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Re: [Ecrit] FW: [Geopriv] Winterbottom-ecrit-direct considered
The only SERVICE necessary in this case is internet access.
If caller identity is your solution to the problem, then you're joining illustrious company [1]. It certainly would solve a lot of problems...
I think that jumping to conclusions here doesn't do us any favours. Perhaps we need to do as was suggested by Bernard in Stockholm [2] and start to look at the security of the entire system.
--Martin
[1] <http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/10/16/kaspersky_rebukes_net_anonymity/>
[2] <http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-tschofenig-ecrit-trustworthy-location>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: ecrit-bounces at ietf.org [mailto:ecrit-bounces at ietf.org] On Behalf
> Of Brian Rosen
> Sent: Tuesday, 27 October 2009 11:59 AM
> To: Dawson, Martin; Hannes Tschofenig; ecrit at ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [Ecrit] FW: [Geopriv] Winterbottom-ecrit-direct considered
>
> First of all, I put it on the wrong email list, sorry about that.
>
> Then, we have carefully arranged it so that there is no identity coming
> from
> the access network provider, and because the location is coming from
> that
> provider, we really don't want to. But even if we did, we would need a
> really good identifier, and there isn't one.
>
> The problem we have with -direct is anonymous callers, and if they have
> any
> option, they would also be location-less. Until and unless we get rid
> of
> anonymity, we can't encourage service provider-less calls. The draft
> does
> not make any provision to provide any kind of identity. Many networks
> (think free wifi for example) would make providing good identity
> difficult.
>
> The fact is that there is a SERVICE provider in nearly all of the
> communications systems. The SERVICE provider is in a position to
> assist
> the emergency calling system when it needs more information. That's
> what a
> good SERVICE provider does. Cutting them out is not a great idea.
> Most of
> the attempts to provide real time communications between people have
> evolved
> to using service providers, even when there were alternatives. File
> transfer via something like Torrent is a counterexample (which isn't
> real
> time), but even there, you end up with service providers like The
> Pirate Bay
> (R.I.P) to provide introduction services. I don't think we're going to
> see
> changes that eliminate service providers, and in this case, they
> provide
> value to the emergency calling systems. All of the emergency
> professionals
> I know have issues with service providers, but they would react with
> horror
> if you suggested cutting them out. Ask them, please.
>
> So, I claim you have a solution in search of a problem. We have solved
> the
> "calling network isn't the access network" problem already. Service
> providers ARE in the path now, in nearly every case (in fact a counter
> example escapes me, although there probably are some). There is no
> movement
> I can detect which would change that any time soon; quite the opposite.
> We
> have a known killer problem without some kind of subscription to a
> service
> that provides a good identity, for which you provide no answers. We
> have
> experience with the killer problem: sim-less calling was supposed to
> provide
> a way to make an emergency call in exactly the kinds of circumstances
> you
> are describing. Our real world experience is that you create a huge
> problem
> that diverts resources from helping people to chasing scammers and
> flea-market sellers.
>
> Nothing is perfect: you can get a AIM screen name without a very good
> identity for example. However, the notion that we're going to provide
> direct access without a service provider deliberately, especially
> without
> really good identity from the access network is, in my opinion not only
> a
> no, it's a heck no. I'll line up as many emergency service
> professionals as
> you would like to tell you this is a harmful idea.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On 10/26/09 7:56 PM, "Dawson, Martin" <Martin.Dawson at andrew.com> wrote:
>
> > I am glad this has come up. It's a debate that has to happen if we
> are to move
> > beyond a long standing legacy misconception.
> >
> > In the circuit service world - whether it was POTS or mobile, the
> access
> > network had full responsibility for delivering the emergency call. In
> that
> > world, routing an emergency call meant getting a circuit established
> to the
> > correct call center. In most parts of the world, this was done using
> the
> > regional part of the PSTN to switch the circuit to a call center on
> the PSTN.
> > In some jurisdictions, such as the US, it was done directly from the
> local
> > exchange carrier to the call center. Either way, there was no third
> party
> > involved.
> >
> > Now we have the Internet. We still have public access network
> providers. They
> > switch packets onto the Internet for their subscribers. They can
> similarly
> > ensure that packets reach the local emergency call centers.
> >
> > The fact is that there was no equivalent of a VSP in the traditional
> > environment. VoIP is a presence service, and it had no common
> equivalent in
> > the PSTN world. It could have, but the narrowband state of technology
> and the
> > common market use cases didn't support its development. By the time
> ISDN
> > arrived, the PSTN had already slipped into its palliative stage
> without
> > realizing it.
