geospatial location information'). This section describes the procedure for combining permissions in such cases. The values of permissions MUST be of either Boolean, Integer, Set, or Undef data type. Attributes with values of data type Integer can also be used for enumerations. For example, you can enumerate different levels of civil location information precision (e.g., level 0 "country, city, street" vs. level 1 "country, city") by associating integers to these levels. The combining rules are simple and depend on the data types of the values of permissions: Let P be a policy. Let M be the subset of P consisting of rules r in P that match with respect to a given request. Let n be a name of a permission contained in a rule r in M, and let M(n) be the subset of M consisting of rules r in M that have a permission of name n. For each rule r in M(n), let v(r,n) and d(r,n) be the value and the data type, respectively, of the attribute of r with name n. Finally, let V(n) be the combined value of all the permissions values v(r,n), r in M(n). The combining rules that lead to the resulting value V(n) are the following: Schulzrinne, et al. Expires August 9, 2004 [Page 18] Internet-Draft Common Policy February 2004 CR 1: If d(r,n)=Boolean or d(r,n)=Undef for all r in M(n), then V(n) is given as follows: If there is a r in M(n) with v(r,n)=TRUE, then V(n)=TRUE. Otherwise, V(n)=FALSE. CR 2: If d(r,n)=Integer or d(r,n)=Undef for all r in M(n), then V(n) is given as follows: If v(r,n)=undef for all r in M(n), then V(n) is not specified by this specification. Otherwise, V(n)=max{v(r,n) | r in M(n)}. CR 3: If d(r,n)=Set or d(r,n)=Undef for all r in M(n), then V(n) is given as follows: V(n)=intersection of all v(r,n), the intersection to be computed over all r in M(n) with v(r,n)!=undef. In the following example we illustrate the process of combining permissions. We will consider three conditions for our purpose, namely those of name identity, sphere, and validity. For editorial reasons the rule set in this example is represented in a table. Furthermore, the domain part of the identity of the WR is omitted. For actions we use two permissions with names X and Y. The values of X and Y are of data types Boolean and Integer, respectively. Permission X might, for example, represent the action. For transformations we use the attribute with the name Z whose value can be set either to '+'(or 1), 'o' (or 2) or '-' (or 3). Permission Z allows us to show the granularity reduction whereby a value of '+' shows the corresponding information unrestricted and '-' shows nothing. This permission might be related to location information or other presence attributes like mood. Internally we use the data type Integer for computing the permission of this attribute. Conditions Actions/Transformations +--------------------------------+---------------------+ | Id WR-ID sphere from to | X Y Z | +--------------------------------+---------------------+ | 1 bob home A1 A2 | TRUE 10 o | | 2 alice work A1 A2 | FALSE 5 + | | 3 bob work A1 A2 | TRUE 3 - | | 4 tom work A1 A2 | TRUE 5 + | | 5 bob work A1 A3 | undef 12 o | | 6 bob work B1 B2 | FALSE 10 - | +--------------------------------+---------------------+ Again for editorial reasons, we use the following abbreviations for the two attributes 'from' and 'to': A1=2003-12-24T17:00:00+01:00 A2=2003-12-24T21:00:00+01:00 Schulzrinne, et al. Expires August 9, 2004 [Page 19] Internet-Draft Common Policy February 2004 A3=2003-12-24T23:30:00+01:00 B1=2003-12-22T17:00:00+01:00 B2=2003-12-23T17:00:00+01:00 The entity 'bob' acts as a WR and requests data items. The policy P consists of the six rules shown in the table and identified by the values 1 to 6 in the 'Id' column. The PS receives the query at 2003-12-24T17:15:00+01:00. The value of the attribute with name 'sphere' indicating the state the PT is curretnly in is set to 'work'. Rule 1 does not match since the sphere condition does not match. Rule 2 does not match as the identity of the WR (here 'alice') does not equal 'bob'. Rule 3 matches since all conditions evaluate to TRUE. Rule 4 does not match as the identity of the WR (here 'tom') does not equal 'bob'. Rule 5 matches. Rule 6 does not match since the rule is not valid anymore. Therefore, the set M of matching rules consists of the rules 3 and 5. These two rules are used to compute the combined permission V(X), V(Y), and V(Z) for each of the permissions X, Y, and Z: Actions/Transformations +-----------------------+ | X Y Z | +-----------------------+ | TRUE 3 - | | undef 12 o | +-----------------------+ The results of the permission combining algorithm is shown below. The combined value V(X) regarding the permission with name X equals TRUE according to the first combining rule listed above. The maximum of 3 and 12 is 12, so that V(Y)=12. For the attribute Z in this example the maximum between 'o' and '-' (i.e., between 2 and 3) is '-'. Actions/Transformations +-----------------------+ | X Y Z | +-----------------------+ | TRUE 12 - | +-----------------------+ Documents that extend the authorization policy framework defined here by introducing application specific actions and transformation MUST NOT define permissions whose values are of data type other than Boolean, Integer, Set, and Undef. Furthermore, permissions and the Schulzrinne, et al. Expires August 9, 2004 [Page 20] Internet-Draft Common Policy February 2004 meaning of their values MUST be defined in such a way that the usage of the combining rules CR 1, CR2, and CR 3 always preserves or increases the level of privacy protection for the PT. In other words, the definition of new permissions MUST respect the way in which CR 1, CR 2, and CF 3 have been formulated in order to guarantee an appropriate level of privacy protection. Explicitly, it is not allowed to introduce a new permission whose value is of data type ... ... Boolean and the PS-side operation corresponding to the permission value TRUE has a lower privacy protection level than that operation that corresponds to the value FALSE. ... Integer and for any two permission values v1 and v2, v1 > v2, the PS-side operation corresponding to the value v1 has a lower privacy protection level than that operation that corresponds to the value v2. ... Set and for any two permission values s1 and s2, the PS-side operation corresponding to the intersection of s1 and s2 has a lower privacy protection level than those operations that correspond to s1 or s2. Schulzrinne, et al. Expires August 9, 2004 [Page 21] Internet-Draft Common Policy February 2004 11. Meta Policies Meta policies authorize a rulemaker to insert, update or delete a particular rule or an entire rule set. Some authorization policies are required to prevent unauthorized modification of rule sets. Meta policies are outside the scope of this document. A simple implementation could restrict access to the rule set only to the PT but more sophisticated mechanisms are useful. Hence, in this case the rule maker is the PT. Schulzrinne, et al. Expires August 9, 2004 [Page 22] Internet-Draft Common Policy February 2004 12. Example This section gives a basic example of an XML document valid with respect to the XML schema defined in Section 13. More useful examples can be found in documents which extend this schema with application domain specific data (e.g., location information). bob@example.com 2003-12-24T17:00:00+01:00 2003-12-24T19:00:00+01:00 true Schulzrinne, et al. Expires August 9, 2004 [Page 23] Internet-Draft Common Policy February 2004 13. XML Schema Definition This section provides the XML schema definition for the common policy markup language described in this document. Schulzrinne, et al. Expires August 9, 2004 [Page 24] Internet-Draft Common Policy February 2004 Although the XML schema does not require detailed explanations the following issues are worth to be mentioned: Each of the , , and (plural!) elements consists of zero or more child elements that belong to the substitution groups 'condition', 'action', and 'transformation', respectively. The respective heads of these substitution groups are the elements , , and (singular!). These Schulzrinne, et al. Expires August 9, 2004 [Page 25] Internet-Draft Common Policy February 2004 elements cannot be used directly in an instance document since they are labeled as abstract. XML schemas that extend this common policy schema by introducing new conditions, actions, and transformations MUST declare to which of these three substitution group the respective attribute belongs. These new attribute elements can then be used as immediate child elements of the , , and elements, depending on to which substitution group they belong. Schulzrinne, et al. Expires August 9, 2004 [Page 26] Internet-Draft Common Policy February 2004 14. Security Considerations This document describes a framework for authorization policy rules. This framework is intended to be enhanced elsewhere towards application domain specific data. Security considerations are to a great extent application data dependent, and need therefore to be covered by documents that extend the framework defined in this specification. However, new action and transformation permissions along with their allowed values must be defined in a way so that the usage of the permissions combining rules of section Section 10 does not lower the level of privacy protection. See section Section 10 for more details on this privacy issue. Schulzrinne, et al. Expires August 9, 2004 [Page 27] Internet-Draft Common Policy February 2004 15. IANA Considerations This section registers a new XML namespace and a new XML schema with IANA. 15.1 Common Policy Namespace Registration URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:common-policy Registrant Contact: IETF Geopriv Working Group, Henning Schulzrinne (hgs+geopriv@cs.columbia.edu). XML: BEGIN Common Policy Namespace

Namespace for Common Authorization Policies

urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:common-policy

See RFCXXXX.

