Re: [Emu] Issue #14 Emergency auth
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Re: [Emu] Issue #14 Emergency auth
Often, there is a richer interface between EAP and the authenticator.
For example in an Access-Accept message from RADIUS a number of things
can be communicated about the authentication including the identity of
the authenticated peer. I also don't think that EAP-Success necessarily
implies mutual authentication, it just says that the EAP server is
satisfied with the result of the process.
Joe
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Yaron Sheffer [mailto:yaronf at checkpoint.com]
> Sent: Thursday, August 06, 2009 3:05 PM
> To: Joseph Salowey (jsalowey); emu at ietf.org
> Subject: RE: Issue #14 Emergency auth
>
> The contract between the authenticator and the EAP layer is,
> when I see an EAP Success message, it means that both sides
> are authenticated. We are now breaking this contract, so it
> makes sense to have EAP inform the upper layer of this fact.
>
> But I suppose EAP is not extensible enough to add such
> semantics. Sigh.
>
> Thanks,
> Yaron
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: emu-bounces at ietf.org [mailto:emu-bounces at ietf.org] On
> Behalf Of
> > Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
> > Sent: Thursday, August 06, 2009 22:14
> > To: emu at ietf.org
> > Subject: [Emu] Issue #14 Emergency auth
> >
> >
> > > Referring to Sec. 3.5 of
> > http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-emu-eaptunnel-req-03, there
> > should be an indication to the application that is using EAP > that
> > such "strange" authentication took place. For example, the
> VoIP server
> > may than make sure that only calls to 911 or 112 are allowed.
> > Otherwise
> > > there is no way to authorize the user without some
> backchannel into
> > the AAA.
> > >
> > > So I propose to add:
> >
> > > "The tunnel method, if it supports emergency services,
> MUST provide
> > > an
> > indication at the EAP or EAP-method level that such authentication
> > took place; >
> > > the indication MUST be unencrypted but integrity protected".
> >
> > I don't understand what this text is for? Who is this
> indication for?
> > An application should not be sniffing EAP packets to see
> what happens.
> > It seems that this is the responsibility of a local API between the
> > EAP server and the application.
> >
> >
> > Joe
> > _______________________________________________
> > Emu mailing list
> > Emu at ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/emu
> >
> > Scanned by Check Point Total Security Gateway.
>
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