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>From: Vernon Schryver <vjs at calcite.rhyolite.com> > >> ... >> The basic idea then would be to trace back bad packets that >> conform to some typically innocent, but occasionally troublesome, >> profiles. The profiles will become self-evident with experience, >> and once people know they will be caught by this traceback >> system they will think twice before spreading their crap around. > >If I were building a DDoS engine today, I'd write a conventional >(Microsoft) DOS virus that does nothing except once every 3 minutes do >the equivalent of: > > echo "GET /index.html HTTP/1.0"; echo) | telnet -r $1 80 > >(maybe instead with a random request instead of /index.html) > >After a few 1,000,000 desktops have been infected by familiar virus >vectors, the victim might notice the traffic. >How would you filter for them? Even if you could give routers >enough processing power, what would you learn from the filtering >that you'd care to apply? It is possible to get more big bang in this case: virus may asks DNS servers about some generated domain names. Algoritm to fight negative caching effect is simple. With millions names in .com there is a long way to keep asking. - Leonid Yegoshin, LY22
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