Re: [Cfrg] DNSSEC considering adopting GOST R 34.10-2001 and GOST R 34.11-94

["Jim Schaad" <ietf at augustcellars.com>]

I would like to note that we added this without having actually seen the
details of the algorithm itself.

Jim Schaad

> -----Original Message-----
> From: cfrg-bounces at irtf.org [mailto:cfrg-bounces at irtf.org] On Behalf Of
> Ólafur Guðmundsson /DNSEXT chair
> Sent: Wednesday, April 22, 2009 8:14 AM
> To: cfrg at irtf.org
> Subject: [Cfrg] DNSSEC considering adopting GOST R 34.10-2001 and GOST
> R 34.11-94
> 
> 
> This message is a request for information.
> In an old CFRG thread
> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/cfrg/current/msg01170.html
> I asked for some guidance on defining ECC algorithms for DNSSEC.
> 
> We now have the first concrete proposal for an ECC algorithm,
>          GOST R 34.10-2001 a ECC public key algorithm
>          GOST R 34.11-94  a hash algorithm
> preliminary ID: (more politics than technical)
> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-dolmatov-dnsext-dnssec-gost-
> 00.txt
> 
> 
> Both algorithms have been added to at least one IETF protocol
> (RFC4490).
> The DNS community is inclined to seriously consider the adoption of
> these
> algorithms, but we are not crypto experts.
> 
> Question #1: Is there a cryptographic reason why GOST R 34.10-2001
> should NOT be considered for adoption by DNS?
> 
> Previously I have received suggestions for following ECC curves:
>          P-256, P-384 and Curve25519.
> 
> Question #2: Is there a cryptographic reason why GOST R 34.11-94
> should NOT be considered for adoption by DNS?
> 
>          thanks
>          Olafur
> 
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