RE: Question for IPv6 w.g. on [Re: IPv6 Type 0 Routing Header issues]
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RE: Question for IPv6 w.g. on [Re: IPv6 Type 0 Routing Header issues]
I thought we already limited to 1 RH0 per packet, but I will have to go back and take a closer look.
As I said on V6ops, before you kill this off too quickly, James Woodyatt's proxy redirection is a perfect example of a valid use for Type 0 Routing Headers. He wants the firewall to redirect traffic through a designated point (what this header was designed to do), and the only hammer at his immediate disposal was IPv6/IPv6 nat. What I don't know is if the firewall can insert one that did not exist, because the source wouldn't know about his 'transparent' proxy.
It is certainly reasonable to have a BCP that says 'these should be filtered at policy boundaries unless there is a good reason to do otherwise', but they are a tool to solve some very specific corner cases. I would say that firewalls should drop these by default, but the rest of the system should recognize them as normal.
Tony
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Brian E Carpenter [mailto:brc at zurich.ibm.com]
> Sent: Thursday, April 26, 2007 3:17 AM
> To: IETF IPv6 Mailing List
> Subject: Re: Question for IPv6 w.g. on [Re: IPv6 Type 0 Routing Header
> issues]
>
> On 2007-04-26 02:39, Bob Hinden wrote:
> > [trimming this to just the IPv6 w.g.]
> >
> > We think the question for the IPv6 working group on this topic is does
> > the working group want to do anything to address the issues raised
> about
> > the Type 0 routing header. Possible actions include:
> >
> > 1) Deprecate all usage of RH0
> > 2) Recommend that RH0 support be off by default in hosts and routers
> > 3) Recommend that RH0 support be off by default in hosts
> > 4) Limit it's usage to one RH0 per IPv6 packet and limit the number
> of
> > addresses in one RH0.
>
> Excuse my ignorance, but have the following three rules ever been
> considered?
>
> 1. The list of addresses in an RH0 MUST NOT include the packet's source
> address.
> 2. The same address MUST NOT occur more than once in an RH0.
> 3. A node processing an RH0 MUST discard any packet breaking these two
> rules.
>
> I'd be interested in whether this would eliminate the various attacks.
>
> (I'm not really advocating this, since it is added complexity for
> a feature that we don't obviously need anyway. But if we don't deprecate
> it, all the other options seem to leave the threats in place.)
>
> Brian
>
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