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To be clear, I don't see that there are, in practice, problems with the current deployment practice. RFC 3118 was published several years ago, but deployment practice today uses other methods to mitigate the risk of DHCP server spoofing attacks. Similar words about recommending the use of RFC 3118 authentication have been included in other RFCs, but RFC 3118 remains undeployed (and, in fact, mostly unimplemented).
- Ralph On Dec 2, 2008, at Dec 2, 2008,3:53 PM, John C Klensin wrote:
--On Tuesday, 02 December, 2008 15:23 -0500 Ralph Droms <rdroms at cisco.com> wrote:Sam - I think most of the issues in your review of draft-raj-dhc-tftp-addr-option-04 can be resolved by reviewing the purposes of RFC 3942 and publishing Informational RFCs describing DHCP option codes. Fundamentally, the reason to publish RFCs under the process described in RFC 3942 is to document existing uses of option codes in the range of option codes reclaimed for assignment to new DHCP options. The concern is to avoid conflicts between new options and those grandfathered ("hijacked") option codes. As such, these RFCs (usually Informational) simply document the already ... Responding to some of your specific points:At the very least, I suggest mandating the use of DHCP Auth and removing the suggestion to use option 66 to enhance security. And, in the absence of a more data about how widely used this option is, I suggest not publishing this document at all.The consensus of the dhc WG, to which I concur, is to publish the document as Informational. The text in the Security Considerations section about option 66 might be removed. ... To reiterate, it's not so much a question of whether a new code point is needed; rather, according to the procedures described in RFC 3942, this document gives a description of an existing use of option code 150. That option code is in use ...Ralph, It seems to me that there is a middle ground here. One can stick with Informational publication as the WG intends, but still modify the Security Considerations section, not only to remove the reference to option 66 (if there is consensus that is appropriate) but to add some explanation about why the use of this option without authentication might be problematic. Put differently, your objection to Sam's suggestion seems to hinge on "just describe the existing practice, don't try to change it in this document". Given RFC 3492, that is entirely reasonable. But, if there are relatively obvious difficulties with that practice, it seems to me that documenting them would be helpful (indeed that not doing so borders on irresponsible). john
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