> >
> > It's an entrenched misconception that because the circuit service
> provided by
> > exchange carriers was most commonly used for "voice" (but, it should
> be noted,
> > also for fax, telex, tty, security system monitoring and, even, IP
> data) that
> > VSPs are somehow equivalent to exchange carriers. They are not.
> >
> > Indeed, involving VSPs in emergency calls is the Internet equivalent
> of
> > involving long distance providers in POTS emergency calls. They are
> neither
> > necessary nor particularly helpful; they can't be guaranteed to be
> within the
> > emergency jurisdiction; depending on them actually diminishes the
> efficacy of
> > emergency service access. It does not help the caller, the emergency
> service,
> > nor the third party to insist on the third party's involvement.
> >
> > It can't be helped if you have over sold the benefits of VSP
> involvement to
> > yourself and others Brian. It is time to have a reasoned debate. From
> my
> > perspective, the argument that there is no "subscription" involved is
> patently
> > false. There has to be a subscription of some description in order to
> get to
> > the Internet. Yes, there is free public Internet access (just as
> there are
> > free courtesy phones on the PSTN and free access to emergency
> services from
> > pay phones. All these services are still connected to the public
> Internet
> > infrastructure and they all represent an "operator" with some level
> of
> > information about the caller.
> >
> > With the over-emphasis on VSPs, what is missing from the ECRIT and i3
> models
> > is the direct interface for querying the access network for
> subscriber data
> > (should it prove necessary). These models need to take the long view
> of how
> > emergency calling is done in the Internet age; they should not be
> protracting
> > an unnecessary reliance on VSPs.
> >
> > I have deleted the premature and prejudicial text from the subject
> heading.
> > And I'll leave this on ECRIT as the most appropriate WG.
> >
> > Cheers,
> > Martin
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: ecrit-bounces at ietf.org [mailto:ecrit-bounces at ietf.org] On
> Behalf Of
> > Hannes Tschofenig
> > Sent: Tuesday, 27 October 2009 8:23 AM
> > To: ecrit at ietf.org
> > Subject: [Ecrit] FW: [Geopriv] Winterbottom-ecrit-direct considered
> harmful,
> > at least given our current experiences
> >
> > FYI: feedback from Brian regarding a recent ECRIT contribution.
> >
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: geopriv-bounces at ietf.org
> >> [mailto:geopriv-bounces at ietf.org] On Behalf Of Rosen, Brian
> >> Sent: 26 October, 2009 23:10
> >> To: geopriv at ietf.org
> >> Subject: [Geopriv] Winterbottom-ecrit-direct considered
> >> harmful, at least given our current experiences
> >>
> >> The notion behind -direct is to not use a service provider to
> >> place an emergency call. Instead, the device registers with
> >> an Emergency Services Routing Proxy immediately before the
> >> call and the call is routed directly from the device to the ESRP.
> >>
> >> At least at the moment, this is an exceedingly bad idea.
> >>
> >> Emergency calling authorities like service providers, a lot.
> >> They like them because they can hold them accountable, and the
> >> service providers don't like theft of service, which is
> >> something the emergency call guys have an analog to.
> >>
> >> The facts are that where unaccountable access to emergency
> >> calling is allowed, huge numbers of false calls occur, with no
> >> way to stop them, and no way to tell the good ones from the
> >> bad ones. This has been seen multiple times where so called
> >> "simless" or "unauthenticated" calls are allowed.
> >>
> >> -direct precisely duplicates simless calling. The only
> >> "registration" is an emergency registration, only emergency
> >> calls are allowed, any device can make an emergency call if
> >> all it has is a (radio) connection to any network.
> >> We can predict, with a very high degree of certainty, that the
> >> feature will be horribly abused: for example to test that a
> >> phone without a service plan works.
> >>
> >> There have been studies which show tens of thousands of bad
> >> calls with zero good ones. Nearly every authority I know
> >> where the regulator has insisted on simless calling wants it
> >> repealed. There is one counter example I know where the fact
> >> that they got a couple, literally, of good calls among the
> >> tens of thousands of bad calls was considered enough reason to
> >> put up with the problem.
> >>
> >> Service providers give us information that may be useful: a
> >> subscriber name and address for example, which is not
> >> spoofable by the caller. They have ways to trace callers,
> >> especially bad callers. They don't want their systems abused
> >> any more than the emergency calling authorities do.
> >>
> >> This is a bad idea. A very bad idea. Please stop it.
> >>
> >> Someday, we may have better ways to prevent abuse. Until we
> >> do, service providers are a good thing on an emergency call.
> >> We don't want them cut out.
> >>
> >> Brian
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> Geopriv mailing list
> >> Geopriv at ietf.org
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/geopriv
> >>
> >
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> >
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