RE: [Nea] IETF67 NEA WG Meeting summary

["Darryl \(Dassa\) Lynch" <dassa at dhs.org>]

Keith Moore wrote:
<snip>
>> regarding NEA: what I might be okay with is giving
>> authorized third-parties yes or no assurance that the host
>> meets or does not meet their policies, without giving them
>> fine-grained detail about what is installed on the host.  so
>> the owner of a host could get details about why a host did
>> or did not fit within a particular network's policy, but the
>> network (if owned by another party than the owner of the host) could
>> only get yes or no information.   I would like to see this option
>> examined further. 

I don't imagine this is totally out there although I can see it may require
some careful consideration with respect to how the attributes may follow
this and still be useful and provide enough information for judgements to be
made.

An example I can imagine is where a NEA enabled node attempts to connect and
is requested to provide information on the current anti-virus status.  A yes
or no answer can only be given where the policy is known and then a
comparison made at the node to determine if the policy is met or not.  This
shifts the onus of providing additional information to the network and away
from the node which exposes some information that may be gleened for refined
attack vectors.

My personal choice is to limit the amount of information exposed by the
network and leave the onus on the node to provide more as they are the ones
requesting access.

If the attributes are defined carefully it should be possible to reach a
reasonable compromise.

Darryl (Dassa) Lynch 


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