Steve and all,
Again we disagree in your conclusion here Steve. Of course we
have been over this ground before. Changing or introducing new
crypto algorithm's in no way should impede or prevent interoerability
and interface facilities now available can and do address this issue.
Steve Crocker wrote:
> No matter what algorithms we choose today, it's likely that changes
will
> be required in the future. Let me strengthen Ran's suggestion. In
> addition to building algorithm-independent protocols, the protocols
> should also include an upgrade mechanism for changing algorithms in
an
> orderly way. It's not good enough to say protocol FOO is
independent of
> algorithm if all of the initial deployment depends on crypto
algorithm
> SNARF and there's no way to introduce new crypto algorithm FARNS
without
> breaking interoperability.
>
> Steve
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: saag-bounces at mit.edu [mailto:saag-bounces at mit.edu] On
> > Behalf Of RJ Atkinson
> > Sent: Thursday, October 28, 2004 8:49 AM
> > To: David A. McGrew
> > Cc: cfrg at ietf.org; saag at mit.edu
> > Subject: [saag] Re: universal MACs
> >
> >
> > David,
> >
> > My protocol preference in an IETF context is for
> > algorithm-independent
> > protocols,
> > so that one does not need to change the protocol to add support
for
> > additional
> > algorithms in future. This property holds for at least OSPFv2
> > authentication and
> > RIPv2 authentication (and yes, I am working on documentation
> > updates to
> > each
> > of those specifications to document how SHA-1 and its relatives
are
> > implemented).
> >
> > My algorithm preference in an IETF context is for algorithms that
are
> > acceptable
> > to the largest number of end users. Right now, many
> > governments (from
> > multiple
> > governments, including several in Europe and several in Asia,
> > NOT just
> > the US)
> > and many non-governmental customers are insisting upon the same
> > algorithm set,
> > which is the set of currently NIST-approved algorithms and
> > modes. This
> > set of
> > algorithms appears to be the preferred set of algorithms and modes
> > right now --
> > by a VERY wide margin.
> >
> > In practice, that means there is a strong buyer preference from
many
> > countries
> > for SHA-1 (and its NIST-documented relatives) and for AES (in
> > NIST-acceptable
> > modes). Several countries, including several in Europe and
> > several in
> > Asia, are
> > also insisting that cryptographic products they buy have NIST FIPS
> > 140-2 approvals.
> > This also tends to reinforce the selection of algorithms and modes
> > since only the
> > NIST-approved algorithms and modes can get a FIPS 140-2 approval.
> >
> > I would even suggest that for the moment, any new security
protocols
> > developed
> > in an IETF context ought to include documentation on how
> > NIST-approved
> > algorithms
> > and modes are used with those protocols -- even if the IETF were
to
> > decide that
> > it preferred some non-NIST algorithm or mode for a particular
> > security
> > protocol
> > as the "default" algorithm/mode choice.
> >
> > Yours,
> >
> > Ran Atkinson
> > rja at extremenetworks.com
> >
> > PS: Nitpickers should please note well that all of my comments
above
> > are about
> > the end-user/marketplace desires, and there is no comment above
about
> > the quality
> > of any particular algorithm or mode.
> >
> >
> > On Oct 28, 2004, at 07:51, David A. McGrew wrote:
> > > I suspect that the group preference would be towards hash
> > > functions that are portable (e.g. fast on a wide variety of
> > CPUs) and
> > > that require minimal per-key state. There may be other points
of
> > > view; others please chime in if you have other priorities.
> > >
> > > David
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > saag mailing list
> > saag at mit.edu
> > https://jis.mit.edu/mailman/listinfo/saag
> >
>
> _______________________________________________
> saag mailing list
> saag at mit.edu
> https://jis.mit.edu/mailman/listinfo/saag
Regards,
--
Jeffrey A. Williams
Spokesman for INEGroup LLA. - (Over 134k members/stakeholders strong!)
"Be precise in the use of words and expect precision from others" -
Pierre Abelard
"If the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B;
liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by
P: i.e., whether B is less than PL."
United States v. Carroll Towing (159 F.2d 169 [2d Cir. 1947]
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