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Re: [Asrg] A question on trust and trust propagation.
A general reputation framework should be able to make assertions
about any source identity, and especially identities that can be
verified. This includes:
IP
"Mail From" address
Source domain
DomainKeys' [selector.]domain space
PRA
Regards,
Alex Bobotek
> -----Original Message-----
> From: asrg-bounces at ietf.org [mailto:asrg-bounces at ietf.org] On Behalf
Of
> Jon Kyme
> Sent: Monday, March 07, 2005 9:48 AM
> To: ASRG
> Subject: SPAMWARNING Re: [Asrg] A question on trust and trust
propagation.
>
> >
> > Maybe the information should not be a binary black/white, but a
> > probability/confidence value? "Mail from that IP is spam with a
> > probability of 99%" or something like that? For most IPs this will
> > usually be close to 0% or 100%, but it should be somewhere in
between
> > if there are too few samples, or if the host is transitioning from
bad
> > to good or vice versa.
> >
> > (I have to look a GOSSiP again - I think that was quite similar)
> >
>
>
> You're right, as I remember, Mark Langston's GOSSiP responded to
queries
> with a reputation score (and an associated confidence rating - did
this
> get
> done?).
>
>
> > Sender domains/addresses are currently completely useless as
trustable
> > entities.
>
> On their own, perhaps. GOSSiP proposed a domain / IP duple as the
> reputation identity, by which I guess some of the issues with
> "granularity"
> were (might be) avoided. There were also schemes to amalgamate
entities
> for
> scoring purposes - perhaps by ref. to "authorisation" mechanisms such
as
> SPF.
>
> Actually, I really liked the ideas behind GOSSiP - particularly the
way
> trust between nodes might be established informally (or not), and then
> modulated dynamically (without human intervention) would have been
neat (I
> don't know how far that got).
>
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