Re: [Ecrit] FW: [Geopriv] Winterbottom-ecrit-direct considered

[Brian Rosen <br at brianrosen.net>]

There is way too much speculation here.

You are speculating that there will be interesting services without service
providers that have two way interactive media, where the identity of the
callers is a simple domain name, emergency calls from those devices is
interesting, they can't provide a suitable callback without a registration
from the ESRP, and such calls wont be the preferred abuse call source.

When we have that problem, if we ever have that problem, we'll solve it.

Right now, the simpler case of a direct call from an unknown source because
you have a proxy server in your boat will get through just fine nearly all
the time.  When it doesn't, it will be because that path is being used by
someone attacking, and the lack of a service provider will probably be to
the disadvantage of the direct caller.  I'm not going to lose sleep over
that problem.  I'd rather beef up the system so we don't have to drop calls
when we're attacked.  OTOH, I don't want to promote the proxy server in the
boat idea.  If it happens occasionally, we'll cope.

Brian


On 10/30/09 4:14 PM, "Marc Linsner" <mlinsner at cisco.com> wrote:

> 
> 
> On 10/30/09 2:29 PM, "Brian Rosen" <br at brianrosen.net> wrote:
> 
>> I'm the messenger here.  PSAPs prefer service providers to be on the path of
>> a call, and they have bad experiences when they aren't.
>> 
>> Given their experiences, I can't fault them.
>> 
>> The reason the text is in phonebcp is as you said it is: because "normal" is
>> likely to work.  The fact that "normal" means SP path in 99.999% of cases
>> gets the PSAPs what they want.  They don't care about why we did it, they
>> care they get the right result.
> 
> I, like others, believe the role/definition of the 'SP', as currently
> defined by the PSAPs, will change significantly going forward.
> 
>> 
>> I don't believe we are going to see vanity domains used on calls, and even
>> if they were in "From", they won't be the domain in P-Asserted-Identity, or
>> the SubjectAltName of the Identity signature.  If some service that used
>> email addresses as identities sent us calls, the email address (with its
>> domain) is the "userpart" of the identity, not the whole thing.  There are
>> some interesting problems when you have URI to something like the MS IM
>> systems.  The first "@' (br at brianrosen.net@msn.com) gets escaped.  We've
>> built systems that handle that.
> 
> I think this is a little short-sighted.  Certificates for vanity domains are
> certainly doable.  Besides P-Asserted-Identity is not a MUST in phonebcp.
> :^)
> 
>> 
>> The Firewall/Session Border controls will have several criteria when PSAPs
>> are overloaded, but AFAIK, no existing firewalls or SBCs do what you suggest
>> other than the repeat offender rule, which is the first line of defense.
>> They do filter based on criteria that equate to IP Address or Domain of the
>> SP, which we can deal with.  We'll use what works for the other users of
>> these systems, we're unlikely to be able to have emergency services special
>> firewalls or SBCs.
> 
> We're not talking about existing firewalls and SBCs.  We're talking about
> ESInet Border Control Function.  If you don't define what you want there,
> you'll live with what you get.  My suggestions are not beyond what's
> possible, it's all software.
> 
> -Marc-
> 
> 
> 
>