[OAUTH-WG] OAuth 1.0 PLAINTEXT without SSL/TLS

Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com> Sat, 09 January 2010 02:15 UTC

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From: Eran Hammer-Lahav <eran@hueniverse.com>
To: "OAuth WG (oauth@ietf.org)" <oauth@ietf.org>, "oauth@googlegroups.com" <oauth@googlegroups.com>
Date: Fri, 08 Jan 2010 19:15:21 -0700
Thread-Topic: OAuth 1.0 PLAINTEXT without SSL/TLS
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth 1.0 PLAINTEXT without SSL/TLS
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I no longer think there is a valid reason why the OAuth 1.0 specification does not mandate using a secure channel with PLAINTEXT, and I would like to make this change from SHOULD to MUST in the RFC draft [1].

Is there anyone using OAuth PLAINTEXT *not* over TLS/SSL? Is there a *good* reason why the 1.0 specification should not mandate using a secure channel for PLAINTEXT? If someone really wants to use it without, it's a free country but I can't think of any reason.

The only reason not to make the change is if there are existing deployed use cases where PLAINTEXT is used in such a way. If there are none after two years, we should not allow it moving forward.

EHL

[1] http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hammer-oauth