Re: [hybi] Why redirects are a bad for the security of WebSockets (was Re: Clarify wheter HTTP responses other than 101 are valid)

Greg Wilkins <gregw@intalio.com> Mon, 28 March 2011 21:04 UTC

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Date: Tue, 29 Mar 2011 08:06:08 +1100
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From: Greg Wilkins <gregw@intalio.com>
To: hybi@ietf.org
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Cc: Patrick McManus <pmcmanus@mozilla.com>
Subject: Re: [hybi] Why redirects are a bad for the security of WebSockets (was Re: Clarify wheter HTTP responses other than 101 are valid)
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On 29 March 2011 07:34, Adam Barth <ietf@adambarth.com> wrote:
> Consider the following code:
>
> var url = <obtain URL from somewhere, e.g. postMessage>
>
> if (!url.startsWith("wss://example.com/"))
>  return;
>
> var socket = new WebSocket(url);
> socket.onopen = function () {
>  [... interact with socket ...]
> };
>
> Reading this code, it's quite natural to assume that sending and
> receiving information on socket will actually communicate with
> example.com.  For example, I might send confidential information to
> example.com or rely upon the integrity of information received from
> example.com.  However, if example.com has has an open redirector (as
> is extremely common on the Internet), this assumption is incorrect and
> leads to vulnerabilities.
>
> Now, we can wring our hands and claim that this sort of issue isn't
> our problem, but it is.  Simply warning folks about these traps in
> Security Considerations is just passing the buck.  Instead, we
> shouldn't add this complexity to WebSockets at this time.  We can
> always change out minds and add support for redirects in the future,
> but we can never remove support once added.

Adam,

I don't think it is "our problem".     I think it is a "W3C/WHATWG
HTML-5 WG problem".

This is essentially an API issue for the browser websocket object.
There are plenty of ways around this (adding optional follow
redirects, exposing redirect responses etc. etc.),   but I think it is
the W3C and WHATWG HTML-5 working groups that should be where such
matters are decided.

As a web developer I really rather not have to go without redirection
and other common auth methods - and I take responsibility for my
servers not being open redirectors..... but would understand if the
W3C/WHATWG decided not to support these features - at least initially.

However, we should make the protocol such that if/when the API does
support these features, then it will only be an in browser change and
not an update of the protocol.

cheers

[hybi] Why redirects are a bad for the security o… Adam Barth
Re: [hybi] Why redirects are a bad for the securi… Greg Wilkins
Re: [hybi] Why redirects are a bad for the securi… Patrick McManus
Re: [hybi] Why redirects are a bad for the securi… Adam Barth
Re: [hybi] Why redirects are a bad for the securi… Iñaki Baz Castillo
Re: [hybi] Why redirects are a bad for the securi… Adam Barth
Re: [hybi] Why redirects are a bad for the securi… Patrick McManus
Re: [hybi] Why redirects are a bad for the securi… Julian Reschke