Re: [Nea] IETF67 NEA WG Meeting summary

["Mike Fratto" <mfratto at gmail.com>]

> regarding NEA: what I might be okay with is giving authorized
> third-parties yes or no assurance that the host meets or does not meet
> their policies, without giving them fine-grained detail about what is
> installed on the host.  so the owner of a host could get details about
> why a host did or did not fit within a particular network's policy, but
> the network (if owned by another party than the owner of the host) could
> only get yes or no information.   I would like to see this option
> examined further.

Nothing is gained here regarding privacy. A validation server could
glean what is installed by asking a series of questions and inferring
the response. for example:

Q: do you have software A, B, or C?
A: No
Q: do you have software D?
A: Yes

Ergo, host has software D.

And if your so concerned about privacy, the network operator has a
right to keep thier policies private so as not to give potential
attackers specific knowlege about thier protective measures.

I think a reasonable solution is one that Steve offered in the other
thread where (to summarize), the endpoint, including the user, and the
network agree on what will be shared during an assessment and then the
network bases an access control decision on that assessment.
Therefore, people with privacy concerns don't expose information and
the network operator enforces local policy.

Does that mean there may be cases where endpoints aren't allowed
access? Sure does, but privacy, like access, has it's price.

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