Le 15/10/2013 10:33, Alexander Pinaev a écrit :
> CAN to wireless gateway is a gift which makes vulnerable CAN easily
> exploitable without a cable connection. Not sure if they are
> concerned if their system protected properly.

I have just noticed an early prototype in which the vehicle's
'username/password' (the vehicle is a 'user') communicated over CAN for
electrical charge billing would be relayed over the air - in clear.

This should be protected.

The protection - e.g. hashing the password - is known practice to those
inclined to security, but is additional hurdle to getting things done to
those inclined to early communications.

I think in the domain of vehicular communications we are at an early
stage where security expertise is very much needed.

Yours,

Alex

>
>
> On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 12:06 AM, Konstantin A. Khait
> <khait@componentality.com <mailto:khait@componentality.com>> wrote:
>
> No, no, no... I didn't mean that it is just an encryption issue. It
> is definitely strange that somebody simply propagates CAN to wireless
> communication area. Nobody took care of CAN security because it was
> designed as a wired bus for [in-particular] in-vehicle use. Moreover,
> it seems rather hard and expensive to make CAN secure, because
> encryption will affect the bus logic: either conflicts resolution
> approach or message priority. It seems to me, the old school design
> of such things assumes a gateway between wireless portion and CAN bus
> which proceeds wireless commands and issues CAN messages. The set of
> commands is limited by required functions, so there's no way to
> provoke random CAN message. In this case wireless channel should be
> secured with using regular pre-shared or more probable public key
> approach and in-vehicle CAN remains unsecured. What I meant, "old
> school design" is nothing if it is not an industry standard. It
> should be a common approach how to send functional data over the air
> and this standard must include a security method. So, it shall be
> like wireless MOST bus where each functional block has limited set of
> methods and properties predefined in the corresponded standard. MOST
> is unsecured (because it is again in-vehicle technology), but it is
> just an example. Wireless method should be based on something common
> (I'd say 802.11) and use corresponded security provisioning
> approaches.
>
> Thanks, Kostia
>
> -----
>
>
>
> ----- Konstantin A. Khait Componentality Oy Tel: +358(0)465662016
> +7(921)9005780 Skype: kostia.khait E-Mail: khait@componentality.com
> <mailto:khait@componentality.com> 53100 Finland Ratakatu 47
> Lappeenranta
>
>
>> The issue is not what encryption technology is used -- that's a
>> discussion in the small. В What is at issue is the scope of the
>> encryption. В
>
>
>> If the CAN is encrypted ... is the data protected in the radio
>> network? В
>
>
>> The important objective is to secure the _data_ and to secure it
>> end-to-end. В Rendering the most important security attributes
>
>> (authenticity and confidentiality) irrelevant to whether the
>> passengers can touch it. В
>
>
>> What the internet does, that none of the wannabes do, is provide
>> end-to-end reliability over an infrastructure that we acknowledge
>> to be less than perfect. В That's what all the ACK/NAC, packet
>> numbering and the three-way handshake in TCP is about. В  What we
>> have not done (at
>
>> least not here) is apply the same principles to security -- we
>> need end-to-end security over an infrastructure that we acknowledge
>> is less than perfect. В
>
>
>
>
>> On Mon, 2013-10-14 at 12:15 +0400, Konstantin A. Khait wrote:
>>> Hm... It is yet another reason why custom "...-based" protocols
>>> are evil [in automotive]. IEEE1609 assumes elliptic encription,
>>> which is very hard to attack (basically even harder than AES).
>>> But according to what we see, nobody in automotive really
>>> concerns about security.
>>>
>>>
>>> -----
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ----- Konstantin A. Khait Componentality Oy Tel:
>>> +358(0)465662016 В  В  В  В +7(921)9005780
>
>>> Skype: kostia.khait E-Mail:khait@componentality.com
>>> <mailto:khait@componentality.com> 53100 Finland Ratakatu 47
>>> Lappeenranta
>>>
>>>
>>>> This "Shuttle bus with J1939 air-conditioning" connects an
>>>> insecure CAN network with (typically at least) little security
>>>> to the wider Internet: "Via a wireless communication based on
>>>> the J1939 protocol, the individual HVAC systems are supervised
>>>> by the climate control center in the operator’s office." В В
>>>> The J1939 CAN-bus is exposed
>>> near
>>>> passengers on the shuttle-bus. В В В В Looks like a rolling
>>>> security
>
>>>> problem to me!
>>>
>>>>
>>> http://can-newsletter.org/engineering/applications/nr_shuttle-bus-with-j1939-air-conditioning_thermoking_131008/
>
>>>
>>
>>> В
>
>>> _______________________________________________ its mailing list
>>> its@ietf.org <mailto:its@ietf.org>
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/its
>>>
>
>
>> _______________________________________________ its mailing list
>> its@ietf.org <mailto:its@ietf.org>
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/its
>
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________ its mailing list
> its@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/its
>