Re: [Emu] EAP and authorization
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Re: [Emu] EAP and authorization



> The discussion here is (a) if we can get *some* generic authorization
> passed via methods used for Channel Bindings, and (b) is that a good idea.
>
> I think that the answer to (a) is "yes", and (b) is "some say yes,
> some say no".

Existing RFCs are clear that Channel Bindings have a specific purpose and
are not a generic authorization mechanism.  For example, RFC 3748
Section 7.15 states:

"
   In order to address this vulnerability, EAP methods may support a
protected exchange of channel properties such as endpoint
identifiers, including (but not limited to): Called-Station-Id
[RFC2865][RFC3580], Calling-Station-Id [RFC2865][RFC3580], NAS-
Identifier [RFC2865], NAS-IP-Address [RFC2865], and NAS-IPv6-Address
[RFC3162].

Using such a protected exchange, it is possible to match the channel
properties provided by the authenticator via out-of-band mechanisms
against those exchanged within the EAP method. Where discrepancies
are found, these SHOULD be logged; additional actions MAY also be
taken, such as denying access.
"

Given the above (and similar material in RFC 5247),  it would seem (surprise!)
that channel bindings relate to properties of the channel.   Despite the confusion
introduced by Section 1 of the Channel Bindings document, the parameters
actually discussed in the Channel Bindings document generally appear consistent
with existing work. 

I say "generally" because the document does appear to need an update or two.
For example,  Section 7.3.2 of the Channel Bindings document
introduces the Mesh-Key-Distributor-Domain-Id.  My understanding is that
this parameter has been removed from 11s, so this section is now out of date.


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