Re: [Emu] Issue #23: Tunnel Protection requirements
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Re: [Emu] Issue #23: Tunnel Protection requirements



Please find my comments and suggested solution inline.

Katrin

PS: Note that NIST DRAFT SP 800-120 and SP 800-57 part 3 both completed
the public call for comments a while ago and can be expected to be
published soon.

> -----Original Message-----
> From: emu-bounces at ietf.org [mailto:emu-bounces at ietf.org] On Behalf Of
> Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
> Sent: Thursday, August 06, 2009 3:12 PM
> To: emu at ietf.org
> Subject: [Emu] Issue #23: Tunnel Protection requirements
> 
> #23: Tunnel Protection requirements
> 
>  > Section 4.2.1.1.2
>  >
>  > "See Part 1 of the NIST Recommendation for
>  >    Key Management [NIST SP 800-57] for a discussion of the relative
>  >    strengths of common algorithms."
>  >
>  > Why not reference the NIST SP 800-120 requirements here?


[KH] This issue talks about Section 4.2.1.1.2 "Tunnel Data Protection
Algorithms". Here it is required that "The tunnel method MUST provide at
least one mandatory to implement cipher suite that provides the
equivalent security of 128-bit AES for encryption and message
authentication."

The reference to NIST SP 800-57 part 3 is meant to help implementers to
determine other cryptographic algorithm with key lengths that correspond
to 128-bit AES security. This NIST recommendation is the correct
reference here because it lists the security strength of crypto
algorithms with particular key lengths.

On the other hand, NIST SP 800-120 (not published yet, but will be soon)
describes security requirements for tunnel protocols, including
requirements for data protection. Note that these requirements are for
Federal networks and it would need to be determined whether these
requirements are reasonable (i.e., not too restrictive) for commercial
networks too.

So either we leave the text as is, i.e. with one example of how to do it
and a reference on how to construct other secure solutions, or we delete
the current text and say that 
"The tunnel method MUST provide at least one mandatory to implement
cipher suite that meets all security requirements for data protections
of a tunnel protocol in NIST DRAFT Recommendation for EAP Methods Used
in Wireless Network Access Authentication [NIST SP 800-120]."

>  >
> 
>  > "o One-way key derivation
>  >  o Cryptographically separated keys.
>  >  o Cryptographically separated entities.
>  >  o Identity binding
>  >  o Context binding
>  >  o Key lifetime
>  >  o Mutual implicit key authentication
>  >  o Key freshness"
>  >
>  > Given that this document assumes a TLS-based tunnel method,
>  > the text on requirements can be made considerably more
>  > specific and actionable based on TLS properties and the
>  > specific requirements of NIST 800-120.
>  > As it stands, a number of these requirements either don't
>  > apply to EAP methods at all (e.g. context binding, key
>  > lifetime) but rather to other elements of the system, or are
>  > automatically provided by TLS (e.g. key freshness, Identity
>  > binding).
>  >
>  > So these requirements need to be made actionable and
>  > specific.  The ones that don't apply to the problem at hand
>  > (e.g. TLS-based tunnel euth) should be removed.
>  >
> 
[KH] This issue addresses Section 4.2.1.1.3. "Tunnel Authentication and
Key Establishment". I agree that the requirements need to be more
specific and some need to be removed altogether. 

NIST DRAFT Recommendation for Key Management, Part 3 [NIST SP 800-57,
part3] will be published soon and specifically lists secure ciphersuites
for Federal Government Use of TLS v1.0, v1.1 and v1.2, including
conventional public key, elliptic curve and pre-shared key ciphersuites.
These ciphersuite meet strict security requirements.

In NIST DRAFT Recommendation for EAP Methods Used in Wireless Network
Access Authentication [NIST SP 800-120], the requirements for TLS
ciphersuites also refer to NIST SP 800-57, part3. However, in addition
requirements for authentication and key establishments for tunnel
protocols are listed.

I suggest changing the text in Section 4.2.1.1.3 to

"A tunnel method MUST provide unidirectional authentication from
authentication server to EAP peer or mutual authentication between
authentication server and EAP peer.  The tunnel method MUST provide at
least one mandatory to implement cipher suite that provides
certificate-based authentication of the server and provides optional
certificate-based authentication of the client.  Other types of
authentication MAY be supported.

At least one mandatory to implement cipher suite MUST be approved by
NIST DRAFT Recommendation for Key Management, Part 3 [NIST SP 800-57,
part3], i.e., the ciphersuite MUST be listed in Table 4-1, 4-2 or 4-3 in
[NIST SP 800-57, part 3].

The mandatory to implement cipher suites MUST NOT include "export
strength" cipher suites, cipher suites providing mutually anonymous
authentication or static Diffie-Hellman cipher suites.  

Other ciphersuites MAY be selected following the security requirements
for tunnel protocols in NIST DRAFT Recommendation for EAP Methods Used
in Wireless Network Access Authentication [NIST SP 800-120]."


> --
> Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/emu/trac/ticket/23>
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