![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
You're right, it does depend on the deployment as well as the raw message processing power of the node running PANA. Perhaps a warning, coupled with a SHOULD, is sufficient. I'm afraid that a MAY could get looked over too quickly.Here are the comments related to rate limiting.
MAY? It seems to me that SHOULD would be better (if not MUST) for anyThe PAA MAY limit the rate it processes incoming PANA-Client-Initiation messages.
message that is subject to DOS attacks.
Would we also need to define parameters for the rate limiting? I think
that'd be difficult, as it really depends on the deployments.
Well, the problem is that a sender of a PANA-ping that considers a node dead after just a few unresponsive pings coupled with a PANA-ping responder that is rate-limiting, could lead to false-positives for a down link. At a minimum, please point this out.I'm a little worried about lack of detail here as PANA-ping used forImplementations MUST limit the rate of performing this test. The PaC and the PAA can handle rate limitation on their own, they do not have to perform any coordination with each other. There is no negotiation of timers for this purpose. Additionally, an implementation MAY rate-limit processing the incoming PANA-Ping-Requests.
liveness detection coupled with an aggressive rate-limiting policy could
be problematic.
Any specific suggestions?
"certain threshold value" simply leaves one guessing. If there is a variable being defined here, or if you are referring to one of the existing PCI values, point that out along with whether or not it should be configurable as in section 9. If the certain threshold here is part of generic rate-limiting which is being left unspecified, say so.
The PaC and PAA MUST respond to duplicate requests as long as theWhat is the "certain threshold value"? Is it a certain number of packets
responding rate does not exceed a certain threshold value.
over a period of time? Something else? I don't think an implementor has
enough information here. Please fully describe, include defaults and a
recommendation as to whether it should be configurable or not (in
section 9, if you like).
Are there any guidelines from existing protocols that we can borrow? What is
the best way to get rate limiting factored into the protocol?
The warning definitely needs to be there, along with which are "hot-spots" for attack. I think there is room at least to normalize the discussion of it in the text (e.g., no references to undefined "certain thresholds", rather a mention that the message may be subject to rate-limiting with a reference to a place in the document where this is discussed in more detail). As for whether you can define real parameters, I agree that this is a difficult thing to do, and perhaps best left up to an implementation to handle the best way it knows how.
I'm starting to think rate limiting is not for the protocol specification to
talk about. It is a safe guard that implementations can utilize on their
own. Maybe we should remove all mentions of rate limiting from the spec.
Comments?
Alper
_______________________________________________ Pana mailing list Pana at ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pana