[Ecrit] FW: [Geopriv] Winterbottom-ecrit-direct considered harmful, at least given our current experiences

["Hannes Tschofenig" <Hannes.Tschofenig at gmx.net>]

FYI: feedback from Brian regarding a recent ECRIT contribution.  

>-----Original Message-----
>From: geopriv-bounces at ietf.org 
>[mailto:geopriv-bounces at ietf.org] On Behalf Of Rosen, Brian
>Sent: 26 October, 2009 23:10
>To: geopriv at ietf.org
>Subject: [Geopriv] Winterbottom-ecrit-direct considered 
>harmful, at least given our current experiences
>
>The notion behind -direct is to not use a service provider to 
>place an emergency call.  Instead, the device registers with 
>an Emergency Services Routing Proxy immediately before the 
>call and the call is routed directly from the device to the ESRP.
>
>At least at the moment, this is an exceedingly bad idea.
>
>Emergency calling authorities like service providers, a lot.  
>They like them because they can hold them accountable, and the 
>service providers don't like theft of service, which is 
>something the emergency call guys have an analog to.
>
>The facts are that where unaccountable access to emergency 
>calling is allowed, huge numbers of false calls occur, with no 
>way to stop them, and no way to tell the good ones from the 
>bad ones.  This has been seen multiple times where so called 
>"simless" or "unauthenticated" calls are allowed.
>
>-direct precisely duplicates simless calling.  The only 
>"registration" is an emergency registration, only emergency 
>calls are allowed, any device can make an emergency call if 
>all it has is a (radio) connection to any network.
>We can predict, with a very high degree of certainty, that the 
>feature will be horribly abused: for example to test that a 
>phone without a service plan works.
>
>There have been studies which show tens of thousands of bad 
>calls with zero good ones.  Nearly every authority I know 
>where the regulator has insisted on simless calling wants it 
>repealed.  There is one counter example I know where the fact 
>that they got a couple, literally, of good calls among the 
>tens of thousands of bad calls was considered enough reason to 
>put up with the problem.
>
>Service providers give us information that may be useful: a 
>subscriber name and address for example, which is not 
>spoofable by the caller.  They have ways to trace callers, 
>especially bad callers.  They don't want their systems abused 
>any more than the emergency calling authorities do.
>
>This is a bad idea.  A very bad idea.  Please stop it.
>
>Someday, we may have better ways to prevent abuse. Until we 
>do, service providers are a good thing on an emergency call.  
>We don't want them cut out.
>
>Brian
>
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