Guys,
I have quite a few comments on your draft document, "Randomness
Recommendations for Security." I'm sorry I haven't gotten this to you
sooner--I know big lists of comments take time to digest, and that
you'd like to get this out the door. For reference, I'm one of the
people working on the X9.82 random number generation standardization
effort, and this is a pretty major area of research for me, so I hope
I can offer you some pretty meaty comments. I wish I had time to give you
more--these comments are still a bit unrefined.
I think there are three core points you need to hit in this section,
one of which you've touched on, two of which you've missed:
a. When you're looking an entropy sources, passing statistical tests
has no relationship to whether the source is unpredictable, which is
what you really want. (This works both ways: The sequence of bits
from SHA1 hashing 0,1,2,... has no unpredictability, but will pass any
statistical test you can find. A sequence of ASCII characters
encoding the rolls of a 6-sided die will fail every statistical test
you can think of, but it's a great source of unpredictability.)