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> Well, we agree on the utility of having multiple PKIs. We disagree onthe need for a PKI that happens to cover a specific name space that underlies the vast majority of IP-based communications, or at least you disagree on the desirability of that specific PKI given the reality of who runs which TLDs. But, you don't offer any suggestions on how to address the need that a DNS-based PKI satisfies.
I don't see it as a 'need' in that sense. If you want to increase the level of trust over the current situation, you pretty much have to either exchange keying material directly with that party, or pick a third party that *you* trust to serve as an intermediary. It's really hard to have multiple intermediaries because you need to trust them all. And just because someone runs a TLD doesn't mean that you want to trust them - it often means you should be wary of them.
It really doesn't have much to do with DNS - the problem is that real trust doesn't scale to that level no matter what the naming scheme or the protocol.
Steve
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