[6tisch] (correction) Re: comment on draft-ietf-6tisch-minimal-06

Rene Struik <rstruik.ext@gmail.com> Thu, 26 March 2015 18:11 UTC

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Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2015 14:11:45 -0400
From: Rene Struik <rstruik.ext@gmail.com>
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Subject: [6tisch] (correction) Re: comment on draft-ietf-6tisch-minimal-06
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Dear colleagues:

I discovered a small editorial glitch - my apologies. Corrected version 
included below.

Rene
> OLD:
> The present document assumes the existence of two keys, which can be
> well-known by the network devices and/or pre-configured. One of the keys
> (K1) is used to authenticate EBs (all frame). As defined in Section 4
> EBs MUST be authenticated but payload not encrypted. This prevents two
> independent networks to interfere or enable non-allowed nodes to join a
> particular network. A second key (K2) is used to authenticate and
> encrypt the payload of DATA, ACKNOWLEDGEMENT, MAC COMMAND frame types
> and respective header IEs.
>
> NEW:
> The present document assumes the existence of two cryptographic keys,
> which can be pre-configured. One of the keys (K1) is used to
> authenticate EBs. As defined in Section 4, EBs MUST be authenticated,
> with no payload encryption. This facilitates logical segregation of
> distinct networks. A second key (K2) is used to authenticate DATA, 
> ACKNOWLEDGEMENT, MAC COMMAND frame types and
> respective header IEs, with payload encryption.
> Depending on security policy, these keys could be the same (i.e., K1=K2).
>
>


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