Re: [keyassure] Bootstrapping Dane Adoption

Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com> Wed, 16 February 2011 19:34 UTC

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Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2011 14:34:43 -0500
From: Andrew Sullivan <ajs@shinkuro.com>
To: keyassure@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [keyassure] Bootstrapping Dane Adoption
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On Wed, Feb 16, 2011 at 11:50:15AM -0500, Richard L. Barnes wrote:
> 
> The corresponding process for DANE would just change X.509 to
> DNSSEC: Clients would have an additional DNSSEC TA (i.e., in
> addition to the root), so that the proxy could assert trust chains
> that bind keys under its control to names that clients are
> interested in.
> 
> I wasn't kidding when I said that proxies would need to MitM the DNS
> traffic as well :)

You're suggesting that the client uses an intermediate resolver for
which it has a TA configured.  The intermediate resolver, when
responding to {all|some class of} queries, intercepts the answers,
creates new RRSIGs and DS records and so on, and synthesizes those as
part of the answer returned to the client?  I guess if you reproduce
the whole chain of trust all the way down, it could work.  I'd want to
work through it completely.  But do I have the idea right?

A

-- 
Andrew Sullivan
ajs@shinkuro.com
Shinkuro, Inc.