RE: [Asrg] RE: 2.a.1 Analysis of Actual Spam Data - Titan Key reduces spam attacks

["Peter Kay" <peter@titankey.com>]

I think you pose some very good questions, although much of your
questions are based on a incorrect assumption: that the  "false-550"
spoof attempts to send an NSU message to the sender, which it does not.


If you hand-type an smtp transaction and attempt to send an email to a
known non-existent recipient you'll see what I mean.

So perhaps after you've gone through that exercise, you will see that an
NSU email is not sent to the recipient and you can restructure your
questions in a tighter context.  

If you need clearer direction don't hesitate to email me off-list.

Peter

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Terry Sullivan [mailto:terry@pantos.org] 
> Sent: Wednesday, August 06, 2003 11:19 AM
> To: asrg@ietf.org
> Subject: RE: [Asrg] RE: 2.a.1 Analysis of Actual Spam Data - 
> Titan Key reduces spam attacks
> 
> 
> On Mon, 4 Aug 2003 06:41:50 -1000
> "Peter Kay" <peter@titankey.com> wrote:
> 
> >  I do believe that techniques using a
> >  550/NSU response are effective in truly 
> >  reducing spam...
> 
> It'd be interesting to hear a focused, clearly articulated case 
> identifying exactly how a "false-550" spoof could possibly affect 
> spam volume.  Ideally, the case should explicitly address the 
> following points:
> 
> I. The return address on the majority of spam is either:
> 
>      A. utterly nonexistent, consisting of either: 
>         1. forged username (e.g., yxal88qz@sbc.net)
>         2. non-existent domain (e.g., Fred@NoSuchDomain.com)
> 
>      B. a legitimate address of an innocent party, pulled at 
>         random from the spammer's database of email addresses
>  
> II. The false-550 notices:
> 
>      A. Cannot possibly be delivered to the nonexistent 
>         addresses identified in I.A, and therefore cannot 
>         possibly affect spam volume.
> 
>      B. Are deliverable to I.B addresses, but since the 
>         I.B recipients are not the source of the original 
>         spam, it's difficult to imagine precisely how the
>         false-550 message would/could influence the amount 
>         of spam sent by someone else.
> 
> III. The small fraction of bulk email that actually bears 
>      the spammer's true return address can be handled and 
>      eliminated without resorting to deceptive, high-volume 
>      automatically-generated email.
> 
> There are also several tangential points that would be crucial in 
> building a business case for the false-550 approach:
> 
>    1. For every spam bearing a I.A.1 forged username, the
>       false-550 approach generates, directly or indirectly, 
>       a minimum of 4 additional automated emails, thus
>       effectively quintupling the burden on shared network 
>       resources.  *Everyone* ends up paying higher costs 
>       associated with a 5-fold increase in unnecessary 
>       automated email.
> 
>    2. When a false-550 message arrives in the InBox of an
>       innocent 3rd party (I.B addresses), it constitutes 
>       an unsolicted, deceptive, automated email, whose sole 
>       purpose is to promote the vested interests of the 
>       sender at the expense of the recipient (i.e., SPAM).
>       Individuals/organizations who send a false-550 should 
>       not be surprised to find that some folks think of them 
>       (and treat them) as spammers.
> 
>    3. Every time a false-550 message is sent to someone who
>       has attempted to undertake an innocent correspondence,
>       the very act of replying with a *false message* impacts 
>       the sender's credibility.  (It amounts to saying, "Some 
>       people take advantage of open communication, so here at 
>       XYZ Corp., we believe that every conversation with a 
>       stranger should begin with a lie.")
> 
> 
> 
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> 
> 



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