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[MMUSIC] Re: [Sipping] Review of draft-saito-mmusic-sdp-ike



To delegate authentication to a CA in IKE, you need a certificate
whose subjectAltName matches something that makes sense -- such
as being the hostname or username or friendly name.  This is what
we're trying to avoid.

IKE and IPsec don't make any particular demands on the relationship between the certificate and the authenticated identifier, just on what goes in the IKE ID payload. To quote RFC 4301:
"
This document does not require that the IKE ID asserted by a peer be
syntactically related to a specific field in an end entity
certificate that is employed to authenticate the identity of that
peer.
"


However, you will need to define what identifier gets put in the IKE ID field, since that's the identifier that gets used for IPsec authorization. So if you define which identifiers to use, the certificate can be whatever you want (subject to policy) -- provided that you work out the issues with self-signed certs I mentioned before.

Yes, I don't see any reason to keep IKE active after the SIP BYE.

On the other hand, I don't know if you should necessarily throw the IKE SA away after the SIP BYE. There are reasons to keep IKE SAs around for some time, namely that it saves a Diffie-Hellman computation from the next setup (in IKEv2; there are other, different savings in IKEv1). It's reminiscent of credential caching used by other protocols.


I guess you need to clarify what the SDP in the SIP transaction is describing: The IKE negotiation, the IKE SA, the IPsec SA, or some combination of the above. If it's just the IKE packets that you're worried about, you could send the BYE after I think 6 IKE packets and let the SAs carry on. If you're worried about the BYE tearing down whatever NAT magic you've done, then you'll need to postpone it until the IPsec SA is done. Perhaps instead of saying "tear down the IPsec stuff when you see a BYE", you should say "don't send a BYE until you're done doing IPsec".

--Richard


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