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Re: [Cfrg] Re: [saag] Algorithm upgrades



On Nov 1, 2004, at 8:09 PM, Hallam-Baker, Phillip wrote:

1. _New_ protocols that are being design should include the ability to negotiate algorithms. This is just good hygiene. If this is not formalized, it should be.

I strongly disagree. History has showed that negotiation mechanisms can lead
to worse security problems than they are meant to address. The IETF has
certainly showed an exceptional ability to overcomplicate them.

Well. We disagree then.

The only history of negotiation failures that I have seen is the GSM vulnerability where they put ECC under weak encryption and then used that same key for high strength, cracked the key, spoofed a base station, mounted a MIM attack and got in. Yes this is a protocol vulnerability with 2 (Doh!) stupid crypto mistakes. Was this caused because there was algorithm flexibility or because of other reasons? I would suggest that this is more about the other mistakes than about the fact that there were protocol vulnerabilities. If you have other examples, I'm all ears.

Keeping a protocol centered on the problem without the siren call of "feature creep" is not easy. It is this creep of "just one more feature cuz its a simple tweak" that, when compounded created a incomprehensible stew of incongruous kludges. If one can keep their eye on the ball, and is managed as a fundamental feature ( not an add on ) along with scalability and reliability, then it -is- possible to have algorithm flexibility.

Half of the IETF protocols are more complicated than the average IETF protocol.

Well, maybe we strongly agree. What we need is an ability to add new algorithms, remove bad algorithms with causing undue complexity to the user.



What we need is a policy layer for the whole application protocol layer
stack. It should not be part of the individual protocols, it should be part
of the DNS.

This seems like a policy punt. what are you suggesting and why?

Thanks

jim


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