RE: Comments on draft-jinmei-ipv6-rfc2462bis-00.txt
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RE: Comments on draft-jinmei-ipv6-rfc2462bis-00.txt
> > Proposed resolution: write "MAY be disabled" instead.
>
> Um, I'd suggest that this by itself isn't really all that helpful. It
> might help to add some more explanatary text together with
> recommendations on what to do. E.g.,
>
> - should an implementation just configure the address and use it
> anyway? (I doubt this, as this implies we should just punt on DAD)
No, we clarified later that the implementation should disable the
address.
> - Assume there is a DOS attack, wait a while, and try again? (hoping
> the bad guy goes away in the meantime)
I would not specify that..
> - generate a new IID and try again? And if so, are there
> recommendations on what kind of ID? And if there is a DOS attack
> in progress, why would trying *any* address result in success?
Yes. The implementation may very well have access to several EUI-64, and
may try an alternative. Or, it may try to use a random address. The
persistence of DAD collision would indicate with quasi certainty a DOS
attack. Forcing the attacker to repeat the attack increases the chances
of detection.
> - Try generating a new address, but use exponential backoff in
> delaying after each failed attempt?
That is a variation of the above. It may be useful in some cases, e.g.
when turning of the interface briefly saves energy.
> - something else? (or some combination of the above?)
Maybe. There is no limit to creativity.
-- Christian Huitema
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