Re: [Netconf] notification access control

[Martin Bjorklund <mbj at tail-f.com>]

Andy Bierman <andy at netconfcentral.com> wrote:
> The all-or-nothing approach actually helps hackers.
> If there is no filter, then any dropped notification
> would stick out like a red flag, since it must have
> contained some sensitive data. (This works just
> by watching the traffic with wireshark, without
> actually being able to read any of the packets.)

How would a hacker know that a notification was *not* sent by watching
the traffic?

I don't care that much if the entire notif is dropped, or some element
is pruned, but the current spec is pretty clear - the notification
MUST be dropped.  So a 5277 compliant server cannot prune
elements from the notifications.


/martin