Re: Last Call: Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol to Proposed Standard

["C. Harald Koch" <chk at utcc.utoronto.ca>]

In message <v0300780bb146a2d106bd at [142.154.136.3]>, "Howard C. Berkowitz" writes:
> 
> Stating things more succinctly, I think the architecture document,
> specifically, does not either discuss proxy vs. end-to-end functions in the
> context of risk analysis, nor does it reference a document that does.
> There have been strong arguments about the interactions of IPsec and
> various proxy and proxy-like functions, including NAT, satellite spoofing,
> firewalls, etc.  Perhaps some guidance from the IESG or IAB is in order,
> clarifying how the IETF will build consensus on the interaction of these
> security and infrastructure technologies. Specific commentary on the effect
> of widespread IPsec deployment on the demand for globally routable IPv4
> space, under various scenarios of IPsec tunneling, should be considered.

None of these were in the Charter for the IPsec working group. This was
deliberate; they're hard problems.

Many of them are (or will be) in the Charter for the IPsecond working group,
and I'm sure we'd love to have you participate in those discussions.


There's precedent for splitting work like this, after all. We're up to RIPv2,
SNMPv3, and BGPv4 right now, after all.

-- 
Harald