[Cfrg] Fwd: [saag] X.509 certificate collision, via MD5 collisions

["David A. McGrew" <mcgrew at cisco.com>]

FYI. Comments welcome.

David

Begin forwarded message:

> From: Russ Housley <housley at vigilsec.com>
> Date: March 1, 2005 3:24:00 PM PST
> To: saag at mit.edu, ietf-pkix at imc.org
> Subject: [saag] X.509 certificate collision, via MD5 collisions
>
> I have not had an opportunity to review this document yet, but the 
> findings need to be shared with the whole Internet security community.
>
> > We announce a method for the construction of pairs of valid X.509 
> > certificates in which the "to
> > be signed" parts form a collision for the MD5 hash function. As a 
> > result the issuer signatures
> > in the certificates will be the same when the issuer uses MD5 as its 
> > hash function.
>
> http://eprint.iacr.org/2005/067
>
>
>
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