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Well Rob, I think the community at large and the IESG in particular would welcome suggestions on what to do with this one.
Sorry Tim, can't agree with that assertion. At least some people seem to be content with handwaving, if the current Atompub spec is any indication of consensus.
In fact, we know what's going to happen:
There's no need for the future tense, since a reasonable number of implementations exist. Here's a python implementation of TLS 1.1:
http://pkgsrc.se/security/py-tlslite
It comes with a demo HTTP server. See how many clients can connect when you use the mandatory cipher from TLS 1.1, and credentials that contain things like Chinese characters, Euro symbols, and "smartquotes". On the plus side, you won't have any problems with authentication databases, because the credentials sent are reusable with any message and authentication scheme, at any time.
--
Robert Sayre
"I would have written a shorter letter, but I did not have the time."
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