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That is what the RP sees if they play along with the scheme.Pete-
Why do you have to trust the RP at all? All the RP ever sees is an assertion that you control the identity URL that you provided.
It is vulnerable to a man in the middle attack - the RP, instead of redirecting to the IdP redirects to itself or some other site in cahoots, then proxies the conversation between the user and the IdP thereby compromising the users (global) credentials as they pass through.Do you see a vulnerability that I'm missing?
-mike
On Wed, 18 Oct 2006 10:49:54 -0700
Pete Rowley <prowley at redhat.com> wrote:
I also think it _is_ a requirement that thebrowser vendors support this - right now you have to trust that the RP is a white hat.
-- Pete
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