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Re: [Cfrg] Re: AES-based hash function



John Viega wrote:
[...] (You can possibly make some provable constructions in the "perfect cipher model", but this is an exceedingly unrealistic model.)
[...]
Now, I do agree the ideal cipher model is unrealistic in that, while
we're assuming AES is an ideal cipher, it clearly cannot be one.
While we could postulate more satisfying theoretical results, the
ideal cipher model seems like the best assurance we're going to get
for this kind of construct any time soon.

Maybe, it's just that this level of assurance is not very reassuring (for me, at least).

Relying on the ideal cipher model for assurance is similar to relying
on the random oracle model for assurance.  There are systems provably
secure in that model that have no secure instantiation when the oracle
is replaced with a real function.  We know that, yet in practice, it
seems to serve us reasonably well.

I don't believe in the analogy to the random-oracle model. As much as
I have problems with the random-oracle model (for theoretical reasons),
proving something in the random-oracle model guarantees that "the common types of attacks" on the scheme cannot work. Not so in the ideal cipher model, where there are natural constructions that are secure in the ideal-cipher model but are insecure in real life.


The most sticking example is the AuthA password-based key-exchange
protocol (see IEEE P1363.2). There, the EKE proof of security in the
ideal-cipher model (Bellare et al, Eurocrypt'00) abstracts away real-world problems that exist in some implementations. Indeed some
implementations that follow the outline of the "provable scheme" were
found to be insecure. (It should be noted that the specific reasons that
these implementations fail are not relevant to our quest of constructing
hash functions from block ciphers. But it does say something about the
model.)


-- Shai


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