Re: Last call comments: draft-williams-on-channel-binding-01.txt: EAP channel bindings

[Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf at mit.edu>]

>>>>> "Nicolas" == Nicolas Williams <Nicolas.Williams at sun.com> writes:

    Nicolas> Also, I think my draft's definition of "end-point channel
    Nicolas> bidning" needs to be tightened just a bit: not only must
    Nicolas> the end-point IDs be cryptographically bound into the
    Nicolas> channel, it must also be the case that the IDs
    Nicolas> meaningfully identify the channel end-points -- that is,
    Nicolas> that one nodes cannot assert the same ID as another
    Nicolas> without sharing credentials with it.  I think my text
    Nicolas> implies this but does not make it sufficiently explicit.

Be careful.  A DN given a trust anchor seems like a find end-point
identifier.  However two nodes can share the same DN without sharing
the same credential.  Under 3280 rules either the CA issued a
certificate it should not have issued or the two nodes are the same
subject.  That's strong enough for the channel binding to be useful
even though the nodes may not share a credential.


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protocol as the
    Charles> EAP<->L2 binding.

The L2 secure association protocol cannot be an eap->anything binding:
it does not typically use EAP level identifiers.

    Charles> -- t. charles clancy, ph.d.  <> tcc at umd.edu <>
    Charles> www.cs.umd.edu/~clancy





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