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Peter Saint-Andre wrote:XMPP ROUTER / | \ CM CM CM \ | / LOAD BALANCER / | \ C C C
The problem is that a client doesn't know which CM it has connected to (e.g., cm6.example.com), since that information is hidden by the load balancer in the middle (all clients appear to be connected to the IP address of the load balancer). For non-Kerberos deployments that doesn't matter, but it does matter for Kerberos deployments since a client needs to know the address of its service.
I never liked hostbased service names ;-)
For "old-fashioned" 2-token Kerberos authentication (which is the authentication exchange currently covered by the official Kerberos 5 gssapi mechanisms (rfc-1964 and rfc-4121), the sharing of the server credentials is a problem. (session replay to servers sharing credentials but not sharing the replay cache).
If Kerberos user2user authentication is used (exclusively), such a vulnerability from sharing the server credentials does not exist. Microsoft has implemented the 3-token user2user authentication exchange in addition to the 2-token authentication exchange of the IETF-defined Kerberos 5 gssapi mechanism, it has already been available in Windows 2000.
The correct approach of using the 2-token exchange in a distributed environment was implemented by DCE many many years ago, but requires a secure directory, something not available in traditional Kerberos.
The most sensible and infrastructure-independent approach (i.e. independent of how load-balancing is done within the backend and where within the backend the secure communication is terminated) for traditional Kerberos authentication would be to standardize the user2user authentication exchange and use that (no use of _hostbased_ service names).
Today, this option is only available if you go proprietary (or implementation-specific).
Peter
-- Peter Saint-Andre XMPP Standards Foundation http://www.xmpp.org/xsf/people/stpeter.shtml
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