Re: [Emu] Re: [Hokeyp] MSK but no EMSK
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Re: [Emu] Re: [Hokeyp] MSK but no EMSK



Hao,

I think you meant to say it would require replacing all existing EAP *method* implementations. EAP implementations will have to change anyway to support derivation of keys within the hierarchy. If you're updating clients and servers already, rev-ing the method implementations to bring them up to spec seems like a reasonable thing to do. Engineering new standards around broken implementations of old standards seems like a bad set of design constraints.

--
t. charles clancy, ph.d.  |  tcc at umd.edu  |  www.cs.umd.edu/~clancy


Hao Zhou (hzhou) wrote:
I pointed in the meeting that even EAP RFC mandates EMSK, however I
don't know any existing EAP implementation actually generates and
exports EMSK (especially the popular ones, like EAP-TLS, PEAP, EAP-FAST,
EAP-TTLS, etc.) So if we build our key hierarchy on top of EMSK, we will
require replacing all existing EAP implementations, both from the server
and client side. If we cold use MSK, then we only need to replace EAP
lower layer that wants to support handover.

-----Original Message-----
From: Lakshminath Dondeti [mailto:ldondeti at qualcomm.com] Sent: Thursday, November 16, 2006 12:38 PM
To: Yoshihiro Ohba; Alper Yegin
Cc: hokeyp at opendiameter.org; emu at ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Emu] Re: [Hokeyp] MSK but no EMSK


At 06:27 AM 11/16/2006, Yoshihiro Ohba wrote:
I made one comment around this in the HOKEY session. The
intent of my
comment was that use of EMSK is optional.
Hi Yoshi,

Which document says that the "use" of EMSK is optional?

There would be an
interoperability issue if peer and server do not negotiate
on the use
of EMSK before actually using it.
The interoperability issue would only come up if there is ambiguity or options.

Lakshminath


Yoshihiro Ohba


On Thu, Nov 16, 2006 at 11:01:15AM +0200, Alper Yegin wrote:
I remember someone in Hokey WG meeting mentioned that not all methods generate EMSK (even though they generate MSK). Is
that accurate?
Despite this RFC 3748 text?

In order to provide keying material for use in a
subsequently negotiated ciphersuite, an EAP method
supporting key
derivation MUST export a Master Session Key (MSK) of
at least 64
octets, and an Extended Master Session Key (EMSK) of
at least 64
   octets.

Alper


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