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Re: [Cfrg] HMAC-MD5

To: David Wagner <daw-usenet at cs.berkeley.edu>,cfrg at ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Cfrg] HMAC-MD5
From: Russ Housley <housley at vigilsec.com>
Date: Wed, 29 Mar 2006 09:14:55 -0500
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David:

Let me ask a question. Is there any reason to be restricted to HMAC?

This was the question that was raised. The working group already has HMAC-MD5 in their draft specification. The question was raised to determine if there is a compelling reason to change.

In the TLS 1.2 design, there is a discussion about supporting non-hash-based integrity mechanisms. In the current design, they use a combination of MD5 and SHA-1 in a HMAC-like construction.

Russ


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References:
- [Cfrg] HMAC-MD5
  - From: Russ Housley
- Re: [Cfrg] HMAC-MD5
  - From: David Wagner

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