RE: [Emu] WGLC comments for draft-simon-emu-rfc2716bis

["Bernard Aboba" <bernard_aboba at hotmail.com>]

> >    Comparing the Server-Id in the certificate to the expected server
> >    name limits the damage that will result from an attacker compromising
> >    a server private key.  If the peer does not check the Server-Id, then
> >    the peer would accept a compromised server certificate chaining to
> >    any of the configured trust anchors.
> >
>
> [Joe] If the server key is compromised then it seems checking the
> server-ID will not help discover this or limit damage.

Maybe this should have been "compromising a trust anchor private key".  I 
think the idea was to prevent a compromise of a trust anchor from enabling 
attackers to carry out "rogue authenticator" attacks across the board.



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