END 15.2 Common Policy Schema Registration URI: Please assign. Registrant Contact: IETF Geopriv Working Group, Henning Schulzrinne (hgs+geopriv@cs.columbia.edu). XML: The XML schema to be registered is contained in section Section 13. Its first line is Schulzrinne, et al. Expires August 9, 2004 [Page 28] Internet-Draft Common Policy February 2004 and its last line is Schulzrinne, et al. Expires August 9, 2004 [Page 29] Internet-Draft Common Policy February 2004 Normative References [1] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", March 1997. Schulzrinne, et al. Expires August 9, 2004 [Page 30] Internet-Draft Common Policy February 2004 Informative References [2] Rosenberg, J., "Extensible Markup Language (XML) Configuration Access Protocol (XCAP) Usages for Setting Presence Authorization", draft-ietf-simple-xcap-auth-usage-01 (work in progress), October 2003. [3] Rosenberg, J., "A Watcher Information Event Template-Package for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)", draft-ietf-simple-winfo-package-05 (work in progress), January 2003. [4] Cuellar, J., Morris, J., Mulligan, D., Peterson, J. and J. Polk, "Geopriv Requirements", draft-ietf-geopriv-reqs-04 (work in progress), October 2003. [5] Sugano, H., Fujimoto, S. and J. Peterson, "Presence Information Data Format (PIDF)", draft-ietf-impp-cpim-pidf-08 (work in progress), May 2003. [6] Schulzrinne, H., Morris, J., Tschofenig, H. and J. Polk, "Geopriv Authorization Rules", draft-ietf-geopriv-rules-00 (work in progress), January 2004. [7] Tschofenig, H., Morris, J., Cuellar, J., Polk, J. and H. Schulzrinne, "Policy Rules for Disclosure and Modification of Geographic Information", draft-ietf-geopriv-policy-00 (work in progress), October 2003. Authors' Addresses Henning Schulzrinne Columbia University Department of Computer Science 450 Computer Science Building New York, NY 10027 USA Phone: +1 212 939 7042 EMail: schulzrinne@cs.columbia.edu URI: http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~hgs Schulzrinne, et al. Expires August 9, 2004 [Page 31] Internet-Draft Common Policy February 2004 John B. Morris, Jr. Center for Democracy and Technology 1634 I Street NW, Suite 1100 Washington, DC 20006 USA EMail: jmorris@cdt.org URI: http://www.cdt.org Hannes Tschofenig Siemens Otto-Hahn-Ring 6 Munich, Bayern 81739 Germany EMail: Hannes.Tschofenig@siemens.com Jorge R. Cuellar Siemens Otto-Hahn-Ring 6 Munich, Bayern 81739 Germany EMail: Jorge.Cuellar@siemens.com James Polk Cisco 2200 East President George Bush Turnpike Richardson, Texas 75082 USA EMail: jmpolk@cisco.com Jonathan Rosenberg DynamicSoft 600 Lanidex Plaza Parsippany, New York 07054 USA EMail: jdrosen@dynamicsoft.com URI: http://www.jdrosen.net Schulzrinne, et al. Expires August 9, 2004 [Page 32] Internet-Draft Common Policy February 2004 Appendix A. Contributors We would like to thank Christian Guenther for his help with this document. Christian Guenther Siemens AG Corporate Technology 81730 Munich Email: christian.guenther@siemens.com Germany Schulzrinne, et al. Expires August 9, 2004 [Page 33] Internet-Draft Common Policy February 2004 Appendix B. Acknowledgments This document is partially based on the discussions within the IETF GEOPRIV working group. Discussions at the Geopriv Interim Meeting 2003 in Washington, D.C., helped the working group to make progress on the authorization policies based on the discussions among the participants. We particularly want to thank Allison Mankin , Randall Gellens , Andrew Newton , Ted Hardie , Jon Peterson for discussing a number of details with us. They helped us to improve the quality of this document. Furthermore, we would like to thank the IETF SIMPLE working group for their discussions of J. Rosenberg's draft on XCAP authorization policies. Schulzrinne, et al. Expires August 9, 2004 [Page 34] Internet-Draft Common Policy February 2004 Intellectual Property Statement The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this document or the extent to which any license under such rights might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it has made any effort to identify any such rights. Information on the IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and standards-related documentation can be found in BCP-11. 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