Re: [Isms] TBD secshell
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Re: [Isms] TBD secshell



--On Wednesday, January 28, 2009 06:44:50 PM -0500 David B Harrington <dbharrington at comcast.net> wrote:

That would seem correct.

Top-posting makes it really hard to understand what you are replying to.

- Section 5.1, we should say what the tmTransportAddress for incoming
messages looks on the SSH server side: it's "address:port" form (not
user at address:port).

Right.


- Section 5.1: we need a better description of how tmSecurityName
works on the SSH client side; IMHO the current behavior isn't quite
right: Suppose a command generator sends a command with
tmSecurityName="alice" and
destTransportAddress="ahopkins at router1.example.net:1234". An SSH
connection is opened and so on. When the command response is received,
the current text in Section 5.1 would lead to having
tmSecurityName="ahopkins" in the response -- a slightly unexpected
response.

As I understand it, the request and response don't carry tmSecurityName, which is information passed between the TM and the upper layers. The request carries a securityName, and if that is "alice" then the securityName in the response should also be "alice".

If a request is sent with securityName="alice" via an SSH transport using transport address "ahopkins at router1.example.net:1234", then what happens next depends on whether tsm or some other security model is used. At the receiver, tmSecurityName is going to be "ahopkins", derived from the SSH user name. If the security model in use is TSM, then TSM is going to look at that value, compare it to the securityName in the message, and reject the request because they do not match. So, there will never be a response. If the security model in use is _not_ TSM, then the value of tmSecurityName is irrelevant.


- Section 5.3, step 1: it would be *really* useful to add a note
that to authenticate the server, the client usually stores
(destTransportAddress, server host public key) pairs in
implementation-dependent manner.

That depends on the key exchange method. There's not always a host key involved, which is one of the reasons we declined to standardize this in detail. Certainly a client needs to know, given a transport address, how to verify that an ssh connection opened to that address is actually connected to the correct peer.

-- Jeff
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