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On Mon, 14 Feb 2000, Anders Feder wrote: > Robert Elz <kre at munnari.OZ.AU> wrote: > >I'm not sure there is a good analogy there. There's no good purpose > >in sending packets with incorrect source addresses I can think of, Crypto- and security-related, I should think. Randomising the source address makes tracking the existence of communications between a given source and a given destination that much harder; they know who they're talking to based on encrypted message content, but no-one else has to. A lot of surveillance can be based on 'if A is talking to B, then A must be as guilty as B', and message content is irrelevant. This helps counters that. (This is vaguely analogous to OpenBSD using non-sequential packet IDs, yes? Bet it's not in IPSEC.) > It is rarely very easy to see what requirements the future will bring and > particularly in this business you can't be sure what the technology of > tomorrow demands. Indeed. L. <L.Wood at surrey.ac.uk>PGP<http://www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/Personal/L.Wood/>
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