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Frank Solensky <fsolensky at PREMONITIA.COM> writes: > Just posted on slashdot: a Bayesian approach to the problem that reports > to have rates of 0.5% on false positives and 0% false negative: > > http://www.paulgraham.com/spam.html The problem is that, naturally, the spammers will start running the tool over their spam before sending it and tweaking it until it passes. This has happened for previous techniques. As with system security and cryptosystems, you have to assume that the enemy knows what techniques you are using and will move to evade them. Not, of course, that I won't add this to my armamentarium for now. Anything to reduce the flood for as long as it will work. -- Perry E. Metzger perry at piermont.com -- "Ask not what your country can force other people to do for you..."
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