[Mobopts] Re: [Mipshop] RE: Review of draft-vidya-mipshop-handover-keys-aaa -00.txt

["James Kempf" <Kempf at docomolabs-usa.com>]

> I am confused by this. The L3 handover key I am referring to is the shared
secret between MN and AR. If we extended an EAP method to derive this key,
when the EAP authenticator is not the same as the AR, we have some issues in
getting the key to the AR without breaking some of the Housley criteria. It
is not that we need a new key as a result of a new L2 auth method, but it is
the process of deriving a key with the next AR may now need to be different,
due to the
>

Suppose that the AAA server pushes the key directly to the AR using some
protocol. That means the AAA server and the AR need to share an end-to-end
security association, that the key must be encrypted in transit, and only
the AR can decrypt.

Now, suppose that, instead of routing the key directly to the AR, it is
routed through the NAS instead. If the key is end-to-end encrypted, how does
that violate the Housley critera? The NAS is acting like a proxy AAA server
and doesn't ever get to look at the key.

Am I missing something?

            jak



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