[pkix] Token Provisioning versus Certificate Enrollment

Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren@telia.com> Thu, 25 August 2011 20:04 UTC

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Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2011 22:05:17 +0200
From: Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren@telia.com>
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Subject: [pkix] Token Provisioning versus Certificate Enrollment
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With a hope to shed some light regarding enrollment protocols the following may be of some interest.

KeyGen2 is /_not_/ a Certificate Enrollment protocol; /it is a Token (cryptographic module) Provisioning protocol/.

Unlike Certificate Enrollment which essentially only requires a request-response pair where the response (certificate) can be securely derived to request, /Token Provisioning usually needs additional
steps /_before_/and _after_ the core message exchange as well/.

Also in contrast to Certificate Enrollment protocols, /Token Provisioning _always_ targets a specific token container/.
If /_secure_/ Token Provisioning is to be performed by remote users over the Internet, /E2ES (end-to-end-security) _must be enforced_, and preferably throughout the _entire_ process/.

Since E2ES cannot be /abstracted/, a prerequisite is that /the issuer and token _speak the same language_/.
This obviously thickens the plot considerably unless you also standardize the token (/with respect to provisioning NB/), which was the sole motivation behind KeyGen2's alter ago, the SKS.

KeyGen2/SKS in similarity to GlobalPlatform relies on a very light-weight security mechanism based on session keys and a two-level client where the provisioning middleware does the /"heavy lifting"/
and handle /user interactions/, while /the token _exclusively_ deals with low-level E2ES-centric operations/.

Token Provisioning in browsers is currently entirely based on /third-party proprietary and mostly secret "plugins"/.

Anders Rundgren
http://webpki.org/auth-token-4-the-cloud.html