RE: [Ecrit] some observations from yesterday wg meeting

["James M. Polk" <jmpolk at cisco.com>]

At 07:45 PM 8/3/2005 +1000, James Winterbottom wrote:
> The problem must exist in someone's charter, and GeoPriv don't seem to 
> want it either!

<snip>

> Location is today in the cellular and wireline world is the responsibility 
> of the access provider, and this will need to remain the responsibility of 
> the access provider in the future until telekenic-osmosis becomes a 
> reality. ECRIT or GeoPriv pick it up until then, but stop passing the buck!!!

James - not every problem has a charter in the IETF.

The Geopriv charter is addressing Location delivery with Privacy 
Considerations - there is nothing about certifying the location is correct 
in that charter. In fact, per RFC3693 (Geopriv's base requirements doc), 
the location provided can be quite imprecise on purpose.

The ECRIT charter is narrowly focused on identification of emergency calls 
and routing of those calls to the correct PSAP of the location provided. I 
continue to argue validating location is outside the IETF's scope, much 
less ECRIT's charter.

None of the above says validating location is a bad idea, BTW.


> Cheers
> James
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: ecrit-bounces at ietf.org 
> [<mailto:ecrit-bounces at ietf.org>mailto:ecrit-bounces at ietf.org] On Behalf 
> Of Brian Rosen
> Sent: Wednesday, 3 August 2005 7:21 PM
> To: 'Andrew Newton'
> Cc: ecrit at ietf.org
> Subject: RE: [Ecrit] some observations from yesterday wg meeting
>
> But that problem is not in our charter.  If an attacker learned a PSAP's 
> SIP URI from any mechanism, they can mount an attack.
>
> True.
>
> Not in our charter.
>
> Determining that a location represents the location of the caller is 
> within charter.
>
> I believe identity of caller is NOT a requirement in general, but I think 
> it's clearly not a requirement in ecrit.
>
> Brian
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Andrew Newton [<mailto:andy at hxr.us>mailto:andy at hxr.us]
> Sent: Wednesday, August 03, 2005 5:07 AM
> To: Brian Rosen
> Cc: 'James Seng'; ecrit at ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [Ecrit] some observations from yesterday wg meeting
>
> On Aug 3, 2005, at 3:23 AM, Brian Rosen wrote:
>
> > This discussion is more or less out of charter, as the work in ecrit
> > addresses the first point above.
>
> I don't think so.  I think James has made a fairly important point:
> the notion that L2 location must be signed can simply be circumvented
> by an attacker contacting the PSAP's SIP server directly.
>
> -andy
>
>
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cheers,
James

                                *******************
                Truth is not to be argued... it is to be presented.

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