Re: New Version Notification for draft-baker-ipv6-nd-session-hijack-00
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Re: New Version Notification for draft-baker-ipv6-nd-session-hijack-00



Maybe you can tell me otherwise, but while the neighbor would not be able to prove ownership, in an FCFS SAVI environment it seems likely that it could gain control of the address, the first guy having relinquished it.

I looked through RFC 3756, and it seemed to me that this was an additional case. Again willing to be told I'm wrong.

On Jul 28, 2009, at 1:53 PM, Erik Nordmark wrote:

Fred Baker wrote:

Filename:     draft-baker-ipv6-nd-session-hijack
Revision:     00
Title:         Session Hijack in Neighbor Discovery
Creation_date:     2009-07-28
WG ID:         Independent Submission
Number_of_pages: 5

Abstract:
This memo is to point out a security issue in IPv6 Neighbor
Discovery.

This is a subset of the issues specified in RFC 3756 'IPv6 Neighbor Discovery (ND) Trust Models and Threats'.

Your draft says that this is an issue with SeND. Can you clarify how this can happen with SeND?

  Erik


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