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In message <20000216200000.F186C41F16 at SIGABA.research.att.com>, "Steven M. Bell ovin" typed: >>Right. Yahoo, though, was flooded mostly by the volume. I worry about >>high-volume TCP garbage sent to port 80, which you can't filter. Steve so in the case that the server resource is overloaded, but not the link, what you can do is extend the servers scheduling discipline (e.g. in dealing with existing connexions at a higher priority than new ones, and applying filters to new ones based on content/application level metrics (e.g. popularity indices, which is something many web servers have got anyhow), to priortise and starve the bad guys... if the links/routers near you are also being clobbered, than some form of "loose unicast RPF source quench" mechanism would be a semi-automated way that server sites could extend this scheduling back "towards" the bad guys - the idea is to take a mix of modified versions of the resource control messages such as icmp source quench ECN RSVP Reject etc, and use them to install soft state upstream towarasd the bad guy this state can either block, or just add a weighted RED higher drop probability, or eeven move traffic into a lower class in a diffserv priority, CBQ, WFQ or other... - but note unlike intserv/rsvp, this state doesnt have to be in all hops - just the appropriate border/choke point....so it has lots of nice scaling properties (its only their for a minority of addresses/flows/ports, its only in a few places, and only when you need it) - now if someone spoofs a real source address, this represrents a problem since you can use this mechanism or something like it to launch an indirect attack using this ....but there are ways to block that (including making it mandatory to use ipsec to use this mechanism...) anyhow, its basically a sort of BGP policy controllable, interne friendly scalable automated version of phoning up your ISP and having them back track through all the further ISPs... cheers jon
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