Re: security review of draft-ietf-mip6-ha-switch-03.txt

[Brian Haley <brian.haley at hp.com>]

Hi Jari, Patrick,

Jari Arkko wrote:
> Thanks for your review, Patrick!
>
> Comments inline:
>
> > I expect that the biggest risk of telling a mobile agent to use a new home
> > agent 
> > is the threat of impersonation, i.e., moving home agents so as to insert a
> > woman-in-the-middle.
> > The document doesn't talk about this at all, only mentioning in the security
> > considerations that
> > a change agent command should be authenticated. 
> >   
>
> Yes. But the protocols used between mobile nodes and home agents
> require authentication and authorization of both sides to act in their
> roles. This applies even with the new home agent.
>
> Perhaps a statement about this for the security considerations
> section would be appropriate.

Sections 4.1 (sending) and 5.1 (receiving) do say that IPsec ESP is a 
MUST, is that not enough?  Maybe there's some confusion over whether 
this is the same SA used for Binding Updates/Acks?

> > General Comments:
> > - There are a bunch of places where something is defined/identified with no
> > obvious explanation.
> > For example, "section 7. Protocol Considerations", defines two timeout
> > values. I wonder how they 
> > came up with the values?
> >   
>
> Good question -- though I would expect any number to be
> merely guidance that may get changed with implementation
> and usage experience.

James Kempf originally came up with those values, but it was back in 
2005, so I'm not sure of the reasoning.  I think the goal was to just 
allow for 3 retries.

-Brian

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