Re: KITTEN: IETF 75 - 76
[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

Re: KITTEN: IETF 75 - 76



17 aug 2009 kl. 10:26 skrev Nicolas Williams:

Acceptors with creds for multiple principals have little choice but to
use GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL and check the resulting security context to see if the acceptor principal (and mech, and, if we ever add it, QoP policy) is acceptable to the app. That's lame. I'd rather be able to acquire a
CREDENTIAL HANDLE for all the principals I'm willing to accept sec
contexts for and then use that.

The GSS-API concept of CREDENTIAL HANDLEs is a set of credentials for
the same principal, but different mechanisms. Changing this to allow it
to be a set of credentials for any {mechanism, principal} seems...
difficult, but perhaps fun anyways.

I don't care about this now, its not a problem I ever run in to.

In fact, I mostly run into the problem that app developer specify a credential handle, and for that reason the application doesn't work with aliases and other mechs that the app author though about.

Love



Note: Messages sent to this list are the opinions of the senders and do not imply endorsement by the IETF.